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1. Introduction of the dissertation
1.1 Functions of strategic procurement and current busi-
ness environment
This dissertation focuses on procurement. Procurement is a critical
activity of the production process supporting the mission of a firm in 3
principal ways. (1) First, procurement ensures the firm’s product avail-
ability, through enabling production continuity. For this, a sufficient
amount of components with the right specificities has to be available
at the right moment to prevent production stoppages and consequent
missed sales. The well-known example of Ericsson illustrates that a per-
sisting disruption of supply can result in dramatic consequences for the
buying firm. We consider that product availability also encompasses
flexibility (to respond to demand changes, for example), as this requires
supply to be available at the right moment. (2) Procurement also plays
a major role in making a firm’s final product cost competitive by trying
to complete the previous function at the lowest cost possible. Since pro-
curement costs often account for more than half of a product total cost,
procurement clearly has a critical impact on the bottom line of a firm.
(3) In addition to those two historical missions, procurement is increas-
ingly expected to bring added-value into a firm’s finished good. For this
reason, procurement does not only belong to the supply chain, but also
to the value development chain, as illustrated on Figure 1. More specif-
ically, procurement has to select the right suppliers to source durably
external expertise that would ensure the firm’s product quality, relia-
bility, innovation, etc... Notably, the quality and the reliability of the
product would greatly depend on the components procured that com-
pose the product. Introducing poor quality components into a product
can oblige a firm to take costly corrective actions, such as recalling prod-
ucts (like in the case of Toyota cars because of Takata airbags exploding
unexpectedly), in addition to damaging the brand image. With the same
logic, procurement has also some responsibility in the innovation process
to secure not only present, but also future market shares.
To fulfill those three functions, the procurement activity constantly
needs to adapt to the business environment in which it takes place, which
is nowadays characterized by an extremely intense competition. Factors
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like globalization, improved transportation and information technologies
have strengthened competition through allowing firms to target any cus-
tomer in the world, hence turning local markets into global ones such
that only the most competitive firms can subsist. On the other hand,
those factors have also offered buying firms an easy access to virtually
any supplier on the planet, including the most efficient ones. This has
motivated firms to increasingly outsource components that a supplier
can do better or cheaper, and focus their resources on their own core
competencies (Gottfredson et al, 2005), rather than using old-fashioned
vertically integrated structures. Beyond components procurement, more
capabilities and functions that were historically managed by the firm
itself are now devoted to suppliers, making the procurement division
bearing a greater responsibility for the activities of the firm, and no-
tably for the end-product differentiation. As an illustration, a survey
from Accenture (2015) emphasizes that some firms expect their suppli-
ers to use their expertise to lead the innovation process. Therefore, while
outsourcing provides some expertise and cost benefits, notably, it also
broadens the scope of action of procurement, as it requires additional
supplier investigation, selection and integration. Moreover, it further
complicates the procurement role by multiplying the supply (and devel-
opment) chain linkages and by reducing the control that a firm has on
each of these linkages (as compared to vertically integrated structures).
The current business environment further affects the procurement role
along (notably) three directions. First, the emergence and the develop-
ment of China, India and other Asian countries as unavoidable low-cost
production hubs resulted in more spread supply chains and longer lead
times, which limit supply chain agility. Second, the lean philosophy
has strongly influenced procurement practices by reducing redundancy
in inventories, in suppliers and in capacity, resulting in both more effi-
cient and more exposed (to disruption risk) supply chains. Third, events
like geopolitical conflicts, social unrests or natural disasters occur more
frequently than in the past, and often have important macroeconomic
consequences, such that the prevailing global uncertainty is higher than
it has ever been.
In conclusion, the environment is characterized nowadays by more
competition, more complex supply chains, less ability to absorb shocks,
higher risk of disruptive events and higher expectations for procurement.
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Figure 1: The enterprise development and supply chain (Simchi-Levi et
al., 1999).
In such context, procurement managers are more challenged than ever
to obtain continuous supply with the right requirements and at a com-
petitive price. However there are many procurement levers that they
can utilize to cope with this situation (e.g. supply diversification, sup-
plier development, procurement auctions, etc...). While some of these
levers could be complementary, some others would not be. The role of
the procurement is therefore to decide which levers to activate, and how
to activate these consistently with each others, in order to define a pro-
curement strategy that would address the three procurement functions
in supporting the firm’s mission. In particular, because each category
of item procured has its own requirements, it also deserves a specific
strategy. Following this, we observe in practice an ever widening gap
between operational suppliers, managed in a procedural manner, and
key suppliers, which become an extension of the firm (Accenture, 2015).
In conclusion, more is required from the procurement activity in a more
demanding environment. To turn this threat into an opportunity, pro-
curement has shifted from an operational activity to a strategic activity.
Our thesis attempts to provide guidance on how to strategically man-
age some procurement levers as a mean to derive comparative advan-
tages. To better visualize how the thesis contributes to the vast literature
in procurement, we first identify the current trends in the procurement
levers (as well as their strategic implications) enabling firms to organize
their supply and value development chains such that they can develop
comparative advantages in the prevailing environment. For this, we re-
view in the next subsection the procurement literature and present the
11
Figure 2: Framework of the main procurement strategic levers investi-
gated in the recent OM literature.
main levers according to the procurement function that they principally
support. We summarize this literature in a framework depicted in Fig-
ure 2. This framework is then used to position our different chapters in
the current literature. Note that the cost competitiveness function of
procurement is interrelated with the two other functions, as shown by
the double-sided arrows. This is because improving supply availability
and developing value often imply extra expenses and hence threaten the
cost competitiveness function of procurement. It follows that there is a
constant trade-off between the cost of a final product and its availability
or value.
1.2 Trends in procurement
Procurement levers related to product availability
We start describing the current trends in procurement by discussing
procurement levers that enable to manage product availability. Under
normal conditions, ensuring product availability for end customers is
not an issue, but as uncertainty keeps growing, it becomes increasingly
challenging. We first study the procurement levers enabling a firm to
12
tackle demand variability, and then present those that can be useful
under supply uncertainty. Finally, we examine offshore-procurement,
which is related to both demand and supply uncertainty. When a buyer
faces demand uncertainty for its product, it needs sufficient available
supply to adapt its production such that it can respond to these demand
variations. For this, the buyer can either maintain expensive inventories,
or somehow outsource this costly function to its suppliers. We designate
the various buyer’s options as inventory management, which is the
first procurement lever that we examine. The first option for a buyer
to be responsive to demand changes is to maintain sufficient inventory
levels. The supply chain costs incurred by inventories can be reduced
through vertical information sharing along the supply chain (Cachon and
Fisher, 2000). Especially, it has been largely documented that supply
chain participants sharing demand information can reduce the bullwhip
effect (Lee et al., 1997a, 1997b; Lee et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2000).
There is a vast literature on inventory decisions (see notably Williams
and Tokar (2008) for a review) and on the bullwhip effect. Given its
important size and since it is not directly related to our projects, we do
no further detail it.
Since more and more capabilities tend to be outsourced to the supply
base, buyers often prefer to limit their own inventories and rely on their
suppliers to either maintain inventories, or to be sufficiently reactive by
disposing of enough capacity. The latter option enables to substitute
the buyer’s inventory risk into a supplier’s capacity risk, which can be
achieved through a pull (rather than a push) contract (Li and Scheller-
Wolf, 2011). However, if the buyer maintains low levels of inventory but
depends on its suppliers’ capacity, it has to motivate supplier invest-
ments in capacity. Before the supplier makes its capacity investment
decision, the buyer has an incentive to inflate its demand forecast to
ensure sufficient supplier’s investments in capacity, which results in the
supplier considering the buyer’s forecast as non credible. Incentivizing
sufficient capacity investments from the supplier through a credible de-
mand forecasts signal can be achieved by the buyer through adequate
contracts (Cachon and Lariviere, 2001; Tomlin, 2003; O¨zer and Wei,
2006; Taylor and Plambeck, 2007a, 2007b) or through building trust
between agents (O¨zer et al., 2011). Sharing capacity investments with
the suppliers is another possibility for the buyer to motivate suppliers’
13
investments in capacity, even though it can be inefficient if resulting in
capacity over-investments from the suppliers (Hu et al., 2017). Rather
than using the full capacity of a single supplier, a buyer can also use
several sources for a specific component, in order to increase the over-
all capacity of its supply base (Burke et al., 2007; Feng, 2012; Gao et
al., 2017). To deal with demand variability and preserve supply chain
responsiveness, the buyer can finally rely on suppliers’ inventory levels.
In that case, suppliers’ inventory levels influence the supplier selection
(Jin and Ryan ,2012), as well as the buyer’s order size decision (Craig
et al., 2016; Jain et al., 2017).
The greater exposure of supply chains to supply disruptions, in par-
allel with the greater risk of occurrence of a disruptive event, has resulted
in abundant research dealing with procurement levers aiming at manag-
ing the uncertainty arising from the supply side, which we regroup under
supply risk management. Supply risk can result either from firm-
specific uncertainty or from systemic uncertainty (i.e. the uncertainty
is out of the control of the firm and threatens many firms). While the
first chapter of this dissertation widely discusses the procurement strate-
gies enhancing supply chain resilience to systemic disruptions, it is less
focused on firm-specific risk, for which we therefore provide complemen-
tary references. Recent investigations on supply risk notably include
inventory decisions adjusted to cope with unreliable suppliers (Dada
et al., 2007), buyer’s long-term commitment with a disruption prone
supplier (Swinney and Netessine, 2009; Gao, 2015), buyer’s subsidy de-
cision while taking into account the supplier financial health specific
situation (Wei et al., 2013; Babich, 2010) and procurement decisions
when the buyer and the supplier have asymmetric information about
the risks of disruption (Chen, 2014). From a different perspective, Hen-
dricks and Singhal (2014) empirically investigate three types of causes
for supply-demand mismatch (i.e. production disruption, excess inven-
tory and product introduction delays) which can affect equity volatility.
Further information on supply risk management can be obtained in the
following literature reviews: Tang (2006), Sohdi et al. (2012) and Snyder
et al. (2012).
We next document another procurement lever related to supply risk
management, namely Supply diversification. This has catalyzed re-
cently more attention in the literature than any other subject related to
14
supply risk. Supply diversification actually supposes that a buying firm
does not source all its supply (for a specific component) from the same
supplier, in order to spread the supply risk over two or multiple suppli-
ers. The main benefit of a diversification strategy is thus to incorporate
supply risk considerations in the procurement order decision, rather than
simply focusing on cost. This trade-off between procurement cost and
supply risk has been examined in many different contexts, including
buyer learning about the yield of an unreliable supplier from their past
experiences (Tomlin, 2009), supplier unreliability (Federgruen and Yang,
2009; Li et al., 2013), correlated suppliers random yields (Tang and Kou-
velis, 2011), buyer’s preference ordering constraints based on non-price
attributes (Honhon et al., 2012), asymmetric suppliers in fixed and vari-
able costs (Zhang et al., 2012), supplier private information about its
own disruption probability (Yang et al., 2012), correlation across two
substitutable resources that are disruption prone (Sting and Huchzer-
meier, 2014), risk of complete disruption threatening only some of the
potential suppliers (Hu and Kostamis, 2015) and suppliers asymmetric
reliability (Li et al., 2017). However, it is critical, for a buyer diversify-
ing its supply, to have visibility on its direct suppliers’ supply network,
in order to avoid overlap or interdependence among lower tiers sup-
pliers, which could erase the diversification benefits (Ang et al., 2017;
Chen and Guo, 2014; Choi and Krause, 2006). Interestingly, some au-
thors have also compared the supply diversification benefits with those
of other supply risk mitigation strategies, such as supplier investments
in capacity restoration (Hu et al., 2013) and buyer’s direct (subsidy) or
indirect (inflated order) investments in its preferred supplier reliability
(Tang et al., 2014), while others have examined the interactions, when
used simultaneously, between diversification and the two other main mit-
igations strategies: excess capacities and safety stocks (Chaturvedi and
Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz, 2016).
Finally, offshore procurement is related to both demand uncer-
tainty and supply uncertainty. Whereas the low labor costs of some
Asian countries, like China, have for long justified to source from over-
seas suppliers, the difference in these labor costs between China and the
US have significantly reduced over time (George et al., 2014), such that
firms pay a greater attention to the disadvantages from offshore pur-
chasing in managing their global sourcing. In addition to several supply
15
risks (e.g. increased risk of disruption or quality), the main disadvan-
tage of offshore procurement, largely documented in the literature, is the
loss in supply chain responsiveness (or flexibility) to demand changes,
notably because of longer distances between supply chain participants.
Offshore procurement is therefore not necessarily detrimental to supply
availability, but rather to supply flexibility. To counterbalance this lack
of flexibility underlying offshore procurement, higher inventory levels
can be maintained, even though this would erode the cost benefits from
this strategy (Jain et al., 2014). A diversification strategy could then
be attractive, in order to balance the cost benefits from offshore pro-
curement and the supply chain responsiveness from local procurement.
Boute and Van Mieghem (2015) compare single-sourcing and diversifica-
tion strategies when the buyer disposes of a responsive local supplier and
a cheap offshore supplier, while considering the implications in terms of
procurement cost, flexibility and inventories. Other authors focus on
rather similar situations, but focusing on specific factors, such as supply
yield uncertainty (Kouvelis and Li, 2013), suppliers with limited capac-
ities (Tan et al., 2016), short life-cycle products (Calvo and Mart´ınez-
de-Albe´niz, 2016) or costless returns (Janakiraman and Seshadri, 2017).
Peng et al. (2012), Kouvelis and Tang (2012), Wu and Zhang (2014),
as well as in Gong et al. (2014) have also contributed to this literature.
Most of the research dealing with offshore procurement uses the example
of US firms sourcing from China. It is well known that with the labor
costs rising in China, US firms have largely considered reshoring jobs
back home, as studied by Chen and Hu (2017), or nearshoring these in a
close country as Mexico (Allon and Van Mieghem, 2010). The latter op-
tion represents a great compromise between cost and flexibility. The risk
related to supply quality in offshore countries has also been advanced
to motivate reshoring (or nearshoring), as in Gray et al. (2011) or in
Ancarani et al. (2015).
Procurement levers related to product cost competitiveness
Other procurement levers aim at improving a product cost competi-
tiveness. A first dimension on which a buyer can play to make procure-
ment costs savings resides in fully exploiting its bargaining power with
its supply base. This can be achieved by multi-division firms through
centralizing and coordinating their procurement activity (Balakrishnan
and Natarajan, 2014). On the contrary, abusively outsourcing might
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lower a buyer’s bargaining power, as it decreases the volume ordered
and hence the leverage on some suppliers (Ellram and Billington, 2001;
Kayis¸ et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2012). Rather than optimizing its bar-
gaining power, the buyer can rather concentrate on limiting its suppliers’
bargaining power through adequate contracts (Feng and Lu, 2012, 2013).
The outcome of a bargaining process can also be affected by situational
factors, including repeated buyer-supplier interactions in a context of
dynamic negotiations (Martinez-de´-Alben´ız and Simchi-Levi, 2013) or
the possibility for complementary suppliers to form negotiation alliances
(Nagarajan and Bassok, 2008). We finally mention Lovejoy (2010), who
examines supply chain efficiency and profitability when bargaining oc-
curs at different echelons of the supply chain.
Another procurement lever that can be actioned is the appeal to in-
termediaries. First, as further discussed in Chapter 3, firms can utilize
group purchasing organizations (Nagarajan et al., 2010) or join buying
groups (Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005) to obtain more attractive financial
conditions from their suppliers through benefiting from the higher bar-
gaining power of the group of buyers, relatively to this of its individual
members. Sourcing intermediaries also become popular. These firms
carry out the complete sourcing function by selecting and managing a
base of suppliers, providing both transactional and informational ben-
efits (Belavina and Girotra, 2012). Sourcing intermediaries can reveal
being particularly useful to manage a network of low-cost international
suppliers (Adida et al., 2016). Intermediaries can also make the link
between a risk-averse retailer and a manufacturer, in order to offer risk-
reducing contracts to the retailer to incentivize this making efficient
order size decisions (Agrawal and Seshadri, 2000).
Procurement spendings can further be reduced by improving the
coordination among supply chain participants. A better coordination
is often achieved with adequate contracts (Cachon, 2003; Chiu et al.,
2011), notably under both supply and demand uncertainties (He and
Zhao, 2016), suppliers’ size asymmetry (O¨zer and Raz, 2011), supplier
and buyer’s profit targets (Deng and Yano, 2016), time or/and quantity
flexibility (Li and Kouvelis, 1999), revenue-sharing contracts (Cachon
and Lariviere, 2005), rebates (Taylor, 2002), quantity flexibility (Tsay,
1999), or with options (Barnes-Schuster et al., 2002). Typically, supply
chain coordination is facilitated by credible information sharing along
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the chain (Chen, 2003). The exchange of information can either be vol-
untary, as suppliers might be better off by sharing their own production
efficiency (Chen and Deng, 2015), or framed by a contract ensuring cred-
ible information sharing, from the supplier to the buyer (C¸akanyildirim
et al., 2012; Fang et al., 2014), or from the buyer to the supplier (Amorn-
petchkul et al., 2015; Tang and Girotra, 2017).
The next procurement lever that we consider derives procurement
savings through intensifying the competition across suppliers. As glob-
alization and communication technologies have respectively increased
the number of potential suppliers per component, and provided an im-
mediate access to each of these suppliers, procurement auctions have
rapidly become an extremely popular tool to enhance competition, es-
pecially for non-strategic and standardized items. The literature has
grown in parallel and is so broad that we simply discuss topics in auc-
tions related to some recent well-published papers (see Chapter 2 for
additional references on auctions). Initially, auctions were used as a
mechanism allowing buying firms to foster competition and to easily
discover the lowest-cost supplier. Through time, more complex types
of auctions have appeared and offer the auctioneer additional benefits,
such as providing the buyer with information about its potential suppli-
ers (pinker et al., 2003). Moreover, if well designed, auctions can also
incorporate non-price attributes in the selection criteria, like switching
cost (Santamar´ıa, 2015) or supplier reputation (Brosig-Koch and Hein-
rich, 2014), even though some non-price attributes remain difficult to be
captured by classical auctions. While relational contracts can be used
to deal with those non-price attributes (Tunca and Zenios, 2005), buyer-
determined auctions are also possible. In these auctions, the buyer can
freely select its preferred supplier after the bidding stage, with or without
having announced upfront the price and non-price attributes affecting
its decision (Stoll and Zo¨ttl, 2017). As mentioned earlier, supply risk has
become prevalent in the environment, which has resulted in procurement
practices incorporating such risk. Auctions have followed the trend, as
through a split-award auction, the buyer is further capable to balance
the benefits of both suppliers competition and diversification. For such
type of auctions, Bichler et al. (2015) and Chaturvedi et al. (2018)
compare the theoretical and experimental outcomes under different auc-
tion formats. Finally, the literature comprehends many works examining
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auctions under specific situations, like auctions with price visibility and
bidders quality (Haruvy and Katok, 2013), repeated auctions for com-
ponents bought in sequence (Jiang, 2015), auction with business rules
on the number of suppliers selected and on the amount procured from
each supplier (Gupta et al., 2015), or auctions (under specific auction
formats) with capacity constrained suppliers (Chaturvedi, 2015). In the
second chapter of this thesis, we analyze whether organizing more (or
less) frequent second-price auctions would enable a firm to balance the
benefits from both supplier competition and effort.
We then delve into the literature on supply chain financing meth-
ods, which enable to facilitate transactions along a supply chain and
hence to better coordinate it (Yang and Birge, 2013). Non-classical fi-
nancing methods are typically advantageous when firms are financially
constrained and have no access to usual means of financing, such as bank
credit. Notably, trade credit can be extended by suppliers to financially
constrained buyers as these suppliers are often better informed than fi-
nancial institutions about the buyers’ default risk (Biais and Gollier,
1997; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), or to help the buyer managing its de-
mand uncertainty (Cai et al., 2014). Trade credit offered by the supplier
to the buyer makes operational sense as the buyer might want to delay
payment in order to observe the quality of the supply upfront the pay-
ment. However, in practice, the situation is often reversed with small
suppliers being in need of credit to produce their supply for a bigger
buyer. In that case, a buyer can play the role of intermediary between
its supplier and a bank to negotiate a lower interest rate in favor of its
supplier (Tunca and Zhu, 2017), or the buyer might even directly extend
trade credit to its supplier (Tang et al., 2017). Depending on its risk
profile, the supplier might also use factoring, which implies the payment
of a premium to a third-party in exchange of this financing the sup-
ply production, as well endorsing the buyer’s risk associated (Klapper,
2006). It is however also largely observed that small and financially con-
strained suppliers extend trade credit to large buyers that do not need
it. While this could be due to the buyer’s bargaining power (Klapper et
al., 2012), or to suppliers’ desire to signal product quality (Long et al.,
1993), Peura et al. (2016) investigate whether the reason would not lie
in the impact of trade credit on horizontal competition among buyers.
Seifert et al. (2012) further provide a detailed literature review on trade
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credit motivations (from both sides). From a different perspective, but
also related to the interface between finance and procurement, Shunko
et al. (2014) investigate the tax optimization problem when sourcing
from multiple countries.
Procurement levers related to the value chain development
Through the outsourcing of multiple components and capabilities,
buying firms partially transfer the control that they have on the compo-
nents that constitute their products to their suppliers. This is an impor-
tant issue since it is notably through those components that a firm pro-
vides value to its customers. Numerous academicians have directed their
attention on the procurement levers that would compensate this loss of
control, and hence assure value to customers (through end-product qual-
ity, reliability and differentiation) on both the short term and the long
term. We summarize recent articles in four procurement levers based
on innovation, supply quality, buyer-supplier relationships, as well as on
green and responsible procurement, which are four drivers of value. We
begin by analyzing the interactions between the procurement activity
and the innovation process. Innovation is critical to create value and
secure market shares in the future, such that firms extensively outsourc-
ing from their suppliers should properly manage the collaboration with
these to promote innovation. This is especially important since decen-
tralized supply chains usually discourage investments in innovation, as
compared to centralized supply chains (Gupta and Loulou, 1998; Plam-
beck and Taylor, 2005). To overcome this, buying firms can, on the one
hand, motivate supplier investments in innovation through committing
early to the price of the end-product (Gilbert and Cvsa, 2003), through
favoring open technology (Hu et al., 2017), as well as through promoting
revenue-sharing contracts (Wang and Shin, 2015). On the other hand,
buyers might rather favor a collaborative approach with the suppliers
and integrate these early in new product development, which in addition
enables to reduce the cost and the time to launch the product on the
market (Ragatz et al., 2002; Petersen et al., 2003, 2005; Koufteros et al.,
2007; Fliess and Becker, 2006; Schiele, 2010; Henke and Zhang, 2010).
Outsourcing practices do not only threaten innovation, but also the
quality/reliability of the product sold to the end customers, since the
firm would have lower visibility and control over the components consti-
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tuting its product. The quality/reliability of the components are how-
ever an important driver of value. Therefore, the lower control that firms
might have on those components poses a certain number of challenges
in terms of supply quality management and requires buyers to work
closely with their suppliers, as a mean to avoid quality issues, which
is particularly important if a failure of one component could cause the
failure of other components (Agrawal et al., 2017). One strategic ap-
proach to avoid quality issues is reactive and consists in setting effective
supply quality verifications. Different control mechanisms have been ex-
amined in the recent literature, including suppliers voluntarily testing
their own product quality (Arya et al., 2014), warranty/penalty con-
tracts (Reyniers and Tapiero, 1995; Balachandran and Radhakrishnan,
2005) and non-contractual verifications (Baiman et al. 2010). Some
factors can also affect the effectiveness of such verifications, like rating
suppliers quality risks (Zhou and Johnson, 2014), appropriately defining
the timing of the controls (Handley and Gray, 2013), or yet adopting
collaborative or competing warranty contracts with suppliers (Dai et
al., 2012). Finally, because buyers are often putting pressure on their
suppliers to lower their price, these might be tempted to cut corners on
quality to remain cost competitive, which is known as product adulter-
ation. This other type of risk related to supply quality should also be
managed (Babich and Tang, 2010), which is possible through deferred
payment (Rui and Lai, 2015).
While suppliers and/or buyer’s supply quality checks provide more
confidence to the buyer in the quality of its supply, some defaults or
issues could appear through time and hence be difficult to detect im-
mediately. To limit this risk, supply quality can further be managed in
a more proactive manner (which does not prevent a buying firm from
further reactive verifications) through establishing close relationships
with suppliers, or even with suppliers’ suppliers (Agrawal et al., 2014).
By doing this, a buyer has more knowledge and visibility on its suppliers’
production standards. In addition, a buyer setting up close relationships
with its suppliers to master supply quality would be less likely to switch
of supplier regularly, as compared to a buyer having adversarial relation-
ships with its suppliers. As a consequence, suppliers in a close relation-
ship with a buyer would surely obtain buyer’s future business, as long as
they provide satisfactory supply quality, and hence would be motivated
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to make efforts in improving supply quality. Even though a close rela-
tionship is an efficient lever to maintain long-term quality and reliability
of external supply (and even innovation), it might not be beneficial in
any circumstances (Lambert et al., 1996). Namely, building close rela-
tionships can sometimes be difficult if the culture of the enterprise is not
adapted, as it has been largely documented through the comparison of
US and Japanese firms in their relationships with suppliers. Actually,
buyer involvement and greater attention to suppliers are necessary for
successful close relationships (Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995; Liker
and Choi, 2004). Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) complement this by
claiming that it is not only managerial inertia, but also opportunistic
behaviors that deter collaboration, despite the fact that it would coordi-
nate the supply chain. Buying firms committed into close buyer-supplier
relationships might still cooperate more closely with some suppliers by
investing in supplier development, which aims at enhancing suppliers’
performance and capabilities to meet the firms’ future needs (Hahn et
al., 1990; Krause, 1997; Krause and Ellram, 1997; Krause et al., 1998).
Finally, even closer collaboration between a buyer and a supplier can oc-
cur through supplier integration, which implies the combination of both
the buyer and the supplier’s resources. While it has mostly been stud-
ied in the context of new product development (see earlier discussion),
supplier integration can also be used to develop or improve processes
(Wagner, 2003). In Chapter 1, we study another potential effect for
the buyer of maintaining close buyer-supplier relationships. Namely, we
analyze whether such type of relationship would affect buyer’s resiliency
to systemic supply disruptions.
The literature has identified two major threats related to outsourc-
ing, as well as to procurement levers dealing with innovation, supply
quality and close relationships. (1) Investing time and efforts in a sup-
plier has to be done cautiously as idiosyncratic investments in suppliers
might not be transferable to another supplier in case of supplier switch
(Bensaou and Anderson, 1999; Kang et al., 2009). More importantly,
a buying firm making specific investments in a strategic supplier and
disclosing sensitive information to this supplier would absolutely want
to avoid that the resulting gains actually also benefit a competitor that
would procure from the same supplier, which is a phenomenon known as
spillover. Therefore the presence of shared suppliers in an industry di-
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rectly influences the organization of the innovation across this industry
or, at least, across some supply chains. Moreover, while it is sometimes
argued that spillovers benefit the pool of firms that share innovation,
in practice, it is observed that firms with superior knowledge lead the
innovation, such that only the firms with inferior knowledge benefit from
the spillovers. This phenomenon therefore reduces the cost of innova-
tion, but also discourages investments in innovation as it could be copied
by competitors (Knott et al., 2009). However, R&D spillovers can also
motivate the supplier in accepting to shift the R&D from the buyer to it-
self, since it can then value this investment nearby other buyers (Harhoff,
1996). There could further be other spillovers than those related to inno-
vation, such as spillovers from buyer’s investments in improving a shared
supplier’s reliability (Wang et al., 2014) or supply quality (Agrawal et
al., 2016). In order to protect idiosyncratic investments in a supplier
shared with rivals, buying firms can design exclusive capacity and first-
priority capacity contracts (Qi et al., 2015). These spillovers highlight
the importance for a buyer of the visibility that it has on its suppliers’
operations.
The other threat mentioned in the literature is (2) the loss of ex-
pertise and skills that would result from intensively relying on external
suppliers. This is notably the case for the innovation process, as manu-
facturing inspires future innovation, such that outsourcing the complete
manufacturing activity can reduce the future ability of a firm to differen-
tiate itself from the competition, and hence to secure long-term market
shares (Xiao and Gaimon, 2013). The loss of expertise could further
affect other functions related to procurement than innovation. Notably,
manufacturing offshoring has resulted in the loss of supply chain skills in
the UK, notably, such that many firms might not be able to bring man-
ufacturing jobs back home (Bailey and De Propris, 2014). The situation
could even be worse. While contract manufacturers allow OEMs to focus
on R&D, marketing or design, they also develop capabilities that might
enable them to finally compete with the OEMs on their end market (Ar-
runada and Vazquez, 2006). As an illustration, Lenovo, which initially
simply distributed IBM equipments in China, has finally engaged in a
joint-venture with IBM and sells PCs with the logo of Lenovo. A simi-
lar situation can occur with suppliers rather than distributors, as these
might learn by supplying (Alcacer and Oxley, 2014) and hence climb
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the value chain, finally competing for their initial buyer’s market shares
(Wan and Wu, 2017). From those two threats, it appears that developing
additional value from the supply base is critical for long-term profitabil-
ity, but protecting the value created and also ensuring the ability of the
firm to keep obtaining value in the future are as much important.
Finally, following the general trend, green and responsible pro-
curement is gaining momentum as it derives additional value for var-
ious reasons, including ethics (Carter and Jennings, 2004), cost reduc-
tions (Carter et al., 2000), regulations compliance (Appolloni et al.,
2014) or yet brand image (Huang et al., 2015; Plambeck and Taylor,
2015). For a buying firm, having in its end product a component (or
having a supplier) that would not respect social or environmental stan-
dards could result in its brand name being negatively impacted. This
justifies that we consider green and responsible procurement as a lever
for a buyer to reach a reliable product. Several options have already
been investigated to help achieving green and responsible procurement,
among which buyer’s commitment into a relationship with a supplier to
motivate its compliance to environmental requirements (Simpson et al.,
2007), collaboration with small firms rather than multinationals to favor
sustainability (Touboulic and Walker, 2015) and buyers’ willingness to
pay a premium for socially and environmentally responsible suppliers
(Guo et al., 2016). It is also intuitive that firms that desire to pro-
mote environmental procurement through reducing, recycling, reusing
and substituting materials in their supply chain would need to better
coordinate with the other participants of their supply chain (Carter and
Carter, 1998). We conclude this paragraph on green and responsible pro-
curement by referring the interested reader to literature reviews from
Srivastava (2007), Hassini et al. (2012), Hoejmose and Adrien-Kirby
(2012), Igarashi et al.(2013), as well as Appolloni et al. (2014).
Impact of uncertainty and information
In Figure 2, one can observe that uncertainty and information would
affect procurement in all of its functions. Actually, uncertainty is every-
where: at the demand side, at the supply side, at the competitors side,
in the environment. It goes far beyond the risk of supply disruption due
to either a firm-specific event or a more systemic event. Uncertainty
could arise from the ability of suppliers to innovate, from the outcome
24
of an auction, from a negotiation process, in the quality of the supply,
etc... Such uncertainty greatly complicates procurement decisions, but
it is also a source of comparative advantage for the firms that man-
age it better than their rivals. The information management comes in
parallel with the notion of uncertainty, since more information reduces
uncertainty and hence improves supply chain decisions. Therefore, it is
important for supply chain participants to disseminate the information
along the supply chain. However, it has to be done cleverly and cau-
tiously. While more information often results in a better coordination of
the supply chain (e.g. the bullwhip effect), it might also sometimes be
detrimental for one specific agent, like in group purchasing, as we show
in the third chapter of this thesis. It is therefore important to ensure
that each supply chain participant has the right incentives to disclose
the information that would make the supply chain more efficient.
Other procurement levers
Aside the procurement levers that we have presented in the previous
paragraphs, others have been mentioned in industry reports, which are
regularly released by consulting firms. These complement the theoretical
literature by presenting more operational challenges that procurement
managers face and will face in the near future. These challenges include
the implementation of cloud computing, real-time analytics, industrial
internet of things, cognitive systems, digital technologies, robotics, au-
tomation, as well coping with the labor costs increase in Asia (PWC,
2012; PWC, 2013; McKinsey, 2013; Ernst & Young, 2015; Ernst &
Young, 2016; Accenture, 2015; Deloitte, 2016; Deloitte, 2017). How-
ever, as the world changes faster than ever, and as procurement evolves
in parallel, it is more the ability of the procurement managers to strate-
gically adapt to the environment and to specific circumstances, rather
than a blind replication of successful procurement strategies, that would
enable a firm to durably develop comparative advantages through the
procurement activity.
1.3 Positioning and contribution of the dissertation
In the previous subsection, we have provided an overview of the main
procurement levers that a firm can use to fulfill the three principal func-
tions of the procurement activity. While some of these levers might be
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managed in a complementary manner (e.g. offshore procurement and
supply quality management), some others would rather be substitutes
(e.g. close buyer-supplier relationships and auctions). The role of pro-
curement is therefore to define (and implement) a strategy that would
consist in deciding the combination of levers that would best serve the
firm’s objectives, and the specific utilization of the selected levers (i.e.
the levers selected are contingent on how they can be utilized more
specifically).
The variety in the available levers and in their utilization indicates
that there is no recognized best practice in procurement, but rather that
each situation (at a firm-component level) deserves a particular strat-
egy. None of the papers cited actually attempts to determine which
combination of procurement levers should be favored. Rather, those pa-
pers analyze how to use particular levers strategically in order to better
support the firm in reaching a comparative advantage in supply avail-
ability, cost competitiveness and value development. This is also how
this dissertation contributes to the literature, as we provide guidance
on how to manage specific procurement levers in particular situations.
Through this, we document the additional value that could be obtained
from strategically using procurement levers, which could further influ-
ence the strategic selection of the procurement levers.
Specifically, the first chapter investigates how various supply chain
practices related to the buyer-supplier relationship influence the ability
of a buying firm to cope with supply disruptions resulting from a sys-
temic shock. Recovering faster to supply disruptions than the competi-
tion can be an important advantage. After a supply disruption provoked
by a fire at a Philips plant in Albuquerque, the faster reaction of Nokia,
as compared to its competitor Ericsson, to secure the remaining supply
from Philips has completely changed the dynamics of the competitive
power of those two firms. In Chapter 2, we show that contract length,
supplier idiosyncratic investments and supply base size interact together
such that decisions on contract length and supply base size should be
made consistently, in order to improve the product cost competitiveness.
In the third chapter, we analyze the potential of group purchasing to fur-
ther reduce production expenses, and thus increase cost competitiveness.
Namely, group purchasing enables buying firms jointly purchasing to ne-
gotiate down a lower purchasing price from their common supplier, but
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would meanwhile result inevitably in some sensitive information being
disclosed between the competing buyers. We therefore observe in which
situations the gains from a lower purchasing price outweigh the cost of
information leakage.
This dissertation covers the three categories of procurement levers
described in our framework. Specifically, Chapter 1 mixes topics arising
from supply availability and supply value development, whereas chapter
2 deals with both supply value development and supply cost competi-
tiveness. Finally, Chapter 3 focuses on procurement levers enabling cost
competitiveness. Before each of these chapters, we detail, in a foreword
section, how our research projects contribute to the literature on strate-
gic procurement in an increasingly competitive environment through
answering three questions:
(1) How is the research project positioned in our framework presenting
the procurement levers discussed in the recent literature?
(2) How does the research project deal with the current business en-
vironment?
(3) What is the strategic dimension of the research project?
The remainder of this dissertation is therefore organized in the fol-
lowing manner: we present each chapter preceded by a foreword subsec-
tion, before concluding and providing the references of this introduction.
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2. Chapter 1 - Buyer-supplier relationship and
resilience to supply disruptions
2.1 Foreword of Chapter 1
The first chapter of this dissertation is entitled “Buyer-supplier rela-
tionship and resilience to supply disruptions”, and it is a joint work with
Pr. A. Chaturvedi. It explores empirically buying firms’ resilience to
systemic supply disruptions, and attempts to determine whether this re-
silience depends on several specific supply chain practices related to the
buyer-supplier relationship (i.e. diversification, loyalty, contract length,
communication, coordination and financial pressure).
For those supply chain practices, buying firms can manage their sup-
pliers consistently with a close, or a weak, buyer-supplier relationship.
For example, diversifying supply, which would tend to be more consis-
tent with weaker buyer-supplier relationships, enabled Nissan to recover
faster from supply disruptions due to the 2011 Thai floods, as the firm
could switch its orders from disrupted suppliers to non-disrupted sup-
pliers. On the contrary, when Renesas was hit by the Japan quake of
2011, several Japanese car makers that had concentrated their purchase
with Renesas decided to send their own workers to fasten the recovery
of their supplier. Since those examples illustrate that both supply diver-
sification and concentration can be efficient to cope with supply chain
disruptions, it is unclear whether a firm that manages supply chain prac-
tices accordingly to a weak buyer-supplier relationship would be more
resilient to supply disruptions than a firm managing supply chain prac-
tices accordingly to a close buyer-supplier relationship. We tackle this
issue in this project.
29
Figure 3: Positioning of Chapter 1 according to the framework presented
in Figure 2.
Because this chapter deals with global supply chains resilience to
systemic supply disruptions, it is directly related to the product avail-
ability procurement function through the inventory management, the
supply risk management, the supply diversification and the offshore pro-
curement levers, as illustrated on Figure 3. However, in this chapter, we
attempt to explain supply chain resilience with supply chain practices
related to buyer-supplier relationships. Namely, we investigate whether
a lever related to value development (i.e. close relationships with sup-
pliers) could, although it is not its prime objective, be used as a lever
to improve product availability, or, on the contrary, whether it would
expose the buying firm to a greater supply risk, and hence reduce its
resilience to supply disruptions. We also define trade credit as an in-
dicator of the financial pressure that a buyer puts on its suppliers, in
order to study whether a buyer putting more financial pressure on its
suppliers (which is associated with weaker buyer-supplier relationships)
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would be more (or less) resilient to supply disruptions. However, this
chapter remains principally focused on product availability and value
development.
Since the present business context is characterized by both a higher
risk of a supply disruption (due to less control on more complex supply
chains and to increased instability) and higher consequences from supply
disruption (because of increased competition), examining supply chain
resilience to supply disruption is a natural manner of taking this context
into account. To cope with such challenging environment, it is critical
for buying firms select procurement levers that would integrate risk, in
addition to cost, considerations, such that they can better mitigate the
impact of a supply disruption and fasten their recovery. This is what we
investigate in this chapter.
More precisely, this chapter tackles the following strategic issue:
should a firm favor closer or weaker buyer-supplier relationships when
deciding how to manage some supply chain practices, in order to im-
prove the resilience of its supply chain? To provide an answer to this
question, we measure the impact of supply disruptions on buying firms’
shareholder value, and then we analyze whether this impact depends on
some specific supply chain practices. If supply disruptions significantly
affect buying firms’ shareholder value, and if some supply chain practices
are associated with a significantly higher resilience to such disruptions,
we would expect firms to incorporate supply chain resilience as a crite-
rion when deciding their procurement strategy on those specific supply
chain practices.
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Buyer-supplier relationship and
resilience to supply disruptions
G. Merckx • A. Chaturvedi
Global supply chains are nowadays more vulnerable than ever, and are
thus extremely challenged when a systemic shocks, like a major natural
disaster, occurs as it often provokes multiple supply disruptions. This
work first attempts to measure, through an event study, the impact of
supply disruptions following a systemic shock on affected firms’ equity.
Then, it analyzes whether specific supply chain practices related to the
buyer-supplier relationship (i.e. supplier diversification, loyalty, commit-
ment, communication, coordination and financial pressure) enable firms
to both mitigate better supply disruptions, as well as recover faster form
such disruptions. Our findings, based on a sample of 232 observations,
indicate that supply disruptions have a persistent negative impact on
affected firms’ equity up to 3 months after the shock. More precisely,
the cumulated impact of supply disruptions on firms’ equity is signifi-
cant over this period of time. With a subset of our complete sample,
we obtain in addition that the supply chain practices related to the
buyer-supplier relationship jointly explain firms’ ability to mitigate sup-
ply disruptions. In particular, we find that behaving consistently with
a strong buyer-supplier relationship, through putting less financial pres-
sure on suppliers, and behaving consistently with a weak buyer-supplier
relationship, through diversifying supply, having bigger inventories or
having less regular contacts with suppliers, favors mitigation. On the
other hand, it is less clear whether the supply chain practices influence
significantly the recovery from a supply disruption.
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2.2 Introduction and literature review
Over the last decades, supply chains vulnerability has increased along
two dimensions. On the one hand, supply chains are more likely to face
a supply disruption. Factors like globalization and outsourcing opportu-
nities have generated longer supply chains (both in terms of number of
linkages and distance between these), reducing firms’ visibility and con-
trol over their own supply chain, therefore resulting in a greater risk that
one of the linkages gets disrupted. This risk is moreover exacerbated by
global uncertainty, which has continuously grown as unexpected events
(e.g. strikes, natural disasters, terrorism...) occur at a faster rate than
ever (Coleman, 2006). On the other hand, the impact following a supply
disruption is likely to be higher than what it would have been in the past.
The influence of the lean philosophy has led buyers to drastically limit
redundant capacities and inventories, as well as to continuously reduce
their supply base size, to regularly reach no more than a single source
per component (Sheffi & Rice, 2005). Ford, for example, procures 98%
of its supply from a single source (Chen and Guo, 2014). A disruption
at a single linkage of the supply chain could therefore be sufficient to
cause production stoppages. In 2016, Volkswagen halted production at 6
plants in Germany because one of its suppliers, Prevent, stopped deliv-
eries of some iron parts and seat covers due to contracting disagreement
(Riddick, 2016).
Since both the risk and the impact of supply disruptions have in-
creased continuously in the recent years, it is not surprising that, in a
survey from PWC (2011), supply chain executives report supply dis-
ruptions from key suppliers as the greatest risk for their supply chain.
However, not only practitioners but also academicians have scrutinized
supply disruption risk. Some authors have attempted to measure the
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negative economic impact of supply disruptions on firm performance,
using either operating metrics like operating income, growth in cost,
growth in inventories (Singhal, 2005a), sales growth (Singhal, 2005a;
Todo et al., 2015; Carvalho et al., 2016), or, as we do in this project, the
change in shareholder value, i.e. the stock returns (Hendricks and Sing-
hal, 2003; Hendricks and Singhal, 2005b; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016;
Jacobs et al., 2017). Stock returns are regularly utilized to capture the
economic impact of various types of events since, from the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis (Malkiel and Fama, 1970), a firm’s stock returns reflect
at any moment all the relevant information about this firm. Therefore,
if a supply disruption has any impact on a firm profitability, it should be
incorporated in the stock returns at the time of the disruption. However,
the complete effect of a disruption is typically difficult to assess immedi-
ately after the disruption (Sheffi and Rice, 2005), such that information
about the impact of the disruption on buyer’s operations would be up-
dated regularly after the disruption. This is particularly true under a
systemic shock, like a natural disaster, which is likely to provoke mul-
tiple simultaneous supply disruptions. The stock returns would then
adapt in parallel with the information updates. Since stock returns are
available on a daily basis, unlike operating metrics, they are especially
convenient to quantify the effect of a supply disruption on a buyer over
time, and hence to determine how resilient are those firms’ to supply
disruptions, with resilience being defined as “the ability to bounce back
from a disruption” (Sheffi and Rice, 2005).
While it is intuitive that a firm’s supply chain structure could in-
fluence resilience to supply disruptions, it is not trivial which supply
chain practices drive resilience. Indeed, various supply chain practices
can improve supply chain resilience to disruptions. The theoretical liter-
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ature has largely documented the benefits for resilience of redundancy,
among others through excess inventories or supply diversification (Sheffi
and Rice, 2005; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). For example, Nissan re-
covered faster from the 2011 flooding in Thailand by having diversified
sources of supply (Haraguchi and Lall, 2014). However, other supply
chain practices like close collaboration (Christopher and Peck, 2004) or
supply chain visibility and joint problem solving (Kleindorfer and Saad,
2005) can also foster resilience, as shown by the following anecdotal evi-
dences. Several Japanese car makers could largely limit the impact of a
supply disruption, as they sent their own workers to resume operations
at the chips manufacturer Renesas, whose factory had been devastated
by the 2011 GEJE (Okazumi et al., 2015). A similar (and well-known)
story had happened with Toyota and its p-valves sole supplier Aisin Seiki
(Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 1998). Typically, such collaborative efforts are
easier with a smaller supply base, and are thus often not complementary
with supply diversification, which would be, as excess inventories, asso-
ciated with weaker buyer-supplier relationships, whereas supply chain
practices related to collaboration would often be associated with closer
buyer-supplier relationships. It is therefore unclear which supply chain
practices result in more resilient supply chains, and whether firms hav-
ing more resilient supply chains exhibit closer or weaker ties with their
suppliers.
In this paper, we look at two disruptive events in order to (1) measure
the impact of systemic disruptive events on shareholder value (i.e. by
capturing the abnormal returns after the events), and then to (2) explore
how specific supply chain practices affect these abnormal returns. More
precisely, we focus on the supply disruptions caused by the Great East
Japan Earthquake (GEJE) and the flooding in Thailand, which occurred
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respectively in March 2011 and in October 2011. These events have
been the costliest natural disasters for the past 10 years (Okazumi et al.,
2015), and, in addition to the tragic human losses, they caused countless
situations of supply disruptions, as Japan and Thailand concentrate
considerable manufacturing activities, especially in the automotive and
electronics industries. Notably, Todo et al. (2015) report that 90% of the
output loss in Japan related to the earthquake resulted from supply chain
disruptions, rather than from direct impact on production facilities, and
that one month after the earthquake, less than 10% of surveyed firms
could operate normally because of supply shortages. Although not as
well known as the GEJE, the Thai floods have also strongly affected
global supply chains, notably in Asia and in the US, as firms like Toyota,
Honda, Lenovo or yet Acer have reported related supply disruptions
(Ten Kate and Kim, 2011). From those events, we have built a sample of
232 observation of firms that suffered from the quake (142 observations)
and/or from the flooding (90 observations).
Leaning on those two natural disasters, we contribute to the litera-
ture in two ways. First, we characterize the impact that systemic shocks
have on firms whose supply base suffered from those events. We do this
by measuring the abnormal stock returns over months after the disasters
through an event study. Our analysis indicates that the natural disasters
can have both an immediate impact on stock returns (hereafter referred
to as initial impact) and a persistent impact, since buying firms’ stock
returns would adapt in parallel with the regular information updates on
the situation of the disrupted supply. Specifically, we find that buying
firms have their stock returns negatively affected by suppliers’ disrup-
tions up to about 3 calendar months after the event. Over that period,
the negative effect of the disruption is significant (at a 5% significance
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level), whereas such effect is not significant for shorter periods after the
event (notably because our sample exhibits cross-correlation). In addi-
tion, we derive a measure for the speed of recovery of buying firms that
have faced supply disruptions (this measure is referred hereafter to as
recovery).
Second, we note some variability across firms in their ability to miti-
gate the supply disruption, as well as to recover from it, and we attempt
to explain this intra-firms variability along 6 supply chain practices
(hereafter referred to as practices) related to the buyer-supplier rela-
tionship, i.e. supplier diversification, loyalty, commitment, communica-
tion, coordination and financial pressure. We evaluate these 6 practices
through a survey and a database, Capital IQ.1 Using the 46 responses
obtained from the survey, we regress the initial impact and the recovery
over the 6 practices. Our findings indicate that while these practices
have a significant joint effect on the mitigation of the disaster (1% sig-
nificance level), it is not as clear for the recovery. In particular, we
find that behaving consistently with a strong buyer-supplier relation-
ship, through putting less financial pressure on suppliers, and behaving
consistently with a weak buyer-supplier relationship, through (1) diver-
sifying supply, (2) having bigger inventories and (3) having less regular
contacts with suppliers, favors mitigation. We finally highlight hetero-
geneous stock markets reactions to the two natural disasters over the
first calendar month following the disaster. This seems to indicate that
investors have limited visibility on firms’ supply chain and hence would
make decisions based on subjective and incomplete beliefs.
Our paper belongs to the empirical literature on supply risk, which
1The first four practices are evaluated through the survey and the others from
Capital IQ.
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has already attempted to estimate the effect of supply disruptions on
shareholder value. Hendricks and Singhal (2005b) find that the share-
holder value is significantly and negatively affected over a 1-year horizon
after a disruption. While they analyze firm-specific disruptions, we con-
sider systemic supply disruptions that would put supply chains under an
extreme pressure. Focusing on the GEJE and considering many types of
firms (including insurance and nuclear firms), regardless whether they
have been hit directly (i.e. their own plants are impacted) or indirectly
(i.e. they face supply disruptions), Jacobs et al. (2017) find that al-
though the effect is significantly negative, supply chains were quite re-
silient to such an extreme shock (-3.73% in stock returns after 1 month).
In particular, the spillover effect of suppliers on buyers is negative and
significant (sample of 74 observations) over a 21-day period after the
event (-2.41%). We complement this work by gathering two heteroge-
neous systemic events together, from which we find that stock market
reaction can differ from one particular event to the other. Moreover,
unlike Jacobs et al. (2017), we try to determine the period of time over
which firms’ stock returns are affected by the events.
Other empirical papers do not only evaluate the impact of supply
disruptions on buying firms’ stock returns, but further study factors in-
fluencing supply chain resilience. Considering firm-specific supply chain
disruptions, Hendricks and Singhal (2003) find that larger firms and
firms with lower growth prospects are less affected by supply chain
glitches. Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) obtain that, when a natural dis-
aster occurs, having at least one supplier headquartered in the state
of the disaster2 negatively affects the buyer’s sales and stock returns.
The effect is even higher if the disrupted supplier is a specific supplier,
2They focus on US disasters.
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with supplier specificity depending on (1) how differentiated the sup-
plied product is, (2) the level of R&D of the supplier and (3) whether
the supplier holds patents. Whereas this paper has a similar objective
than ours, both the criteria to select sample firms and the factors af-
fecting resilience that we consider are different from theirs. We next
cite some papers that also investigate supply chain resilience, but using
other metrics than stock returns. Carvalho et al. (2016) observe how
production changes (i.e. sales growth rate) of firms in the disastered area
(based on the GEJE) impact the production changes of their customers
outside of the damaged area. With a sample mostly composed of small
firms, in contrast with our sample composed only of traded firms, they
find that having suppliers in the damaged area affects negatively but not
significantly the buying firm’s growth rate. In a similar context, Todo
et al. (2015) show that having more suppliers outside the damaged area
reduces the time needed to resume operations normally and to reach the
pre-quake sales growth level. Jain, Girotra and Netessine (2016) show
that supplier concentration and buyer’s loyalty to its suppliers fasten re-
covery. However, they consider disruption as supply-demand mismatch,
and recovery as percentage of expected demand that is actually sup-
plied, considering the disruption of the period and the spillover arising
from disruptions in the previous periods. This is rather distant from our
definition of a systemic disruption.
Finally, our work relates to the theoretical literature dealing with
practices impacting supply chain resilience. While we discuss in Sub-
section 2.4.1 the literature related to the supply chain practices whose
impact on resilience is studied in this paper, other supply chain practices
have also been considered to tackle supply risk. Notably, Tang (2006)
proposes mitigating actions (e.g. forming supply alliance networks, re-
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ducing lead time, developing recovery planning systems) to limit the
impact of a supply disruption. Other options also include analyzing fa-
cilities location (Snyder and Daskin, 2005) and sharing the cost of the
disruption with suppliers (Bakshi and Kleindorfer, 2009). In more spe-
cific situations, Wang et al. (2010) favor multi-sourcing over investing
in improving supplier reliability to ensure continuity of supply under
high heterogeneity of supplier reliability, whereas to cope with durable
supply disruptions, Tomlin (2006) advocates in favor of the utilization
of a reliable supplier rather than carrying excess inventories.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.3,
we calculate the impact of the natural disasters on buying firms’ stock
returns, whereas in Section 2.4 we investigate how this impact can be re-
lated to the buyer-supplier relationship. We finally draw our conclusions
in Section 4.8, right before the appendix.
2.3 Impact of systemic disruption on stock returns
In this section, we first detail how the sample has been built in
Subsection 2.3.1, before explaining the methodology used to analyze
the stock returns of the sample firms in Subsection 2.3.2. Then, in
Subsection 2.3.3, we analyze and discuss the effect that the GEJE and
the Thai floods have had on the sample firms’ stock returns. Finally, in
Subsection 2.3.4, we attempt to determine the duration of the effect of
the disruptive events, but this time focusing on the reserve prices, rather
than on the stock returns.
2.3.1 Sample selection
To perform a statistical analysis, we start by constituting a sam-
ple of firms that faced supply disruptions related to the Great East
Japan Earthquake (GEJE), which occurred on the 11th of March in 2011,
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and/or to the Thai floods of 2011 (industrial parks have been hit from
the 4th to the 20th of October in 2011). Since an event study analyzes
stock returns, we followed a systematic approach that consisted in con-
sidering all the firms traded over a period spanning from September 2010
(i.e. 6 months before the first disaster) to April 2012 (i.e. 6 months after
the second disaster) on either the NASDAQ, the NYSE, the AMEX or
the TSE. From these, we removed the firms without likely manufactur-
ing activities (e.g. insurance, services or financial firms), leaving us with
1013 candidate firms to enter our sample. We then determined which of
those firms suffered from supply shortages after at least one of the events,
by searching on Google for words like “supply disruption”, “shortage”,
“production halt”, “idle”, “missing”, “quake”, “floods”, etc... in articles
from periodicals (e.g. The Wall Street Journal, Reuters, The Financial
Times,...) and in the firms’ quarterly and annual reports. We found 142
firms whose supply base has been hit by the GEJE and 90 for the Thai
floods. Among these firms, 55 were hit by both of them, such that we
have a database of 232 observations for 177 different firms. Although we
suspect that many other firms have been impacted, we did not include in
the database firms for which we had no tangible information supporting
supply disruptions following the disasters.
2.3.2 Event study methodology
In this paper, we use the event study methodology to measure the
impact of supply disruptions, either due to the quake or to the floods, on
buying firms’ stock returns. Event studies were initially used in finance,
but have been applied for long in many other fields, such as marketing
or operations management. To conduct our statistical tests, we first
need, for each firm, to capture the part of the daily post-event stock
returns that can be attributed to the event, i.e. the (daily) abnormal
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returns (AR). Then, the daily abnormal returns would be aggregated
across firms (i.e. the average abnormal returns or the AAR) to deter-
mine whether the disruptive events have significant statistical effect on
a particular day after the event. As discussed in the introduction, after
a systemic shock, the effect of the disruption would reflect over time in
the stock returns, in parallel with the information flow that would be
disclosed (voluntarily or not) to the investors. In that case, the aver-
age abnormal returns would further be cumulated over multiple days to
becomre the cumulated average abnormal returns (CAAR). Because an
event study requires to be performed cautiously, we discuss in the next
paragraphs several practical points related to this methodology.
First, there are two main approaches to obtain the AR. One of these
calculates the AR as the difference between the observed returns of a
focal firm affected by an event and the observed returns of a portfolio
of firms that are similar (often in size and book-to-market ratio) to the
focal firm but that did not suffer from the event. This is known as the
portfolio method. Because for a systemic shock, many firms outside of
our sample would also have suffered from the event, this approach would
be likely to provide biased AR. Therefore, we only use it as a mean to
support our analysis of the abnormal stock returns obtained with the
other approach. This second approach derives the AR by comparing a
firm’s performance before and after the event. More precisely, we define
the estimation window, namely a period of time before the event that
is supposed to represent normal conditions, which we use to infer what
should be the performance of the firm after the event if there had been no
event. For this, we use the established Fama, French (1993) and Carhart
(1997) model, which states that stock returns are explained by 4 factors,
namely the market returns (RM), the size (SMB), the book-to-market
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ratio (HML) and the momentum (WML). Therefore, we regress in the
estimation window each sample firm’s observed stock returns R over the
4 factors (using daily data from Kenneth French’s website), through the
following equation:
Rit = αi+βi∗[RMt−RFt]+si∗SMBt+hi∗HMLt+wi∗WMLt+it+RFt,
(1)
where subscripts i and t respectively denote firm i and day t, it is
the error term and RF the risk-free return. We thus obtain firm i’s
coefficients αi, βi, si hi and wi, which determine how a firm i’s stock
returns react to the 4 factors under normal conditions. We then use
these coefficients and the 4-factor data for the period after the event
(i.e. the observation window) to derive, through Equation 1 again, what
should have been the returns after the event if there had been no event
(i.e. the normal returns). Then calculating the difference between the
observed returns and the normal returns after the event, we obtain the
(daily) AR, which thus measures the impact of a disruptive event.
Second, we need to define the date at which each of the events oc-
curred, in order to align both events around their respective event date.
In this way, AR would not be associated with a specific date anymore,
but would be recorded as the xth day after the disruptive event, hence
facilitating the aggregation of AR after different events. For the GEJE,
this is straightforward as it occurred on March 11th 2011, in the mid-
dle of a trading day, and could not have been anticipated. Regarding
the Thai floods, monsoon rains resulted in a first industrial park be-
ing flooded on October 4th 2011, before that other industrial parks were
flooded between the 5th and the 20th of October. However, the first park
flooded has served as a warning for investors such that stock markets
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could anticipate that further industrial parks might be flooded in the
next days. Moreover, investors might be aware of a firm’s exposure to
Thailand without necessarily knowing exactly in which park are located
all its suppliers, and would hence react anticipatively as soon as they
find out that supply chains in Thailand are affected or threatened. As
a consequence, October 4th 2011 would be day from which we expect to
observe a reaction of the markets resulting from the Thai floods. Be-
cause there is a significant drop on the US stock markets (not related to
the Thai floods) on the 3rd of October, fully compensated the day after
(the aggregate effect is zero), we take the 3rd of October as the first day
of Thai floods.
Third, the duration of the observation window musts also be decided
carefully. Indeed, because it is well acknowledged that any information
is immediately reflected in the stock returns (Malkiel and Fama, 1970),
event studies were initially designed to analyze AR over a very short pe-
riod. However, it has been shown through longer-term event studies that
some events can have persistent effects. Hendricks and Singhal (2005b)
find that after a firm-specific supply disruption, the 1-year CAAR are
significantly negative. Following them, we might be tempted to consider
such a long observation window. However, this would not be without
posing a certain number of challenges (see Kothari and Warner, 1997 and
2007). Notably, long observation windows increase the risk that other
macroeconomic events get incorporated in the observation window and
bias the analysis (especially when the events considered are aligned in
calendar-time, which is our case). Specifically, our study happens in
2011 in a volatile context, notably because of the European debt crisis,
and we observe two stock market movements around 4 months after both
the quake and the floods. As a consequence, we limit our analysis to 4
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months after the event. Over that period, most of the firms would have
resumed full operations, and the complete effect of the disruptive events
on the firms’ supply chain would have had evaluated and reported to the
investors (if it ever is). Over the 4 months following the event, we make
three measurements: (1) the initial impact, which we measure as the 1-
month CAAR. This leaves some time for the market to absorb informa-
tion and make a first assessment of the impact of the supply disruptions
on the buying firm’s supply chain; (2) the duration of the impact, which
we measure as the time during which negative abnormal returns keep
accumulating; and (3) the recovery, which is calculated as the difference
between the mean AAR over the month from which negative abnormal
stock returns stop to accumulate, and the mean abnormal returns over
the duration of the impact (i.e. the previous measure). Thus, this third
measurement depends on the previous one.
Fourth, the length of the estimation window must also be appropri-
ately chosen. While a long estimation window might not be represen-
tative of the situation of the firm at the moment of the event, a short
estimation window might be strongly influenced by the usual volatility of
the stock returns. As a compromise, We have chosen a 6-calendar-month
estimation window, resulting in about 120 trading days to estimate the
firm-specific coefficients from Equation 1. Because the Thai floods oc-
cur only 7 months after the GEJE, the period before the floods is the
aftermath of the quake, and therefore is unlikely to be representative of
usual business conditions. We thus consider the same estimation window
for both the events, which is the period of 6 months before the GEJE.
The volatility index (VIX) suggests that, over that period, the business
environment was normal since the volatility was reasonable.
Fifth, to compute statistical tests, we need to estimate the vari-
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ance of the CAAR, which requires to take two precautions. On the
one hand, systemic disruptive events are likely to provoke an increase
in the post-event variance, such that measuring the variance from the
estimation window might underestimate the true variance, leading to
an over-rejection of the null hypothesis assuming no AR. Therefore, we
calculate the variance from the event window, as suggested by Campbell
et al. (1997). Actually, we performed our statistical analysis with both
the variance calculated from the event window and from the estimation
window, and our findings do not change significantly, suggesting that
the difference of variance before and after the event is limited.3 For the
sake of conciseness, we present in this paper the results with the vari-
ance of the CAAR obtained from the event window. On the other hand,
because our sample observations are clustered in calendar-time and in
industry (the events that we consider have principally disrupted auto-
motive and electronics supply chains), our abnormal returns are likely to
exhibit some cross-correlation, also resulting in underestimating the true
variance. We take this into account through the procedure proposed by
Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010), which inflate the variance of the CAAR
by a factor depending on the level of cross-correlation in the sample.
2.3.3 Analysis of the stock returns
Considering the practical decisions discussed in the previous subsec-
tion, we use the 4-factor model to calculate the firms’ daily AR, from
which we obtain the daily AAR across firms and then the CAAR when
cumulating the AAR over multiple days. We then test the null hypoth-
esis H0 : CAAR = 0 against the alternative hypothesis Ha : CAAR < 0
through computing a Student t-statistics t = CAARσˆ . This standard pro-
3To be even more certain of this conclusion, one might want to use a GARCH
model, which would calculate the variance of the CAAR as a function of the previous
error terms.
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cedure, described more in details notably in Campbell et al. (1997),
enables us to analyze first the initial impact, namely the CAAR of our
complete sample after 1 calendar month (hereafter, we also use trading
days, with one calendar month being equivalent to 20 trading days).
We find that supply disruptions following systemic shocks result in an
initial impact of −0.17% (i.e the average decrease in stock returns over
a 20-trading-day period), which is not significantly negative. We then
observe that the CAAR decrease up to 3 calendar months after the
disasters (see the left plot of Figure 4). At that time, the CAAR are
−10.36%, which is significant (at a 5% significance level). As mentioned
earlier, our sample firms’ AR exhibit some cross-correlation as it is clus-
tered both in calendar-time and in industries. Since even a small amount
of cross-correlation has a strong impact on statistical tests (Kolari and
Pynno¨nen, 2010), obtaining significant abnormal returns is not straight-
forward, despite that we consider highly disruptive events. The left plot
of Figure 4 illustrates that negative CAAR are observed almost from the
day of the event, up to 3 calendar months after, but the right plot shows
that these negative CAAR are significant only for periods of time of
about 60 days after the event. With this finding, we show that systemic
supply disruptions have a persistent negative impact on stock returns,
which implies that a buying firm should take supply chain resilience
into account when deciding its procurement strategy. In Section 2.4, we
attempt to determine specifically which supply chain practices would
result in a better supply chain resilience for a buying firm, in order to
provide guidelines on how firms can manage their procurement strategy
such that they would strengthen their resilience to potential systemic
supply disruptions.
Because we consider two different events and firms traded either on
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Figure 4: Behavior of our sample (left) cumulated average abnormal
returns (in %) and (right) related t-statistics over trading days following
the supply disruption.
US or on Japanese stock markets, our sample is actually composed of 4
subsamples, as illustrated on Figure 5. To gain deeper understanding in
our results on the initial impact, we observe individually those subsam-
ples. The two events actually reveal different realities. As the quake was
largely advertised, we observe an immediate (over)reaction in the days
following the disaster, and a correction in the days after. While this im-
mediate reaction was negative (on average) for the Japanese firms, it was
actually positive (on average) for the US firms. The investors assumed
that most of the Japanese firms would be strongly affected by the quake,
which would benefit their US competitors (our sample contains US and
Japanese firms from similar industries). After this immediate reaction,
both Japanese and US firms observe negative abnormal returns up to
60 days after the event (see Table 1 for detailed CAAR of subsamples).
The different immediate reactions of the stock market about US and
Japanese firms confirm that considering 20 trading days for the initial
impact is relevant. For shorter periods, the stock market reaction would
probably not be representative of the ability of supply chains to mitigate
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Figure 5: Behavior of our sample cumulated average abnormal returns
(in %) after GEJE (left) and Thai floods (right).
Full sample Quake - Japan Quake - US
1 month −0.17% −5.58% −3.60%
3 months −10.36% −10.69% −14.25%
Flooding - Japan Flooding - US Updated sample
1 month 5.65% 7.47% −1.45%
3 months −5.07% −8.33% −11.49%
Table 1: CAAR for the complete sample and for subsamples, after both
1 and 3 calendar month(s).
the effect of the systemic shock.
In contrast with the quake, the floods have not reflected immediately
in the stock returns of firms whose supply base has been disrupted as
can be seen on Figure 5 (right). The reason for this could be that the
Thai floods have been less publicized, and thus that their impact on
supply chains got absorbed by the market less rapidly. Actually, at
the moment of the floods, there seems to be an increasing trend in the
sample firms’ stock returns, which continues up to about 20 days after
the Thai floods. After this length of time, the CAAR start decreasing
up to about 60 days after the event, as for the quake. Figure 5 illustrates
these observations.
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The analysis of the initial impact across subsamples suggests that
different natural disasters can result in heterogeneous stock market re-
actions. As we investigate how buying firms’ stock returns vary when
proper suppliers get disrupted, these firms might only be affected several
days after the event if they have mitigation strategies, such as excess in-
ventories, enabling them to keep operating normally for some days. The
immediate reaction of the stock markets would thus be anticipative, and
hence would not always depict accurately the current state of the sup-
ply. We advance two reasons that can justify why the stock market
anticipative reaction would differ across disasters. First, because stock
market reactions are often emotional, the stock returns right after the
events might depend on how spectacular and publicized these are. In
our case, the GEJE, which has been extremely documented, would have
resulted in an over-reaction on the short-term, while the Thai floods,
less covered in the press, would have resulted in an under-reaction. Be-
cause buying firms affected by supply shortages would not reveal rapidly
that they face supply disruptions following an event, or might voluntar-
ily understate the impact, an under-reaction could be corrected some
time later. Second, as investors might not always be aware of the true
exposure of firms to some geographic locations, their anticipation of the
disruption impact on a buying firm’s supply chain might be biased. For
the GEJE, it was rather clear that most of the Japanese firms would be
affected, whereas the extent of supply chains exposure to Thailand was
less intuitive.
Next, we define our measure for recovery based on the previous find-
ings. Namely, as we have shown that the complete effect of the supply
disruptions is realized over 3 calendar months after the event (see the
right plot of Figure 4), recovery is calculated as the mean AAR over the
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first month from which negative AAR stop accumulating (i.e. month 4
after the disruption), less the mean AAR over the 3 months right after
the disruption.4 Recovery therefore measures the slope of the recovery
of firms that faced supply disruptions, which is positive (see Figure 4).
We perform a paired samples t-test and find that the recovery is signif-
icantly greater than 0 (at a 1% significance level). This supports our
observation that buying firms’ stock returns stop being affected after,
on average, a 3-month period following a systemic disruptive event. The
objective of this measure is however to quantify the recovery such that
we can, in the next section, study whether specific supply chain practices
improve recovery after supply chain disruptions.
To support our results from the 4-factor model, we also compute the
abnormal returns using the portfolio method as discussed earlier. As the
portfolios used with this method would also include firms that have faced
supply disruptions or other damages from the disasters (notably our
sample firms as we use predetermined portfolios available on Kenneth
French’s website), this method would underestimate the magnitude of
the AR. However, it enables to see whether stock market movements due
to other macroeconomic factors than the event that we consider might
explain the negative AR that we observe. The portfolio method supports
the 4-factor model for all subsamples but the one with the Japanese firms
having suffered from the Thai floods. According to the portfolio method,
our subsample composed of Japanese firms affected by the thai floods
has exhibited slightly greater returns than portfolio firms. Therefore,
we suspect that other elements could have affected the Japanese firms
that faced supply shortages after the Thai floods, and hence we do not
4Note that to measure the impact of the disruptive events on the firms’ stock
returns, it is more intuitive to use cumulated AAR, while to interpret the regressions,
it makes more sense to use mean AAR.
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consider these firms for the analysis of the next section. The updated
sample (i.e. the whole sample less the Japanese firms having suffered
from the floods) still has 192 observations and exhibits −1.45% of CAAR
after 1 month (not significant) and −11.49% after 3 months (significant).
Note that the abnormal stock returns for the US firms after the GEJE
with the portfolio method take a bit more time to decrease (around 40
days). Hence, we can not be completely certain that the decrease is
not driven by other factors. However, we have seen for the Thai floods
that the effect would not necessarily be felt immediately. Moreover,
the competitive effect, favorable to US firms could have contributed to
make the AR decreasing later. Ideally, we would thus consider a sample
without the US firms having suffered from the GEJE, as it might bring
noise into the regressions that we present in the next section. However,
this would result in a smaller sample for the regressions, which would
also be detrimental to our study. Thus we keep the updated sample, but
also provide aside analysis for the sample with only US firms affected
by the Thai floods and Japanese firms affected by the GEJE.
2.3.4 Duration of the impact of the events
To test the results that we obtain from the analysis of the abnormal
returns, we perform another study of the duration of the effect of the
disruptive events. Rather than focusing on stock returns, as in the
previous subsections, we lean on the stock prices to observe how much
time the firms facing systemic supply disruptions need to recover from
the disruption. More specifically, disruptive events often have a direct
negative impact on stock prices, as we observe with the GEJE (see
previous analysis). Thus, we calculate the time that happened between
the drop in the sample firms’ stock prices following an event and the
moment at which the stock prices reach back their pre-event level. To
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cope with the day-to-day volatility of the stock prices, we measure the
pre-event stock price as the mean of the last five trading days, and the
post-event daily stock prices as a five-days moving average. As we know
that macro events occurred four months after each event, we use this four
months after the event as the upper bound of our analysis. Therefore,
firms that did not recover their pre-event stock price after four months
were considered as having recovered after four months.
This method confirms the heterogeneous reactions of the stock mar-
ket after the GEJE and the floods, since the mean number of trading
days to recover is 47 for the GEJE and 10 for the floods. From the stock
returns analysis, we know that the impact of the floods have taken more
time to materialize than the impact of the GEJE, and thus this dura-
tion analysis might not work correctly for the Thai floods (see the right
plot of Figure 5). Therefore, our focus for this duration analysis is on the
GEJE. As shown on Figure 6, the Japanese firms have been affected
longer by the GEJE than the US firms. On average, the former have
needed 67 trading days (i.e. more than three calendar months) to return
to their pre-event stock prices, while the latter only needed 34 days (i.e.
less than two calendar months). Namely, the analysis of the duration
from the stock prices suggests that Japanese firms have taken more time
to fully recover from the GEJE than the US firms, on average. This
is intuitive as Japanese firms are likely to be more dependent upon the
area directly affected by the quake than the US firms.
Analyzing the duration of the effect of the GEJE from the stock
returns and from the stock prices are two different analysis. When we
study the stock returns, we define the recovery as the moment from
which the stock returns are not lower than usual. On the other hand,
when we observe the stock prices, we define the recovery as the mo-
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Figure 6: Number of trading days between the GEJE and the moment
at which the firms returned to their pre-event stock prices. The left plot
depicts the distribution of the Japanese firms and the right plot depicts
the distribution of the US firms.
ment at which the negative impact of the quake has been totally offset.
Moreover, as we have an upper bound on the duration four months after
the event, our average duration from the stock prices is necessarily un-
derestimated. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the average duration
obtained from the stock prices (as well as Figure 6) with the results from
the left plot of Figure 5.
2.4 Buyer-supplier relationship and resiliency
In the previous section, we have derived measures for the initial im-
pact and the recovery. While so far we have studied those measures at an
aggregated level, our second objective is to investigate whether the vari-
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ability that we would observe across firms (for both measures) could be
explained by specific supply chain practices related to the buyer-supplier
relationship. Specifically, we attempt to determine whether managing
those practices consistently with a strong or a weak buyer-supplier re-
lationship would have a significant effect on supply chain resilience to
systemic shocks. To tackle this research objective, we present in sub-
section 2.4.1 our hypothesis dealing with the impact of various supply
chain practices on supply chain resilience. Then, we present in Subsec-
tion 2.4.2 the result from a survey sent to our sample firms, which aims
at measuring how firms manage those specific practices. Leaning on this
survey, we test our hypothesis through regressions in Subsection 2.4.3.
2.4.1 Hypothesis
The 6 supply chain practices related to the buyer-supplier relation-
ship that we treat in this project are (1) supplier diversification, (2)
loyalty, (3) commitment, (4) communication, (5) coordination and (6)
financial pressure. Since we want to determine whether those supply
chain practices affect the initial impact and/or the recovery, we provide
a hypothesis about the effect of each practice on both the initial impact
of the disruption and the recovery.
Supplier diversification: The more suppliers a buyer relies on
per component, the better it mitigates the impact of a supply
disruption (H1a), and the slower it recovers from a supply
disruption (H1b).
While globalization and transportation efficiency motivated firms to
outsource more activities to external suppliers (Sheffi, 2001), lean man-
agement practices have led buying firms to continuously reduce their
supply base size, to regularly reach no more than a single source per
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component (Sheffi & Rice, 2005). With a rising global uncertainty, re-
lying on many single sources is extremely risky (Christopher and Peck,
2004, Craighead et al., 2007), such that many firms are reversing and
use a redundant supplier to cope with this uncertainty (Chopra and
Sodhi, 2004). Since redundancy offers a shock absorber (Chongvilaivan,
2012), a buyer sourcing a component from multiple suppliers would be
less affected by the disruption of one of its suppliers than if its single-
source supplier is disrupted (Rice, 2003). Diversification, in addition
to mitigate the impact of a disruption, might also ease recovery since
inducing competition among suppliers generates investments from the
suppliers to fasten the recovery to a potential disruption (Jain, Girotra
and Netessine, 2016).
Although having back up suppliers dilutes the risk associated with
specific suppliers, some firms voluntarily keep single-sourcing. The story
with Aisin Seiki and Toyota testimonies that focusing on single sources
is not necessarily detrimental in terms of resiliency, as a smaller sup-
ply base favors collaborative efforts improving resilience (Wang, Gilland
and Tomlin, 2010). Indeed, a buyer single sourcing would buy greater
volumes from its supplier than if it was multi sourcing, and hence has
greater leverage over this supplier, notably to require managerial and
technical expertise sharing from the supplier (Dowlatshahi, 1998), to
cooperate in organizing the recovery (Larson and Kulchitsky, 1998) or
to secure the remaining supply after a disruption (Jain, Girotra and
Netessine, 2016). Finally, Christopher and Peck (2004) point out that a
buyer using a single source with no short-term alternative would ascer-
tain to be prepared to respond to a supply disruption.
On the shorter term, we expect that relying on more suppliers would
limit the impact of a supply disruption, whereas having close suppliers
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willing to collaborate for their buyer would ease recovery on the longer
term.
Loyalty: The longer the buyer has been working with its
suppliers, the better it mitigates a supply disruption (H2a),
and the faster it recovers from a supply disruption (H2b).
Buyers’ loyalty to their suppliers favors resilience in two ways. On
the one hand, it would make suppliers more willing to collaborate with
the buyer if this faces a supply disruption. This is because long-term
relationships require idiosyncratic investments, offer an advantage to
the supplier (over other potential suppliers) for this particular buyer’s
business (Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995) and foster commitment in the
relationship (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). It would thus be costlier for
suppliers committed to long-term relationships with a buyer if this had
to be disrupted, motivating such historic suppliers to collaborate for the
buyer’s rapid recovery, or to secure the remaining capacity if they are re-
sponsible for their buyer’s disruption. On the other hand, loyalty results
in more efficient collaboration, as long-term cooperation enables a buyer
and its suppliers to develop problem-solving capabilities (Nisiguchi and
Beaudet, 1998), efficiency in the information exchange (Prajogo and Ol-
hager, 2011) and trust (Dyer and Chu, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997).
In addition, loyalty would also improve the buyer’s knowledge of its sup-
pliers’ operations and networks, an therefore the supply chain resilience
(Christopher and Peck, 2004). However, Anderson and Jap (2005) point
out that old relations often deteriorate and must be monitored to avoid
supplier complacency. Similarly, a buyer that has been working for long
with the same suppliers might be less flexible to switch frequently of
suppliers and to qualify new suppliers. Todo et al. (2015) document
that such supplier switches have been frequent after the GEJE. Consid-
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ering the amount of arguments that have been raised, we expect that
a buyer facing a supply disruption would both suffer less and recover
faster from the disruption, if it has a longer history, on average, with
its suppliers, as compared to a buyer that would have a shorter history
with its suppliers.
Commitment: The longer the contract a buyer offers to its
suppliers, the better it mitigates a supply disruption (H3a),
and the faster it recovers from a supply disruption (H3b).
Mutual commitment is a major factor for a successful buyer-supplier
relationship (Krause, Handfield and Tyler, 2007), notably because it
positively affects trust (Kwon and Suh, 2004). Trust, in turn, favors col-
laboration between partners, enabling faster recovery. Moreover, Turn-
bull, Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) show that long-term contracts and
higher commitment from partners make them more dependent upon
each other. As in hypothesis 2, this would incentivize the supplier to
support its buyer facing a supply disruption. Finally, Jain, Girotra and
Netessine (2016) point out that a supplier is typically willing to sacrifice
some short-term benefits to cooperate with a buyer that is disrupted if
it expects higher benefits on the long-term from this buyer. This would
intuitively be more likely if the buyer is more engaged with the sup-
plier, for example with a long-term contract. Therefore our hypothesis
state that partners commitment would make the buyer’s supply chain
more resilient. Following Speckman’s (1988) argument that buyers and
suppliers can prove their commitment by engaging in long-term con-
tracts together, we use contract length as a proxy for buyer and supplier
commitment into the relationship.
Communication: The more regular the contacts between a
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buyer and its suppliers, the better it mitigates a supply disrup-
tion (H4a), and the faster it recovers from a supply disruption
(H4b).
Efficient information sharing between a buyer and its supply base
fosters resilience along two dimensions. First, upfront any disruption, it
improves buyer’s visibility on its suppliers’ operations (Christopher and
Peck, 2004; Speckman, 1988), providing the buyer a better knowledge
about the exposure risk of its suppliers, such that it could set up ade-
quate mitigation plans. Second, if a disruption occurs, an efficient com-
munication between supply chain participants would enable the buyer
to quickly receive, or request, information from a supplier that would be
in trouble, accelerating its responsiveness (Lummus et al., 2005). The
Nokia-Ericsson case illustrates that having fast, regular and complete
information can be crucial in case of a supply disruption, notably to se-
cure the remaining supply (Latour, 2001). Information sharing further
helps to build trust (Doney and Cannon, 1997), which can motivate
collaboration in the case of a disruption. Heide and Miner (1992) even
draw a direct link even between frequent contacts and suppliers’ will-
ingness to cooperate. In absence of any valuable counter-argument, we
expect buyers more frequently in contact with their suppliers to be more
resilient to supply disruptions, and to recover faster from these.
Coordination: The higher the inventory levels, the better
the buyer can mitigate a supply disruption (H5a), but the slower
it recovers from a supply disruption (H5b).
To measure the coordination across partners’ supply chains, we use
the level of inventory as proxy, since these are often inversely correlated.
For example, the lean philosophy, through its just-in-time dimension, is
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typically associated with low levels of inventory, and with a high level of
coordination between the buyer and its suppliers (Levy, 1997; Zimmer,
2002), which can speed up recovery. However, low levels of inventory
would expose supply chains to a greater impact in case of an unex-
pected supply disruption (Yu, Zeng and Zhao, 2008; Park, Hong and
Roh, 2013), since it would be a buffer to mitigate disruptions (Chopra
and Sodhi, 2004). As a consequence, we suppose that having more
inventories (and hence less coordinated supply chains) would favor mit-
igation, but not recovery. We use the days inventory outstanding (i.e.
the average inventory divided by the total cost of goods sold, multiplied
by 365 days) from Capital IQ as a proxy for supply chain coordination.
Financial pressure: The less financial pressure a buyer puts
on its suppliers, the more resilient it is to a supply disrup-
tion (H6a), and the faster it recovers from a supply disruption
(H6b).
Several authors (e.g. Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005) point out that
profitability of both parts is an important factor of success of a buyer-
supplier relationship. Therefore, buyers that would want to maintain
a strong relationship with their suppliers would avoid putting excessive
financial pressure on their suppliers. Excessive financial pressure could,
in addition, result in negative consequences in case of a disruption. On
the one hand, suppliers directly disrupted might face difficulties to re-
cover as desired if they face some financial constraints. They might even
be at risk for going bankrupt, as testimony the 1,698 firms that went
bankrupt after the GEJE (The Japan Times, 2016). This is particularly
true for small firms having a limited access to credit (Tang, Yang and
Wu, 2017). This could be detrimental to the buying firm. Carvalho et
al. (2016) show that supplier bankruptcy leads to a more negative effect
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than simple supplier disruption. Following this, we expect that a buyer
putting less financial pressure on its suppliers would mitigate better a
supply disruption. On the other hand, a supplier deriving a low benefit
from its relationship with a buyer would be less willing to make efforts
to help this buyer to recover. This could be either through not awarding
the remaining supply to this buyer (if the supplier is directly affected),
or through refusing to cooperate with the buyer to fasten its recovery.
This motivates our hypothesis H6b.
We use the average days accounts payable outstanding from Capital
IQ to estimate the financial pressure that a buyer puts on its suppliers.
This measure captures the average number of days that would happen
between that the buyer receives its order and eventually pays it. This
delay is often contractually imposed by the buyer, despite the fact that
it can negatively affect the financial situation of its suppliers, especially
if these are small (Tunca and Zhu, 2017). As this measure often depends
on the bargaining power of the buyer (Ng et al., 1999; Klapper et al.,
2012), it represents a natural measure for the financial pressure that a
buyer puts on its suppliers. Examples from the food industry notably,
show that firms like AB InBev or Heinz request to pay their orders
120 days after having received it (Strom, 2016), tightening the financial
pressure on their suppliers.
2.4.2 Information gathering and methodology
We thus have, for each of the six practices, one hypothesis for the
initial effect and one hypothesis for the recovery. To test our hypothe-
sis, we regress the initial effect and the recovery, as described in Section
2.3, over the six practices of the buyer-supplier relationship that we con-
sider. For this, we tried to obtain a measure for our sample firms about
each of the practices. While practices 5 and 6 are evaluated through
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data coming from Capital IQ, practices 1 to 4 are evaluated through
a survey (available in Appendix), which is inspired by Hendricks and
Ellram (1993). The survey is voluntarily short to increase the likelihood
of response from the firms, and consists of one question per practices.
As it was not easy to obtain responses by mail, we have called the firms
directly to make a phone interview, which consisted in simply reading
the questionnaire. All the respondents were people employed by the firm
surveyed, who were aware of the firm’s procurement policies. Since, for
each firm, there could be multiple procurement policies, as there are
multiple types of items, we asked the firms to reveal their information
on average for all components. We assume that the averages distinguish
the buyers favoring stronger relationships with their suppliers from those
preferring weaker relationships. For the 4 first practices, we respectively
obtained 46, 50, 49 and 49 responses over our 232 observations. As
some firms have been (indirectly) hit by both disasters, it corresponds
to responses obtained from 33, 36, 35 and 35 firms over our sample of
176 firms, which amounts to a per-practice response rate of about 20%.
For practices 5 and 6, we have data for all of our sample firms. A sum-
mary of the responses is provided in Table 2. However, as we focus on
the updated sample, we actually use 38, 41, 40 and 40 responses for our
principal analysis. Finally, note that, using the data that we have for
all the practices (i.e. 46 observations), we can perform the Belsley test,
which reveals that there is no significant collinearity among the practices
that we consider, such that we keep these all.
2.4.3 Results
The regressions that we conduct in this subsection enable us to derive
three major types of findings: (1) whether the practices of the buyer-
supplier relationship together explain buying firms’ resilience (i.e. initial
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Nb of observations Max Min Mean Standard error
Practice 1 46 4.5 1 2.15 0.97
Practice 2 50 31 2.5 11.84 7.39
Practice 3 49 12 0 3.13 3.14
Practice 4 49 365 0 57.49 117.48
Practice 5 232 255.4 6.9 67.8 36
Practice 6 232 257.4 19.8 61.4 31.35
Table 2: Summary of the data. Practice 1 is the number of suppliers
per component, practice 2 is the years of collaboration, practice 3 is
the contract length (in years), practice 4 is the number of days per
year during which there is a contact, practice 5 is the days inventory
outstanding and practice 6 is the days accounts payable outstanding.
impact and recovery), through performing a F−test with a null hypoth-
esis stating that the joint effect of the 6 practices is null; (2) which of
the six practices individually influence(s) resilience, through individual
t − tests with the null hypothesis that a specific supply chain practice
has no effect; (3) for each practice that individually influences resilience,
whether a buying firm behaving consistently with a weak (or a strong)
buyer-supplier relationship for that practice would be more resilient.
We start by analyzing the joint effect of practices related to the
buyer-supplier relationship on the initial impact. For this, we regress the
initial impact over our 6 practices. We therefore use the 37 observations
for which we have responses on all the practices for the updated sample.
Consistent with Subsection 2.3.2, the initial impact is defined as the
CAAR over the first month (i.e. the 20 first trading days) after the
event. The regression output is described in Figure 7. It shows that
over the 20-day period after the event, our practices have a significant
effect on the initial impact (i.e. the p-value of the F − test is lower than
1%), with an adjusted R-squared of 38.1%. Looking at CAAR over other
period lengths shows that the p-value of the F − test is significant (at
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least at a 5% level) from day 16 up to day 65 after the event (e.g. for day
16, this means the CAAR from day 1 to day 16, and so on for the other
period lengths). This is consistent with our analysis of the abnormal
stock returns in Subsection 2.3.3, which shows that over the first days
after the event, the stock market reaction can be driven by emotional
factors and thus often underestimates or overestimates the real impact,
while it sometimes even seem to not suspect any impact at all. For such
short-term periods, supply chain practices do not explain the CAAR
after the disruptive events. From day 16 after the event, it appears that
our supply chain practices significantly influence the impact of supply
disruptions on buying firms. We suggest as rationale that, at that time,
more information has been absorbed by the market about the disruption,
which has then corrected the anticipative measures taken right after the
event. We arbitrarily stop our measurement of the mitigation on day 20
(i.e. after 1 month), as it seems to capture both the short-term effect of
the disruption and the mitigation of the disruption through the buyer-
supplier relationship strategy. When observing the CAAR over longer
periods, we see that the p-value of the F−test remains significant up to a
bit more than 3 months (i.e. 65 days). This also supports our abnormal
returns analysis that resulted in a negative and significant impact over
3 months after the event.
Regarding the effect of the individual practices on the initial impact,
we find that, over 20 days following the event, the most significant prac-
tice (p-value < 1%) is trade credit, with buyers requiring longer payment
terms from their suppliers being more affected by supply disruptions.
This strongly supports H6a in stating that putting more financial pres-
sure on its suppliers would be counter productive to mitigate the effect
of a supply disruption. At a 5% significance level, H5a is also verified
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Figure 7: Regression of the initial impact (y) over the 6 practices (for
example, x1 denotes practice 1) for the updated sample.
Figure 8: Regression of the recovery (y) over the 6 practices (for example,
x1 denotes practice 1) for the updated sample.
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suggesting that buying firms can mitigate disruptions through carrying
out excess inventories. Finally, for a 10% level of significance, practices
1 and 4 are also significant, such that having a more diversified supply
base per component contributes to mitigate supply disruptions, whereas
having more regular contacts with its suppliers is penalizing to mitigate
disruptions. While our hypothesis H1a is verified, H4a is reversed. This
is particularly surprising as we had found no strong argument for more
frequent contacts being detrimental to mitigate disruptions. A potential
explanation for this is that regular communication between a buyer and
its supplier would make communication less proactive in case of a dis-
ruptive event, as the disrupted firm would know that it would rapidly
be in contact with its buyer. Thus, the disrupted firm would rather
communicate in priority with the buyers with which it has less regular
contacts. Practices 2 (loyalty) and 3 (contract length) seem to have
no impact on the mitigation effect, hence H2a and H3a are not sup-
ported. According to those observations, buying firms favoring weaker
relationships with their suppliers would foster resilience in the sense that
they can mitigate supply disruptions through diversifying supply, hav-
ing less frequent contacts with their suppliers and carrying out excess
inventories (since these practices are typically associated with weaker
buyer-supplier relationships). On the contrary, buying firms opting for
closer buyer-supplier relationships would mitigate disruptions through
putting less financial pressure on their suppliers (which is associated
with stronger buyer-supplier relationships). These results are summa-
rized in Figure 7. Note that, as a robustness check, we have performed
all our regressions without dependent variables that we have found to be
non-significant. These new regressions simply confirm all of our previous
findings and are therefore not presented in this paper.
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We then analyze the recovery, which we define as the mean AAR
of month 4 after the event less the mean AAR of the 3-month period
following the event. Hence, the higher the recovery value, the faster the
buying firm has recovered. This measure is relative to how much firms
have been affected by the disruptive event, and how much they have
recovered from it. As the individual firms’ recovery value itself does
not represent much, we simply use it to investigate which supply chain
practices could be associated with faster, or slower, recovery. Regressing
the firms’ individual recovery over the six practices leads to the following
findings (see Figure 8 for the regression output). First, the p-value of the
F − test is significant, but only at a 10% level, making the six practices
together likely to be meaningful in explaining the firms’ recovery. The
related adjusted R-squared is rather low: 14.6%. For the recovery, only
practice 6 is significant (< 5%). However, our hypothesis H6b is not
supported as a buyer putting more financial pressure on its suppliers
would recover faster from supply disruptions. Because none of the other
practices seems to have a significant impact on recovery, hypothesis H1b,
H2b, H3b, H4b and H5b are also not supported.
While the results presented so far are based on the updated sample,
we complete our analysis by computing the same regressions but on dif-
ferent samples (see the discussion in the last paragraph of Subsection
2.3.3). Focusing on the sample with only Japanese firms having suffered
from the GEJE and US firms having suffered from the Thai floods, which
is thus the sample for which the impact of the disruptions is the more ob-
vious, the results for the initial impact would not differ significantly than
those of the updated sample. The p-value of the F − test (< 0.1%) and
the adjusted R-squared (59.6%) would even be more convincing than for
the updated sample. The only notable difference is that practice 4 (i.e.
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Figure 9: Regression of the initial impact (y) over the 6 practices (for
example, x1 denotes practice 1) for the updated sample less the US firms
having suffered from the GEJE.
Figure 10: Regression of the recovery (y) over the 6 practices (for ex-
ample, x1 denotes practice 1) for the updated sample less the US firms
having suffered from the GEJE.
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communication) is now not significant anymore. For the recovery, con-
sidering this smaller sample would result in a lower adjusted R-squared
and in a non-significant impact. We present the regression outputs for
those samples in Figures 9 and 10. For the sake of completeness, we also
provide the output regressions for the complete sample (hence adding
Japanese firms having suffered from the Thai floods to the updated sam-
ple) in Figures 11 and 12. Adding these seems to bring noise into our
analysis. For the initial impact, the lower adjusted R-squared (29.2%)
tends to confirm that the Japanese firms having been disrupted by the
Thai floods might have had their stock returns after the Thai floods
also influenced by another factor. However, it also supports that supply
chain practices related to the buyer-supplier relationship significantly
affect resilience, and especially through practice 6 (i.e. trade credit). It
also tends to confirm that the practices considered in our work weakly
influence recovery, as testimony the p-value of the F − test (14.4%) and
the adjusted R-squared (8.87%).
2.5 Conclusion
The global uncertainty threatening supply chains that are more vul-
nerable than they were in the past has motivated us to investigate supply
chains resilience to supply disruptions. Recent natural disasters have
especially emphasized the weaknesses of supply chains having supply
networks concentrated in specific geographical locations, since in that
case, multiple supply disruptions are likely to appear.
In this project, we wanted to quantify the impact for buying firms
of such disruptions due to systemic shocks. For this, we have used
affected firms’ stock returns, as these should incorporate any important
information, including those related to the supply issues arising from
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Figure 11: Regression of the initial impact (y) over the 6 practices (for
example, x1 denotes practice 1) for the complete sample.
Figure 12: Regression of the recovery (y) over the 6 practices (for ex-
ample, x1 denotes practice 1) for the complete sample.
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systemic shocks. We found that this impact is, as expected, negative,
and takes around 3 months to be fully reflected in the stock returns.
This could be either because firms have mitigation strategies (e.g. excess
inventories) allowing them to maintain production levels for some time,
or because the information dealing with the impact of the shock on a firm
supply chain might not be estimated correctly after the event. This last
argument suggests that firms have incentives to remain rather vague on
how their supply chain is organized, and especially on how their supply
chain is dependent upon a specific location.
Since systemic supply disruptions have a significant negative influ-
ence on buying firms’ financial health, these should be interested in
limiting this negative influence. In this paper, we have investigated the
role that six specific supply chain practices might play in reducing the
impact of systemic supply disruptions on buying firms’ stock returns.
Specifically, we have observed whether those six practices would influ-
ence both the mitigation of the disruption, as well as the ability to
recover from the disruption. Our findings indicate that those six sup-
ply chain practices significantly explain firms’ ability to mitigate supply
disruptions, while it is less clear whether they explain firms’ recovery.
This result suggests that firms desiring to incorporate supply chain re-
silience in their procurement strategy decisions should rather focus on
supply chain practices improving the mitigation of a disruption, since
it is not clear whether different supply chain practices result in a bet-
ter ability to recover. We observe that for most of the practices with
a significant impact, firms favoring weaker buyer-supplier relationships
with their suppliers mitigate better supply disruptions. In particular,
diversifying supply, non-regular communication with suppliers and car-
rying out excess inventories are supply chain practices enabling firms
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to be more resilient to supply disruptions on the short-term. However,
putting less financial pressure on suppliers also allow buying firms to
improve their resilience to supply chain disruptions, despite that it is
consistent with close buyer-supplier relationship.
Aside the practical points discussed in Subsection 2.3.2, we highlight
in this last paragraph two limitations of this work. (1) The first limita-
tion is the small sample size for the regression analysis of Section 2.4.
Sample size is often the bottleneck in studies requiring non-public data
from (traded) firms. Although the sample size is taken into account in
the statistical analysis, it obliges us to remain cautious in generalizing
our conclusions. (2) Also, the reduced time window between both the
events, coupled with the fact that some firms have been affected by both
natural disasters could introduce some bias in our results. Indeed, a firm
having suffered from supply disruptions related to the quake might not
have completely recovered when facing similar disruptions following the
Thai floods. On the contrary, some might also argue that such firms
would have learned lessons from the first systemic shock, and would
thus be better prepared for the second shock. Those two limitations
directly provide avenues for future research, which could enable to draw
more general conclusions.
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Supply Chain Survey 
We investigate the impact of the buyer-supplier relationship on the resilience of a firm to an 
unexpected event that disrupts the buyer’s supply. We wonder whether buyers that have close ties 
with their suppliers recover faster from a supply disruption, as compared to buyers that have weaker 
ties with their suppliers. 
We have selected an important number of firms and your company is one of these. Therefore we 
would be thankful if you would agree to answer this short questionnaire. 
 
 
I will answer the following questions as if we were in... (If possible, answer the questions as if we 
were in 2010 - before the quake and the floods) 
☐ 2010 
☐ 2014, I do not remember how things were in 2010 
☐ 2014, but the procurement policies did not change much since 2010 
Questions 
1) In general, how many suppliers does your company have per component? 
…………………………………………………………….. 
2) On average, for how long has your company been doing business with its actual suppliers? 
…………………………………………….. 
3) On average, what is the contract length that your company offers to its suppliers? 
…………………………………………….. 
4) When there is no particular event/issue, how often on average does your company have 
contacts with a component supplier’s manager? ………………………………………………….. 
5) Which company are you working for? .......................................................................... 
6) Are you interested in receiving the conclusions of this research project once finished? 
☐  Yes 
☐ No 
In order to avoid validating false responses (and to eventually receive a copy of our results), please 
leave a valid e-mail address. This will only be kept for the purpose of this study. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
3. Chapter 2 - Contract length and supplier in-
vestment
3.1 Foreword of Chapter 2
The second chapter of this dissertation is entitled “Short vs. long-
term procurement contracts when supplier can invest in cost reduction”,
and it is a joint work with Pr. A. Chaturvedi. In this chapter, we use an
analytical model based on auction theory, as a mean to investigate how
the length of contract(s) auctioned off by a buyer affects its procurement
expenses, when the winning supplier can invest in improving its future
production cost. This situation creates a trade-off for the buyer between
motivating supplier effort through a long-term contract and leveraging
competition through shorter-term contracts.
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Figure 13: Positioning of Chapter 2 according to the framework pre-
sented in Figure 2.
This chapter attempts to balance the costs savings arising from sup-
pliers’ competition and from supplier’s investments in process improve-
ments. Therefore, it is directly focused on reducing procurement ex-
penses. However, this project also investigates how to manage the un-
certainty related to suppliers’ adaptability to new technologies. Through
this dimension, it is related to the innovation process, and thus to the
value development function of procurement. The impact of uncertainty
and information on this project is also significant. Namely, in our model
the buyer does not know how well its different suppliers have adapted
to the new technology, and uses auctions to obtain this information, as
these are a mean to discover hidden information. While a long-term con-
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tract might be perceived as a greater commitment from the buyer into
the relationship with the selected supplier, the focus of this work is not
on the collaborative benefits that might arise from a closer collaboration
between a buyer and its supplier. Hence, this chapter is only related to
the cost reduction and to the value development procurement functions.
Especially, it is interested in examining how to select the right auction
mechanism (between auctioning a long-term contract or two short-term
contracts) resulting in the highest procurement cost savings. This is
summarized in Figure 13.
Globalization and better transportation technologies have given buy-
ing firms access to multiple suppliers for any component, hence increas-
ing suppliers competition. Procurement auctions, by using available
information technologies, enable the buying firms to leverage this com-
petition and hence reduce their production cost. Unlike Chapter 1, this
chapter does not use procurement levers to cope with threats arising
from the environment, but rather takes advantage (through auctions) of
the opportunities brought by the current environment.
The strategic dimension of this chapter is straightforward. Namely,
in this project, the buyer has to anticipate suppliers’ behavior, in or-
der to chose between giving up some benefits that would be obtained
through maximizing the competition across suppliers, and inflating the
cost savings following supplier’s investments in cost-reducing activities.
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Short vs. Long-Term Procurement Contracts
when Supplier can Invest in Cost Reduction
Gilles Merckx • Aadhaar Chaturvedi
In dynamic markets where cost of components changes fast, buyers typ-
ically auction off regular short-term contracts to fully leverage supplier
competition in each period to continuously source from the lowest-cost
supplier. However, too much competition through short-term contracts
does not incentivize the incumbent supplier to make idiosyncratic in-
vestments in cost-reducing process improvement, as future business is
not assured. We investigate this trade-off, between leveraging supplier
competition in each period versus incentivizing incumbent’s investment,
with a stylized two-period model in which the buyer decides whether
to auction off short-term contracts in each period or auction off a single
long-term contract spanning both periods. In both cases, we characterize
the optimal incumbent supplier’s investment, the suppliers’ equilibrium
bidding strategy and the buyer’s expected cost. Our analysis shows
that the supplier always invests more in a long-term contract. However
the buyer’s cost depends on supply base size: it prefers short-term con-
tracts for large supply base size, otherwise it prefers long-term contract.
Moreover, we find that system cost is typically lower with short-term
contracts and that the suppliers are always better off with short-term
contracts. Finally, adding non-discriminatory or discriminatory reserve
prices to our model does not fundamentally modify the trade-off, but we
find that auctions with discriminatory reserve price are better at bal-
ancing this trade-off compared to long or short-term contracts.
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3.2 Introduction
Procurement managers frequently use electronic reverse auctions to
source standardized and well specified items like memory circuits, printed
circuit boards, power chords and cable connectors. In dynamic markets,
like consumer electronics, that see frequent evolution of technology, sup-
pliers’ cost of producing these items can change from period to period.
For instance, plant level investments in either new production technology
or even worker training, made either by the supplier or its sub-supplier,
can have uncertain impact on a supplier’s cost from one period to the
next (see Carillo and Gaimon, 2004). Other factors like supply-demand
dynamics could impact a supplier’s opportunity cost of dedicating its
capacity to any particular buyer in uncertain ways (because another
buyer might value production with supplier’s new technology more or
less), which make it difficult to predict which supplier might offer the
best price, period-to-period, to a buyer. In order to discover the cur-
rent best market price, among all the potential suppliers whose cost
might change from one period to the next, procurement managers often
organize reverse auctions periodically (see Carbone 2004).
On the other hand, by assuring long-term business to a supplier, a
buyer can gain cost savings from supplier’s investment (in form of time,
effort and resources that a supplier incurs) in reducing the production
cost for this specific buyer. In this paper, we focus on supplier’s invest-
ments aiming at lowering buyer-specific production cost that would be
contingent upon the production experience accumulated by the supplier
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with this specific buyer. Namely, we consider investments that are dedi-
cated to a specific buyer and that can not be replicated by other potential
suppliers (as investments would depend on production experience). We
provide three different examples of investments falling into this category.
(1) For instance, some large buyers (e.g. Ikea or Walmart) have their
own energy efficiency assessment programs in order to determine which
investments their suppliers could realize to improve their energy effi-
ciency and thus reduce their production cost. As a consequence, those
investments made by the suppliers would be buyer specific and would
not be accessible to suppliers that would not be producing for the buyer
(Nguyen, Donohue and Mehrotra, 2018). (2) Other buyer-specific invest-
ments aiming at lowering production cost also include investments that
the supplier would make to integrate its operations to the buyer’s sup-
ply chain. Specifically, buyers often require their suppliers to align with
their own IT system, despite the fact that it would initially be expen-
sive and time-consuming for the supplier.5 However, those investments
can be necessary, notably if the buyer uses a just-in-time production
system (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999). A better integration can further
be achieved through investments in human capital (e.g. manufactur-
ing engineers developing knowledge about the buyer), in manufacturing
equipment or in plants or warehouses investments dedicated to a spe-
cific buyer (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993), notably to lower future inventory
and transportation expenses (Williamson, 1983). (3) Buyer-specific pro-
duction cost reduction could finally occur due to supplier’s production
learning — which requires not only sufficient production volume but also
engineering trials that use expensive production capacity at supplier’s
end (along with employee time and effort) for controlled experiments in
5see Boyson, Corsi and Verbraeck (2003) for examples from the automotive and
electronics industries
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optimizing production processes specific to the buyer’s order fulfillment
(see Terwiesch and Bohn, 2001). Indeed, learning through production
experience leads to cost reductions (Lewis and Yildirim, 2002), but those
cost reductions actually often require parallel investments and improve-
ments to exploit this potential for cost reductions (Dutton and Thomas,
1984).
The level of these idiosyncratic investments in production process
improvement depends on the continuity of business that the supplier
anticipates from the buyer:6 intuitively, higher levels of idiosyncratic
investment made by a supplier are riskier in short-term contracts (com-
pared to long-term contract) since it has to compete again for buyer’s
business in a market where cost of suppliers can change from one period
to the next. Thus a buyer can better incentivize its supplier towards
making higher idiosyncratic investments by offering a longer-term con-
tract to the supplier which in turn can benefit the buyer from the cost
advantages that the supplier can offer the buyer.
Thus there exists a trade-off in buyer’s sourcing strategy: it can
either gain higher cost savings derived from the buyer specific, idiosyn-
cratic, investments made by the supplier by assuring long-term contracts
to suppliers or it can fully leverage supplier competition in each period
by only offering short-term contracts.
To capture this trade-off we present a stylized 2-period model in
which symmetric suppliers independently draw fresh costs in both the
periods (to reflect the changes in suppliers’ cost from periodic invest-
ments in new technology). The buyer has two sourcing options: (1) it
6We refer to supplier’s investment in production process improvement as idiosyn-
cratic investments since they are made for improving buyer specific production pro-
cesses.
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can organize a second-price auction at the beginning of each period and
give a short-term contract, spanning a single period, to the lowest bidder
in each period, or (2) it can organize a single second-price auction at
the beginning of the first period and give a long-term contract, spanning
both the periods, to the lowest bidder. To capture idiosyncratic invest-
ments made by the supplier that has won the first-period auction (from
now on the incumbent supplier, in contrast with a first-period auction
loser that we define as a non-incumbent supplier), the model assumes
that the incumbent supplier (in either the single or the two-auction set-
ting) can invest in process improvement which stochastically reduces the
supplier’s second-period cost. The level of investment made by supplier
in either auction setting is a decision variable.
Intuitively, risk of losing buyer’s business soon (in a short-term con-
tract) would disincentivize supplier from making idiosyncratic invest-
ments. For similar reason, greater competition would increase the risk
of investment in short-term contract. In fact we find that the difference
in investments between the long and the short-term contract is increas-
ing with the supply base size. However, with greater supply base size the
buyer increases its chances of drawing a lower cost in both the periods
through short-term contracts as compared to long-term contracts. Thus
the buyer’s decision on long or short-term contracts critically depends
on its supply base size.
To quantitatively compare the long-versus-short term sourcing strate-
gies, we next investigate buyer’s cost in both the auction settings. For
this, we characterize the equilibrium bids that suppliers would submit
in both the auction settings. Since the incumbent supplier can invest in
process improvement, hence the equilibrium bids must take into account
the cost of investment and the resulting cost improvements that the sup-
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pliers would gain. We find that typically the buyer would prefer short-
term contracts for large supply base size and would prefer long-term
contract for smaller supply base size. However, the buyer’s preference
for long-term or short-term contract has a more nuanced dependence
on the supply base size. This is because in a two-period setting, the
investment in short-term contracts drops to zero beyond a certain sup-
ply base size, at which point the long-term contract can become more
preferable for the buyer. Moreover we show that suppliers are always
better off, in expectation, by participating in auctions that give away
short-term contracts. Finally we find that the system cost (i.e., the sum
of production cost and investment) is lower with short-term contracts
than with longer-term contracts.
We also numerically investigate how our findings are affected when
the buyer can optimally set non-discriminatory, and discriminatory, re-
serve prices to lower its procurement cost (for instance when the buyer
has access to an inexpensive outside option). Neither non-discriminatory
reserve prices, nor discriminatory reserve prices change the fundamen-
tal trade-off between leveraging period-to-period supplier competition
versus incentivizing incumbent supplier’s process improvement invest-
ment. However, we find that discriminatory reserve prices are a better
tool for balancing this trade-off in comparison to short or long-term con-
tract. More specifically, with discriminatory reserve prices the buyer can
organize an auction in each period and thus leverage period-to-period
supplier competition, as in the short-term contracts case, but at the
same time it can discriminate in favor of the incumbent supplier in the
second auction to incentivize a high investment from the incumbent,
as in the long-term contract case. We find that a contract with op-
timally set discriminatory reserve prices always performs better than
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both the long-term and the short-term contract cases. We further find
that buyer’s expected cost in the contract with discriminatory reserve
prices are closer to those in a long-term contract when supply base size
is smaller, and are closer to those in short-term contracts when sup-
ply base size is bigger, consistent with our previous findings. However,
with discriminatory reserve prices the buyer has sufficient control over
its cost as a result of which its expected cost decrease monotonically in
the supply base size.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we first review the
procurement auctions literature in §3.3. Then we introduce the model in
§3.4 and determine supplier optimal investment in §3.5. Next, in §3.6 we
characterize and compare the buyer’s expected cost, suppliers’ surplus
and system cost in both the settings. Finally we discuss the impact of
reserve prices on our model in §3.7, and we present the conclusion in
§3.8. All the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
3.3 Literature Review
Our work relates to the literature in procurement auctions that in-
vestigates supplier investment. Some papers completely focus on the
supplier investment decision, observing how it is affected by specific
factors, like the auction format (Arozamena & Cantillon, 2004) or the
commitment to a mechanism (Dasgupta, 1990; Piccione & Tan, 1996).
Unlike these papers, our objective is not to observe what affects supplier
investment levels, but rather to determine the influence that the supplier
investment opportunity has on the buyer’s contract length decision and
expected cost.
However, other papers also consider supplier investment as a pa-
rameter in the design of a procurement mechanism. In two different
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settings, Li (2013) and Gong, Li and McAfee (2012) find that the effort
that a supplier exerts is tied to the amount of business that it expects
from the buyer. Namely, supplier effort is maximal in sole-sourcing,
whereas dual-sourcing motivates investment from both suppliers. This
is consistent with our finding that a supplier invests more in long-term
than short-term contracts, even if we consider idiosyncratic investments,
where only the incumbent supplier can invest. Li (2013) and Gong et
al. (2012) then balance the savings from supplier effort with those from
competition, which are greater when the suppliers are more symmetric,
to determine how to split the contract among two suppliers. While we
too investigate how the buyer can optimize the joint benefits from sup-
plier effort and competition, our focus is on the length rather than on
the split of the contract(s). Lewis and Yildirim (2002) analyze a trade-
off similar to the two previous papers, but consider learning economies
rather than supplier investment. Unlike these papers, which assume at
most two suppliers, we also analyze how larger supply base sizes impact
supplier investment and buyer’s contract length decision.
Cisternas and Figueroa (2015) design an optimal mechanism in a
two-auction setting when supplier investment is observable. They find
that the buyer can stimulate competition in the first period by giving an
advantage to the first-period winner in the second period. Bag (1997)
also states that discrimination can benefit the buyer by motivating a
greater investment from the favored supplier. Their findings are in line
with the results from our discussion section (§3.7), even though none
of them consider differentiated reserve prices. Moreover, our focus is
on the impact of contract length on supplier investments, which is not
investigated in these papers.
Existing literature on contract length in the context of auctions in-
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cludes Li and Debo who study two dynamic situations in which the buyer
has to choose, as in our paper, between committing to a short-term or a
long-term relationship. Similar to us, Li and Debo measure the benefits
from opening the competition in the second period. They compare these
with exogenous costs of switching of supplier after the first period, in
presence of supplier learning, demand uncertainty and supplier cost of
capacity (2009a), or of transferable capacity (2009b). Rather, we trade
off the benefits from competition with the cost induced by a lower in-
vestment endogenously decided by the supplier that does not receive a
long-term contract. Moreover, we consider a general size of the sup-
ply base (rather than two suppliers in Li and Debo (2009a)), to gauge
the impact that supply base size would have on investment and on the
buyer’s contract length decision.
Elmaghraby and Oh (2004) study the efficiency of an eroding price
contract when suppliers benefit from learning-by-doing. They show that
such a contract is better than sequential auctions only if past production
and switching costs give a strong comparative advantage to the con-
tracted supplier. Similar to this work, we balance the effects of supplier
cost improvement and competition. However, we focus on the impact of
supply base size and contract length on the investment that the winning
supplier can make to reduce its production cost, rather than exogenously
fixing cost improvement through learning-by-doing (as in Elmaghraby
and Oh (2004)).
Finally, our work relates to the literature that investigates the impact
of supply base size on the buyer’s expected cost. Counter intuitively, we
find, in our work, that increasing competition does not always reduce
the buyer’s cost, as it can deter supplier investment. Other papers have
shown that this also holds true when there is a cost of entry (McAfee &
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McMillan, 1987) or a cost of maintaining the supply base (Chaturvedi,
Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz & Beil, 2014). Li and Wan (2015) investigate how
supply base size affects supplier investment and competition. While we
consider in our paper any supply base size of at least two suppliers,
they compare situations where either the supplier is assured of the con-
tract, or two suppliers compete for it. In conditions rather similar to
our setting, they also find that having two suppliers competing, rather
than one, reduces supplier investment. However, when the buyer does
not (or partially) commit(s) to a mechanism before supplier effort, they
first find that two symmetric suppliers could end up making divergent
investments, as equal investments would be costly but would not give a
cost advantage to any of the suppliers. This never happens in our model,
as only the incumbent supplier actually invests, and in consequence ob-
tains a cost advantage over the other supplier(s) for the second auction.
Second, they find that a supply base size of two, rather than one, can
result in higher supplier effort, since competition can motivate an ex-
tra effort from a supplier that wants to maximize its chance of winning
the contract. In our paper, the suppliers compete in both settings, and
therefore always make efforts. Their effort is associated with the risk of
not winning the second auction, and thus decreases in the supply base
size. For the same reason, investment is greater in the single-auction set-
ting than in the two-auction setting. Lastly, Aral, Bakos & Brynjolfsson
(2017) study, as we do, the interactions between supply base size and
relationship-specific investments, and they also find that less competi-
tion favors larger investments. However, their focus is on the impact of
information technology on these interactions under a multi-period set-
ting, whereas our main objective is to examine the effect of contract
length on both the buyer’s supply base size decision and suppliers’ in-
vestments. Two other major differences can be highlighted between
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their paper and ours: (1) they consider the effect of trust, arising from
repeated interactions with the same supplier, on investments level, and
(2) they use incomplete contracts (rather than second-price auctions in
our case).
3.4 Model
We consider a 2-period model in which a buyer needs to procure one
unit of homogeneous good in each period. Without any loss of gener-
ality, we normalize the buyer’s demand to one unit per period. The
buyer has n qualified risk-neutral suppliers present in its supply base
in both periods. We denote by cf = (cf1 , . . . , c
f
n) and cs = (cs1, . . . , c
s
n)
the vectors of suppliers’ per-unit cost in the first and the second period
respectively. The cost of each supplier in any given period is its private
information. The period-1 cost of suppliers is distributed according to
c.d.f. F (c) defined in the interval [c, c¯] and this distribution is known to
all the suppliers and the buyer. We assume that in the first period each
supplier is uncertain about its period-2 cost. This reflects the fact that
in dynamic markets, technology evolves fast such that suppliers cannot
anticipate how well they will adapt to the new technology, hence result-
ing in their future cost being highly uncertain. For example, frequent
plant level investments made by suppliers (or their sub-suppliers) in new
production technology or worker training can have uncertain impact on
their cost of producing for the buyer (see Carillo and Gaimon, 2004). For
instance, uncertain yield resulting from working with new technology or
uncertainty in worker skill level can result in uncertain impact of adapt-
ing technology or of a worker training program on the production cost of
a supplier. Moreover, changing supply-demand dynamics in the supply
chain could alter a supplier’s opportunity cost of dedicating its capac-
ity to a particular buyer, e.g., in instances when another buyer might
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value production with supplier’s new production technology more (or
an existing buyer abandons the supplier) thus increasing (decreasing)
supplier’s opportunity cost of dedicating the capacity for a particular
buyer. Therefore in the first period suppliers are only informed about
the distribution of their period-2 cost. We assume that period-2 cost of
suppliers are also distributed according to c.d.f. F (c) defined in the in-
terval [c, c¯] and are independent of period-1 cost. Period-1 and period-2
cost distributions are identical to reflect that the market characteristics
shaping period-1 cost distribution should also shape period-2 cost dis-
tribution. Note that what matters is the relative difference between the
suppliers’ cost and it is the distribution of these relative differences that
is identical and independent across periods.
Actually, our model is simplified in the sense that most of the time,
suppliers’ cost would not be completely independent from one period to
the other, even if the technology is evolving fast. There could be certain
components of cost that are similar across suppliers, which might be
correlated across periods. Such cost components can easily be included
in the analysis, but as these would not affect our findings, they are not
inserted in the paper for simplicity.7 Finally, the cost distribution is
common knowledge, i.e., it is known to the buyer and all the suppliers.
In this paper we consider three different strategies that the buyer
can use to procure its demand in each period. In all three strategies the
buyer uses the second-price auction format, in which the buyer procures
from the lowest bidder and pays it the bid quoted by the second-lowest
7For example, supplier i’s first and second-period costs could be respectively ex-
pressed as cfp + c
f
i and as c
s
p + c
s
i , where c
f
i and c
s
i would represent supplier i’s types,
drawn independently in each period, and cfp and c
s
p would represent the cost terms that
are common for all suppliers in period-1 and period-2 respectively. These common
cost terms could represent cost of commodities that change (and could be correlated)
from one period to the next, for instance.
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bidder. The first strategy of the buyer is to organize a second-price auc-
tion at the beginning of each period, and thus procure one unit from the
lowest bidder of each period. Thus this two-auction case is analogous to
the buyer using short-term procurement contracts to fully leverage sup-
plier competition in each period. The second strategy of the buyer is to
organize a single second-price auction only at the beginning of the first
period, thus committing to procure two units from the lowest bidder of
the first period. Thus this single-auction case is analogous to the buyer
using long-term procurement contract to incentivize its chosen supplier
to invest in process improvement. Finally, in the third strategy, which
is a hybrid of the first two, the buyer organizes a second-price auction
in both the periods but in the second-period auction it discriminates
in favor of the incumbent supplier (who won the first-period auction)
by setting appropriate reserve prices. Thus this hybrid strategy tries
to optimally balance both the benefits of leveraging supplier competi-
tion in each period as well as incentivizing the incumbent supplier to
invest in process improvement. We assume that for the single-auction
case, the buyer can credibly commit to buy from the winning supplier
the second unit of its demand (corresponding to the second-period de-
mand of the buyer), irrespective of the incumbent supplier’s cost draw
in the second period. Vice-versa, we also assume that the incumbent
supplier commits to supply the second unit of buyer’s demand, irre-
spective of the supplier’s cost draw in the second period. One way to
ensure such commitments is through legally binding contracts that im-
pose a heavy penalty on the party that reneges on its commitment. In
the following sections, we first compare the two first strategies, namely
the long-term contract and the short-term contracts strategies. Then,
in §3.7.1, we show that our findings are robust to the introduction of
non-discriminatory reserve prices. Finally, in §3.7.2, we analyze the
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third strategy (i.e. the hybrid contract). Next, we compare the buyer’s
expected cost in procuring through two short-term contracts versus a
single long-term contract.
Buyer’s Expected Cost: Since the suppliers draw their cost afresh
in the second period, each supplier’s best strategy for the two-auction
case without investment would be to bid its realized cost in both the
second and the first period. Thus the buyer’s total expected cost can be
characterized as Ecf2:n + Ec
s
2:n, where cm:n denotes the m
th lowest cost
from a sample size of n. Since cost distribution for the first-period and
second-period cost is identical (and independent), the buyer’s expected
cost can be characterized as 2Ec2:n, where
Ec2:n = c+
c¯∫
c
F
n−1
(x)
〈
nF (x) + F (x)
〉
dx. (2)
For the single-auction case, the suppliers would have to bid the cost
for both the periods at the beginning of the first period. Since suppliers
are risk neutral, supplier i’s best strategy would be to bid cfi +Ecs, where
Ecs represents the mean of the second-period cost distribution. Hence
the buyer’s expected cost for the single auction would be Ec2:n + Ecs.
Thus the difference in the buyer’s expected cost between the single-
auction setting and two-auction setting can be characterized as
Ecs − Ec2:n = Ecs − c−
c¯∫
c
F
n−1
(x)
〈
nF (x) + F (x)
〉
dx. (3)
Lemma 1 The difference in the buyer’s expected cost between the single-
auction case and the two-auction case increases in n. Moreover, there
exists a threshold supply base size beyond which procuring through two
auctions, rather than a single auction, results in a lower expected cost
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for the buyer.
3.5 Incumbent Supplier’s Idiosyncratic Investment
In this section, we investigate the implications of the incumbent sup-
plier making idiosyncratic investments in production process improve-
ment which reduce its per-unit cost for a specific buyer. As mentioned in
§3.2, these are for example supplier investments in improving its energy
efficiency, in integrating its operations to the buyer’s supply chain, or
in production learning (e.g. time, effort and resources required) for en-
gineering experiments conducted to optimize production processes spe-
cific to buyer’s order fulfillment. Production experience is a necessary
requirement for these idiosyncratic investments to take place and there-
fore these investments can only be made by the incumbent supplier (in
either the single or the two-auction setting), and not by the entrant sup-
pliers. In addition, costly idiosyncratic investments would intuitively
be incurred by the supplier only in counterpart of a supply contract,
in order for the supplier to recover the investment (Yu, Liao and Lin,
2006). However, the impact of these idiosyncratic investment on sup-
plier’s period-2 cost would be more certain, in contrast to the uncertain
impact of plant level investments that we discussed in §3.4.
Specifically, we assume that the incumbent supplier (irrespective of
there being one or two auctions) can decide to invest an amount k
(which is a decision variable such that k ≥ 0) to reduce the mean of
its second-period cost, by shifting the supplier’s second-period cost dis-
tribution downwards by an amount φ(k). Thus a supplier that wins
the first-period auction and consequently invests an amount k, draws its
second-period cost from the distribution F (c+φ(k)) defined in the limits
[c−φ(k), c¯−φ(k)]. We assume that φ(k) is increasing and concave in k.
This assumption captures the decreasing returns of investments, since
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*
Figure 14: Chronology of events in the single-auction case (above) and
the two-auction case (below)
the most interesting investments would be made first. Moreover, we as-
sume that φ(k) takes value between 0 and min(c, c¯−c). This assumption
implies that idiosyncratic investment never results in the incumbent sup-
plier drawing a second-period cost below 0, and neither in being certain
of winning the second auction in the two-auction setting. Also φ(0) = 0.
The second-period cost of the non-incumbent suppliers is drawn from
the distribution F (c). We denote by csw the second-period cost of the
incumbent supplier. In Figure 14 we show the model timeline.
To recap, our main assumptions are as follows:
(1) The buyer procures one unit of homogeneous good in each of the
two periods
(2) The buyer uses the second-price auction format to award either
two 1-period contracts or a single 2-period contract
(3) The buyer has n qualified suppliers in its supply base in both
periods
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(4) The suppliers draw a private cost in each period from a symmetric
cost distribution (defined in the interval [c, c¯]), which is common
knowledge
(5) The buyer and the selected supplier(s) commit to respect the terms
of the contract, regardless of the selected supplier’s second-period
cost draw.
(6) Suppliers’ costs are independent across suppliers and across time
(7) Only the incumbent supplier can invest k to shift down its second-
period cost distribution by φ(k) (i.e. it is not symmetric with the
other suppliers in the second period if φ(k) > 0)
(8) The cost improvement φ(k) is a deterministic function that is in-
creasing and concave in k. It is common knowledge and similar
for all the suppliers
(9) An investment cannot result in the incumbent supplier drawing
a negative second-period cost, or being assured of winning the
second-period auction
We first investigate the optimal investment, k∗1 and k∗2, that the
incumbent supplier would make in the single-auction and two-auction
settings respectively.
3.5.1 Supplier Investment in the Single-Auction Setting
In the single-auction setting, the incumbent supplier decides on its
optimal investment for the second period. Since in this setting the price
offered to the incumbent supplier gets fixed in the first period, the invest-
ment should minimize the incumbent supplier’s second-period expected
cost Ecsw. Since Ecsw = Ecs−φ(k1), we can characterize supplier optimal
investment decision k∗1 as the following maximization program
k∗1 ≡ argmax
k1
(
φ(k1)− k1
)
. (4)
101
Since φ(k1) is concave in k1, one can characterize the optimal in-
vestment k∗1 through the first order condition. Note that the optimal
investment level in the single-auction case is independent of the supply
base size n and of the cost distribution since the second-period business
is guaranteed in the single-auction setting. Moreover, as suppliers are
ex-ante symmetric, each of them would, before the auction, decide to
invest the same amount if it wins the auction. Accordingly, they decide
their bid in the auction. In §3.6.1 we find suppliers equilibrium bid and
then characterize the buyer’s expected cost in a single-auction setting.
3.5.2 Supplier Investment in the Two-Auction Setting
In the two-auction setting, the incumbent supplier decides its invest-
ment for the second period such that it maximizes its expected second-
period surplus. This supplier’s expected second-period surplus if it wins
the first-period auction and invests k2 is characterized as
U sw(k2, n) = EcswEcs1:n−1 [c
s
1:n−1−csw|cs1:n−1 ≥ csw]·P(cs1:n−1 ≥ csw)−k2, (5)
where cs1:n−1 denotes the lowest second-period cost amongst the n − 1
non-incumbent suppliers. We can further characterize U sw(k2, n) as (see
detailed steps in the Appendix):
U sw(k2, n) =
c∫
c−φ(k2)
F (x+ φ(k2))dx+
c¯−φ(k2)∫
c
F
n−1
(x)F (x+ φ(k2))dx
+
c¯∫
c¯−φ(k2)
F
n−1
(x)dx− k2. (6)
The optimal investment, k∗2 can then be characterized as
k∗2(n) ≡ argmax
k2
U sw(k2, n). (7)
Typically U sw(k2, n) is not concave in k2 for any cost distribution and
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therefore one can not characterize the optimal investment in the two-
auction case through first order condition. However, we can determine
the effect of supply base size on the optimal investment k∗2. This is
summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 In the two-auction case, the optimal investment k∗2 of
the incumbent supplier is decreasing in the supply base size n.
Intuitively, a greater supply base size would decrease the likelihood
of winning the second-period auction and hence would decrease the ex-
pected returns on the investment; therefore reducing the level of invest-
ment made by the incumbent supplier.
One might expect k∗2 to always decrease smoothly to 0 as the supply
base size n increases. We show in Theorem 1 that this is not always
true.
Theorem 1 For any m ∈ R; k∗2(m) is either 0 or not continuously
differentiable in m ≥ mt if for an mt ≥ 2, the following conditions hold
true:
(1) ∂U
s
w(0,m)
∂k2
< 0 ∀m ≥ mt;
(2) ∂
2Usw(0,m)
∂k22
> 0 ∀m ≥ mt;
(3) ∂
2Usw(k2,m)
∂k22
= 0 has a unique solution ∀m ≥ mt;
(4) k∗2(+∞) = 0.
Theorem 1 implies that, in the two-auction case, investment can drop
abruptly to 0 after the supply base size crosses a certain threshold. As
we will see in Section 3.6.3, this result has important implications on the
buyer’s expected cost in the two-auction setting for large supply base
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size. The next proposition characterizes the cost distribution and the
functional form of φ(k) that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1.
Proposition 2 For cost distributed uniformly in the interval [c, c¯] and
for φ(k) = φmax(1 − e−λk), conditions (1) to (4) of Theorem 1 are
satisfied if 2 ≥ c¯−cφmax ≥ 1 and λφmax ≤
c¯−c
φmax
.
The right panel of Figure 15 illustrates Theorem 1 and Proposition 2
in showing that the drop to 0 investment could be quite abrupt as supply
base size n increases. The intuition behind this result is illustrated in
the left panel of Figure 15. Since U sw(k2, n) decreases in n, beyond
a certain threshold the maxima of U sw(k2, n) drops below U
s
w(0, n), at
which point the supplier stops investing. We also find that this result
remains robust for different cost distributions like Uniform and Power
distributions. Thus we find that contrary to the single-auction setting,
the supply base size can have significant impact on supplier investment
in the two-auction setting.
We had also noted that optimal investment in the single-auction
setting is independent of the cost distribution. On the contrary, in the
two-auction setting one would expect that supplier investment gets more
risky as the spread of the cost distribution increases, thus resulting in
the incumbent supplier reducing its level of investment k∗2. The next
proposition formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 3 In the two-auction case the optimal investment k∗2 de-
creases in the spread of the cost distribution for Uniformly distributed
cost.
Figure 16 echoes the findings of Proposition 3 when the underlying
costs are distributed according to a power law.
104
0 0.05 0.1 0.15
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Investment k2
U ws
(k 2
)
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
Supply Base Size n
O
pt
im
al
 In
ve
st
m
en
t k
2*
 
 
k2
*
 − Uniform
k2
*
 − Power
n=9
n=8
n=7
n=6
n=5
Figure 15: The left panel shows U sw(k2, n) for Uniformly distributed
costs. The right panel shows k∗2(n) when costs are either distributed
Uniformly or according to a Power distribution with c.d.f. F (c) =
c3−0.6193
1.3193−0.6193 . For both the panels the Uniform distribution of cost is
in the interval [0.7; 1.4] and φ(k2) = 0.5(1− e−9k2).
3.5.3 Comparison of the Levels of Investment
Finally, one can compare the investments between the two-auction
and single-auction cases. As intuition would suggest, the incumbent
supplier is assured of second-period business in a single-auction setting
and thus has lower risk on the returns that it can make on its invest-
ment. In contrast, in the two-auction setting the incumbent supplier
could, even after investing in process improvement, lose the second-
period auction. Thus its risk on its investment is higher as compared to
the single-auction setting. Therefore, one would expect the investments
in the single-auction setting to be higher than the investments in the
two-auction setting. The following proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 4 Regardless of the supply base size, supplier investment
is higher in the single-auction case than in the two-auction case.
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in the right panel. All other parameter values are similar to those in
Figure 15.
We had seen earlier that investment in the single-auction setting
k∗1 is independent of the supply base size n, whereas in Proposition 1
we saw that the investment in the two-auction setting k∗2 decreases in
the supply base size n. This implies that the difference in the optimal
investment between the single-auction setting and the two-auction setting
is increasing in the supply base size.
Similarly, we had also seen that investment in the single-auction
setting is independent of the cost distribution, whereas we found that the
investment in the two-auction setting typically decreases in the spread
of the cost distribution. This implies that the difference in the optimal
investment between the single-auction setting and the two-auction setting
typically increases in the spread of the cost distribution
These results have an interesting implication for the buyer selecting
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between organizing a single auction or two auctions. We saw in Lemma
1 that, without supplier investment, buyer’s relative savings from the
two-auction case (as compared to the single-auction case) are increasing
in the supply base size. However, now we see that supplier investment in
cost reduction efforts is increasing in a single-auction setting relative to a
two-auction setting as the supply base size increases. Thus, upfront it is
not clear whether a buyer would prefer a single auction or two auctions
as its supply base size increases. More generally, for a given supply
base size, what would be better (less costly) for the buyer: a long-term
contract or short-term contracts? To answer this question, we first need
to characterize the buyer’s expected cost in both the settings, and then
compare those costs. We perform this task in the next section.
3.6 Buyer’s Expected Cost and Suppliers’ Surplus
In this section, we characterize the buyer’s expected cost in both
the single and the two-auction settings. For this, we first characterize
the equilibrium bidding strategies of the suppliers in both the auction
formats and then characterize the difference in the buyer’s expected
cost between the single and the two-auction settings. We also compare
the single-auction and two-auction setting for differences in supplier’s
surplus and system cost.
3.6.1 Buyer’s Expected Cost in the Single-Auction Setting
Since it is a one-shot second-price auction event, each supplier would
bid its expected cost for both the periods. The first-period cost is known
to the supplier. The expectation for the second-period cost would in-
volve the optimal investment that the supplier would make if it wins
the auction. Since suppliers are ex-ante (before the auction) symmet-
ric, each supplier’s expected second-period cost would be the same, i.e.,
Ecsw +k∗1, where Ecsw and k∗1 have been characterized in §3.5.1. Thus the
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equilibrium bid of supplier i in the single second-price auction would be
cfi + Ec
s
w + k
∗
1, (8)
such that the buyer’s expected cost in a single second-price auction can
be characterized as
EB1 = Ecf2:n + Ec
s
w + k
∗
1. (9)
From Lemma 1 we know that Ecf2:n is decreasing in n and therefore
the buyer’s expected cost in the single-auction setting is decreasing in
the supply base size n.
3.6.2 Buyer’s Expected Cost in the Two-Auction Setting
In the two-auction setting, winning the first-period auction does not
ensure second-period business (for which the incumbent supplier would
have to compete again in the second-period auction). However, winning
the first-period auction enables the supplier to invest in process im-
provement (and consequent cost reduction) thus increasing its chances
of winning the second-period auction. Each supplier bidding for the
first-period auction would thus strategically take into account the im-
pact that its first-period bid would have on its second-period expected
surplus.
The second-period second-price auction is similar to single-shot second-
price auction, therefore each supplier would bid its realized cost of the
second-period in the second-period auction. Denote by U sl the second-
period expected surplus of a non-incumbent supplier (see detailed ex-
pression for U sl in appendix):
U sl = EcsiEζs [ζ
s − csi |ζs ≥ csi ] · P(ζs ≥ csi ), (10)
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where ζs represents the lowest cost amongst the n − 2 other non-
incumbent suppliers and the incumbent supplier. Moreover, denote by
δ the additional second-period expected surplus that a supplier would
make by winning the first-period auction as compared to losing the first-
period auction, i.e.,
δ = U sw(k2, n)− U sl . (11)
Then the equilibrium bidding strategy of the supplier in the first-
period auction can be characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 In the two-auction setting, the equilibrium bidding strategy
of the suppliers in the first auction can be characterized as
β∗double(c
f
i ) = c
f
i − δ. (12)
Intuitively, δ is the additional surplus that a supplier expects to gain
in the second period by winning the first-period auction and therefore
it bids away these gains in its first-period auction bid. This result is
consistent with Klotz and Chatterjee (1995) and Elmaghrabhy and Oh
(2004) who find that in a two-auction setting suppliers bid away their
second-period gains in the first period. The buyer’s expected cost in two
second-price auctions can then be characterized as
EB2 = Ecf2:n + Ec
s
2:n − δ, (13)
where Ecs2:n is the second-period expected second-lowest cost amongst
the incumbent supplier and the remaining n−1 non-incumbent suppliers.
One can characterize Ecs2:n as
Ecs2:n = c+
c¯∫
c
F
n−2
(x)
〈
F (x)F (x+φ(k2))+(n−1)F (x+φ(k2))F (x)+F (x)F (x+φ(k2))
〉
dx.
(14)
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Next we compare the buyer’s expected cost between the single and the
two-auction case.
3.6.3 Comparison of the Buyer’s Expected Cost
When deciding between long-term and short-term contracts, the
buyer weighs two major factors: (1) through short-term contracts the
buyer discovers the lowest-cost supplier in each period, whereas it only
discovers the lowest-cost supplier in the first period with a long-term
contract. Thus a long-term contract results in an opportunity cost for
the buyer of not discovering the lowest-cost supplier in period 2. (2)
However, Proposition 4 states that the buyer can incentivize a greater
investment (and therefore cost reduction) from the incumbent supplier
through a long-term rather than short-term contract. Figure 17 shows
that for smaller supply base sizes, the difference in savings from incum-
bent supplier’s cost reduction effort between long-term versus short-
term contracts is higher than the opportunity cost of not discovering
the lowest-cost supplier in the second-period. Hence the buyer prefers
longer-term contracts when supply base size is small. As supply base size
gets bigger, the buyer’s opportunity cost of not discovering the lowest-
cost supplier in the second period increases and eventually surpasses
the difference in savings from incumbent supplier’s cost reduction effort
between the long-term contract and the short-term contract. Thus the
buyer starts preferring shorter-term contracts. However, beyond a cer-
tain supply base size, the incumbent supplier, in the short-term contract
case, stops investing as a result of which the difference in buyer’s sav-
ings from suppliers’ cost improvement between long versus short-term
contracts suddenly increases and buyer again starts to prefer long-term
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Figure 17: Buyer’s expected costs as n changes. Costs are uniformly dis-
tributed in the interval [0.7; 1.4]. All other parameter values are similar
to those in Figure 15.
contract.8 But then gradually with further increase in supply base size
the opportunity cost of not organizing a second-period auction creeps
up and thus the buyer again tilts towards giving short-term contracts.
Overall, we find that the complex interaction of the supply base size
on the buyer’s expected cost in the two-auction setting implies that the
buyer might prefer a single auction (i.e. a long-term contract) or two
auctions (i.e. short term contracts) depending on the size of its supply
base.
In Figure 18 we investigate the difference in the buyer’s expected cost
in both the auction settings as parameters of φ(k) and the cost distribu-
tion are changed. In the top two plots of Figure 18, we see that, regard-
less of the supply base size, the difference in the buyer’s expected cost
between the auction settings (EB1 −EB2) tends to diminish as the effi-
ciency of supplier investment (measured by λ or φmax) increases. How-
ever, this does not always remain true as supplier investment can drop
8Unlike in the single-auction case, the buyer’s expected cost in the two-auction
case is not necessarily monotonic in the supply base size.
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abruptly when supply base size goes beyond a certain threshold, which
is different for different efficiency of supplier investment. We define an
investment being more efficient when the same amount of investment k
in process improvement results in greater reduction of production cost.
The intuition behind this finding is that higher efficiency of investment
enables, in the two-auction case, the incumbent supplier to invest higher
amounts, which increases its chances of winning the second auction as
well. Thus the investment of the incumbent supplier in the two-auction
case approaches the investment level of the incumbent supplier in the
single-auction case (who is sure of getting the second-period business).
Thus, the buyer’s expected cost in both the auction settings converges
as the efficiency of the supplier’s investment increases. Similarly, we see
in the bottom plot of Figure 18 that the difference in the buyer’s ex-
pected cost between the auction settings diminishes as the range of the
cost distribution decreases. The reason for this finding is similar to the
one above, i.e., with decreasing range of suppliers’ cost distribution it
becomes more likely for the incumbent supplier, in the two-auction case,
to win the second auction also. Thus its investment in the two-auction
case converges towards the level of investment of the incumbent supplier
in the single-auction case and therefore buyer’s expected costs in both
the auction settings also converge.
The three subplots of Figure 18 indicate that in industries where
the benefits derived from suppliers making idiosyncratic investments are
more important relatively to suppliers’ cost variability, the difference be-
tween organizing two short-term auctions and a single auction is smaller.
Namely, selecting the right contract length is especially important when
idiosyncratic investments result in moderate cost improvements.
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3.6.4 Minimum Return on Investment Constraint
A supplier that needs to raise capital for investing in production cost
improvement might do so only if it expects a certain minimum amount
of return from its investment. A low expectation of return from such an
investment would deter the supplier from investing in production process
improvement. In this subsection, we introduce a return on investment
constraint in our model. Since any investment made by the winning
supplier only affects its second-period surplus, we calculate return on
investment as the difference of the supplier’s expected second-period
surplus if it invests and its expected second-period surplus if it does not,
divided by the investment. We denote by α > 0 the minimum return
on investment desired by the supplier. Thus the model analysis can be
modified by adding the constraint (φ(k1) − k1)/k1 ≥ α to program (4)
and by adding the constraint (U sw(k2, n)−U sw(0, n))/k2 ≥ α to program
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(7).
In Figure 19 we present the numerical analysis on buyer’s expected
cost after the minimum return on investment constraint is added to the
model. Comparing the left hand side of Figure 19 with Figure 17 we
find that in the two-auction case the constraint on return on investment
results in the incumbent supplier reducing its investment to 0 at a much
lower supply base size as compared to no constraint on return on invest-
ment9. Moreover, the jump in the buyer’s expected cost (at the supply
base size at which supplier stops investing) is much greater with the
constraint on return on investment than without it. This is because the
drop in investment (to the 0 level) as the supply base size increases is
much greater with the constraint on level of investment than without it.
We see this more clearly in the right hand side of Figure 19 where the
jump in EB2 is higher and occurs at a lower supply base size for higher
value of α.
3.6.5 Comparison of the Expected Suppliers’ Surplus
We now compare the suppliers’ expected surplus in both the single-
auction and the two-auction settings when they can invest in cost im-
provement.
Proposition 5 For a given supply base size, the suppliers’ expected sur-
plus (before the first-period auction) is higher in the two-auction case as
compared to the single-auction case.
We saw in Equation (8) and Equation (12) that, in both the auc-
tion settings, the suppliers are willing to bid away (in the first-period
9Buyer’s expected cost remains unchanged in the single-auction case because the
return on investment for the winning supplier in the single auction case is more than
30%.
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Figure 19: Buyer’s expected cost with return on investment. α = 0.3
(left plot). Costs are uniformly distributed in the interval [0.7; 1.4]. All
other parameter values are similar to those in Figure 15.
auction) the second-period surplus that they expect to make by winning
the first-period auction. But, in the two-auction setting, the suppliers
that do not win in the first auction can still win the second auction
and thus make a positive gain. However, in the single-auction case, the
non-incumbent suppliers do not get a second chance, and therefore their
second-period gains are zero. Thus suppliers are better-off, in expecta-
tion, in participating in two auctions rather than a single auction.
3.6.6 Comparison of the Expected System Cost
Finally, we compare the expected system cost (i.e., the expected
production cost plus the investment in process improvement) in both
the auction settings. For that, we denote the expected system cost, in
the single and the two-auction cases, as EPC1 = Ecf1:n + Ecsw + k∗1 and
EPC2 = Ecf1:n+Ecs1:n+k∗2, respectively. We characterize the difference of
the expected system cost between the single and the two-auction settings
as ∆EPC:
∆EPC = EPC1 − EPC2 = Ecsw + k∗1 − Ecs1:n − k∗2. (15)
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In Figure 20 we present numerical results on system cost. The top
plot of Figure 20 shows that, unlike the buyer’s expected cost, the ex-
pected system cost is monotonically decreasing in the supply base size
for both the single and the two-auction setting. This is because the
system cost does not include the supplier’s surplus whereas the buyer’s
expected cost does. Thus the system cost does not change abruptly
(unlike the buyer’s cost) when the supplier stops investing beyond the
threshold supply base size. Also, typically the single-auction system cost
is higher than the two-auction system cost. This is because the invest-
ment in the single-auction setting is higher and moreover the expected
second-period cost in the single-auction setting is also higher since it
is the mean of the winning supplier’s cost whereas in the two-auction
setting it is the lowest cost amongst the n suppliers.
In the other plots of Figure 20 we find that the difference in system
cost converges to 0 as investments are more efficient or as the range of
cost distribution reduces. These findings echo the results from Figure 18;
because with higher investment efficiency or lower cost range the sup-
plier who won the first auction, in the two-auction setting, is more likely
to win the second auction also and therefore the expected second-period
cost is similar in both the single-auction and the two-auction setting.
Finally, we find that the difference in system cost is increasing in the
supply base size. This is because the investment in the two-auction set-
ting is decreasing relative to the investment in the single-auction setting
as n increases and moreover the gap between the lowest draw in the
second period and the mean of the second-period cost increases as n
increases.
Therefore, Figure 20 confirms the managerial insights derived from
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Figure 18, namely that selecting the adequate contract length is less
critical when the idiosyncratic investments are result in more consequent
supplier’s cost improvements relatively to the supplier’s cost variability.
3.7 Reserve Prices
This section investigates how the results would change if the buyer
uses optimally set reserve prices in both auction settings. In a classi-
cal single shot second-price auction, reserve prices are used to better
manage buyer’s procurement cost when the buyer has access to a viable
outside option (which could be a non-participating supplier or buyer’s
in-house production). In our single-auction setting, the buyer’s rationale
for setting optimal reserve price remains similar to the classical single
shot second-price auction. Also, in the two-auction setting too the ra-
tionale for using reserve price remains same as above as long as there is
a single reserve price set in both the first and the second-period auction
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(although the reserve prices could be different in the first and second
auction). However, the rationale for using reserve prices changes in the
two-auction setting if the buyer can discriminate between the supplier
who won the first period and those who did not win the first period auc-
tion. In this case, discriminatory reserve prices allow the buyer to bet-
ter balance the trade-off between incentivizing the incumbent supplier
to invest in process improvement (by setting a very high second-period
reserve price for the incumbent supplier and very low second-period re-
serve price for the non-incumbent suppliers) versus leveraging supplier
competition in the second-period (by setting a single second period re-
serve price for both the incumbent and non-incumbent suppliers).
In this section, we therefore analyze two different models with re-
serve prices, depending upon whether the buyer can discriminate be-
tween suppliers (note that supplier discrimination can only occur in the
second-period auction of the two-auction setting, since suppliers would
be ex-ante symmetric in the first-period auction of either the single or
two-auction setting). First, we consider in §3.7.1 that, the buyer does
not discriminate between the suppliers in the second-period of the two-
auction setting. Then, we allow, in §3.7.2, the buyer to offer a different
reserve price, in the second auction, to the incumbent supplier and to
the non-incumbent supplier.
3.7.1 Non-Discriminatory Reserve Prices
With non-discriminatory reserve prices, the buyer offers the same
reserve price to every supplier in each auction. In the single-auction
setting, the (unique) reserve price is denoted r1. If no supplier bids
below r1, the buyer pays cout (i.e. the per-unit cost of the outside option)
for the first auction, and re-organizes an auction in the second period,
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for which it sets a reserve price rnw. This new auction thus gathers n
suppliers that could not invest. If no supplier bids below rnw in the re-
organized auction, then the buyer again pays cout for the second period.
In the two-auction setting, the suppliers face one reserve price in the first
auction, rf2 , and another in the second auction, r
s
2. If no supplier bids
below rf2 (r
s
2) in the first (second) auction, the buyer pays cout for this
period. When no supplier bids below rf2 in the first auction, the second
auction is similar to the re-organized auction of the single-auction setting
(when no supplier meets r1). Therefore, we consider the same rnw for
both settings. Note that the buyer commits to the reserve prices before
the first-period auction. Also the subscript rp denotes a value specific
to the case with reserve prices.
We first characterize the buyer’s problem of selecting the optimal
reserve prices in both the single and the two-auction settings. Finding
closed form solutions to optimal reserve price is very hard in dynamic
settings, especially when there are cost asymmetries (as in the second
auction of the two-auction case). Therefore we find the optimal reserve
prices numerically. In the single-auction setting, we can characterize the
buyer’s expected cost as
EB1,rp(n, r1) = Pr
(
b1:n > r1(n)
)
∗
(
cout + EBnw(n)
)
+ Pr
(
b2:n ≤ r1(n)
)
∗ E
[
b2:n|b2:n ≤ r1(n)
]
+ Pr
(
b1:n ≤ r1(n) ≤ b2:n
)
∗ r1(n), (16)
where suppliers bid bi = c
f
i + Ecsw + k∗1,rp, as in Equation (8) and
where EBnw(n) represents the buyer’ expected second-period cost if no
119
supplier accepts its first-period reserve price r1, and is characterized as:
EBnw(n) = Pr
(
cs1:n > rnw
)
∗ cout + Pr
(
cs2:n ≤ rnw
)
∗ E
[
cs2:n|cs2:n ≤ rnw
]
+ Pr
(
cs1:n ≤ rnw ≤ cs2:n
)
∗ rnw. (17)
From Equation (17) we find the optimal rnw. Then, from Equation
(16), we obtain the optimal r1 and EB1,rp.
We then characterize the buyer’s problem for the two-auction set-
ting by working backward, i.e., we first calculate k∗2,rp (the optimal
investment made by the incumbent supplier) and δrp (the additional
second-period expected surplus that a supplier would make by winning
the first-period auction as compared to losing the first-period auction,
defined in Equation (11)) for any n and rs2.
10 We then find the buyer’s
expected cost in the second auction if there is a winner in the first pe-
riod, and denote it by EBs2,w, for any n and rs2. The buyer’s expected
cost in the second auction if no supplier meets the first-auction reserve
price, EBnw, and the related optimal rnw remains similar to one charac-
terized by Equation (17). Knowing δrp (and thus the first-auction bids
bfi = c
f
i − δrp(n, rs2), see Equation (12)), we obtain the buyer’s first-
period expected cost. We then find the reserve prices that minimize the
10As reserve prices are announced upfront, when the suppliers bid their cost less δ
in the first auction, they are aware of whether they meet rf2 or not. Unlike a supplier
that meets rf2 , a supplier who does not meet r
f
2 (and therefore does not bid in the
first auction) would not be certain that at least one supplier will meet rf2 and invest.
Thus, there would be a difference in Usl , and thus in δrp, between these two suppliers.
However, without any loss of generality, the buyer can assume that all the suppliers
bid as if they meet the reserve price, as only those bids are considered to determine
the winner. This eases the calculations by making δrp independent of r
f
2 .
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Figure 21: Optimal reserve prices (right plot) and buyer’s expected cost
(left plot) in n with non-discriminatory reserve prices. cout = c¯. All
other parameters are similar to those in Figure 15.
overall buyer’s cost, which we characterize as:
EB2,rp(n, rf2 , r
s
2)
= Pr
(
bf1:n > r
f
2 (n)
)
∗
(
cout + EBnw(n)
)
+ Pr
(
bf1:n ≤ rf2 (n)
)
∗ E
[
Bs2,w(n, r
s
2)|bf1:n ≤ rf2 (n)
]
+ Pr
(
bf1:n ≤ rf2 (n) ≤ bf2:n
)
∗ rf2 (n)
+ Pr
(
bf2:n ≤ rf2 (n)
)
∗ E
[
bf2:n|bf2:n ≤ rf2 (n)
]
. (18)
Our numerical findings are illustrated in Figure 21. From Equation
(4), we deduce that k∗1,rp is independent of r1 in the single-auction set-
ting. In the two-auction setting, the right plot shows that, as long as the
incumbent supplier invests a positive amount, the buyer sets rs2 = c¯ such
that it does not put any additional pressure on the suppliers’ second-
period expected profit, as compared to the original model without re-
serve prices, and hence does not deter investment from the incumbent
supplier. Consequently, optimal investments are as in Figure 15 (right).
However, when the supply base size is such that the incumbent supplier
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does not invest, the suppliers are symmetric and the second-period re-
serve price rs2 drops to rnw. Then, to understand how r
f
2 changes in the
supply base size n, one must first notice that investment, in the two-
auction setting, benefits the buyer in two ways. On the one hand, the
buyer makes savings in the first auction as the suppliers bid away δrp
in that auction to optimize their chance to win it. On the other hand,
the buyer makes savings in the second auction since one of the suppliers
has shifted down its cost distribution through its investment. When the
incumbent supplier does not invest, the buyer puts a reserve price rf2
that is equal to rnw, as the first and the second auctions are similar,
and do not affect each other. However, the buyer sets rf2 < rnw, to put
pressure on the suppliers in the first period, if it can make greater sav-
ings from the investment in the first auction, rather than in the second
auction. In contrast, it sets rf2 > rnw to ensure that there will be a
winner in the first auction, if it can make greater savings from the in-
vestment in the second auction. Also note that the optimal reserve price
in the single-auction setting, r1, decreases in n. Indeed, if no supplier
bids below r1, the buyer pays cout for the first auction, plus EBnw(n) for
the re-organized auction. As cout + EBnw(n) decreases in n, the buyer
is willing to take more risk in setting an aggressive reserve price r1.
We show in Figure 21 (left) that introducing non-discriminatory re-
serve prices into our original model does not impact our results. Al-
though it improves the buyer’s cost in both settings (compare Figure 21
(left) and Figure 17), as it offers an extra option to the buyer, it does
not change the optimal investments and preserve the trade-off between
a long-term contract, that incentivizes investment, and short-term con-
tracts, that foster competition. Importantly, Theorem 1 remains valid
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with non-discriminatory reserve prices.
3.7.2 Discriminatory Reserve Prices
With discriminatory reserve prices the buyer can offer, in the sec-
ond auction, a different reserve price to the incumbent supplier and to
the non-incumbent suppliers.11 As a result it is not necessary that the
second-period lowest bidder always wins the auction. Indeed, the lowest
bidder’s bid might be above its reserve price while a higher bidder’s bid
might be below its reserve price.
By discriminating in favor of the incumbent, i.e., by setting a high
reserve price for the incumbent supplier relative to the reserve price of
the non-incumbent suppliers, the buyer can offer a partial protection
to the incumbent supplier in the second-period auction and thus incen-
tivize the incumbent supplier to invest in process improvement. This is
similar to offering a long-term contract in which the buyer gave full pro-
tection to the incumbent supplier for the second-period business, which
motivated a higher investment from the incumbent supplier. On the
other hand, by setting similar reserve prices for both the incumbent and
non-incumbent suppliers, the buyer reduces business assurance to the
incumbent supplier but increases second-period price competition be-
tween the incumbent and non-incumbent suppliers by offering a greater
chance to the non-incumbent suppliers to win buyer’s business in the
second period. This is similar to two short-term contracts in which
the buyer gives no protection to the incumbent supplier for the second
auction, thus reducing the level of investment from the incumbent, but
resulting in a higher level of competition between the incumbent and
the non-incumbent suppliers.
11Note that discrimination can only occur in the second-period of the two-auction
setting since in the first-period auction all the suppliers are symmetric.
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Intuitively, by appropriately selecting the level of the incumbent sup-
plier’s reserve price and the non-incumbent suppliers’ reserve price, the
buyer can better balance the trade-off between benefits from the in-
cumbent supplier’s process improvement investments and benefits from
second-period supplier price competition. Hence we think of a contract
with discriminatory reserve prices as a hybrid contract that best bal-
ances the trade-off in buyer’s sourcing strategy.
We use subscript h to denote a value specific to such a hybrid con-
tract and use (rsh,w) to denote second-period reserve price of the incum-
bent supplier and use (rsh,l) to denote the second-period reserve price
of the non-incumbent suppliers. By setting rsh,l ≤ c, the buyer en-
sures the second-period business to the incumbent supplier and there-
fore mimics the single-auction setting as in §3.7.1. Similarly, by setting
rsh,l = r
s
h,w = c¯, the buyer offers the same reserve price to every sup-
plier and therefore mimics the two-auction setting as in §3.7.1. As the
buyer can replicate both the single-auction and the two-auction settings
with a hybrid contract, it always prefers to use a hybrid contract with
optimally set reserve prices than to use either a long-term contract or
short-term contracts. We state this formally in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 The buyer’s expected cost is always lower with a hybrid
contract than with either a long-term contract or short-term contracts.
To determine the reserve prices that would result in the optimal
hybrid contract, we characterize the buyer’s expected cost as
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EBh(n, rsh,w, rsh,l, r
f
h)
= Pr
(
bf1:n > r
f
h(n)
)
∗
(
cout + EBnw(n)
)
+ Pr
(
bf1:n ≤ rfh(n)
)
∗ E
[
Bsh,w(n, r
s
h,w, r
s
h,l)|bf1:n ≤ rfh(n)
]
+ Pr
(
bf1:n ≤ rfh(n) ≤ bf2:n
)
∗ rfh(n)
+ Pr
(
bf2:n ≤ rfh(n)
)
∗ E
[
bf2:n|bf2:n ≤ rfh(n)
]
, (19)
with the expected buyer’s cost in the second period if one of the supplier
wins the first-period auction being defined as
EBsh,w(n, rsh,w, rsh,l)
= Pr(cw > r
s
h,w, c1:n−1 > r
s
h,l) · cout
+ Pr(cw ≤ rsh,w, c1:n−1 > rsh,l) · rsh,w
+ Pr(cw > r
s
h,w, c1:n−1 ≤ rsh,l) · Ecn−1(min(rsl,w, c2:n−1)|c1:n−1 ≤ rsh,l)
+ Pr(cw ≤ rsh,w, c1:n−1 ≤ rsh,l, cw ≤ c1:n−1)
· Ecw,c1:n−1(min(rsh,w, c1:n−1)|cw ≤ rsh,w, c1:n−1 ≤ rsh,l, cw ≤ c1:n−1)
+ Pr(cw ≤ rsh,w, c1:n−1 ≤ rsh,l, cw > c1:n−1)
· Ecw,cn−1(min(rsl,w, cw, c2:n−1)|cw ≤ rsh,w, c1:n−1 ≤ rsh,l, cw > c1:n−1).
(20)
We depict our numerical results in Figure 22. This shows that the
optimal hybrid contract enables the buyer to achieve the benefits of both
competition and supplier investment. Indeed, the buyer benefits from
competition by two means. First, it sets rsh,l > c, such that the incum-
bent supplier is not guaranteed to win the second auction, which implies
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Figure 22: Optimal investment (top right plot), reserve price (bottom
right plot), and buyer’s expected cost (left plot) in n with discriminatory
reserve prices. All parameters are similar to those in Figure 21.
a competitive auction in both periods. Second, it sets rsh,l low enough to
take a chance that at least one non-incumbent supplier draws a low cost,
such that the buyer would pay at most rsh,l for the second auction. In ad-
dition to taking advantage of the competition, the buyer ensures a high
investment by providing sufficient protection to the incumbent supplier
in the second auction, by setting rsh,w > r
s
h,l. This reduces the likeli-
hood that the incumbent loses the second auction (and its investment),
hence resulting in a higher investment (than in the classical two-auction
setting) and therefore a lower expected cost for the buyer. Note that a
high rsh,w not only induces higher investment, but also increases the ex-
pected payment to the incumbent supplier if it wins the second auction.
However, the incumbent supplier bids away this expected extra profit
in the first auction to increase its chance of winning this auction, and a
high rsh,w therefore does not increase the buyer’s expected cost. These
observations are in line with Cisternas and Figueroa (2015). In a sim-
ilar setting, they show that giving an advantage in the second auction
to the incumbent supplier results in an optimal mechanism. However,
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they discriminate in favor of the incumbent supplier through artificially
inflating the non-incumbent suppliers’ second-period bid, rather than
through reserve prices.
Figure 22 (bottom-right) summarizes the dynamics of the reserve
prices, in the optimal hybrid contract, in n. As in §3.7.1, the buyer
does not put pressure on the second-period expected profit of the in-
cumbent supplier, by setting rsh,w = c¯. This motivates investment, and
consequently a high δh. The benefits from winning the first auction, δh,
is even greater since rsh,l < r
s
h,w. As a greater δh increases the buyer’s
benefits in the first auction, due to the investment, the buyer sets rfh
lower than in the non-discriminatory reserve prices case. Moreover, as
δh decreases in n, r
f
h increases gradually in n, as long as the incumbent
supplier invests.
In the models discussed before §3.7.2, the buyer either fully protected
the incumbent supplier in the second period (through a long-term con-
tract), or it did not protect it at all (through short-term contracts). In
this subsection, by deciding rsh,l, the buyer can select the accurate level
of protection that it wants to offer to the incumbent supplier in the sec-
ond auction. Although we see that rsh,l is relatively constant as long as
the supply base size is such that the incumbent supplier invests, one can
deduce that the level of protection offered to the incumbent supplier ac-
tually decreases in n. Indeed, as n increases, the risk for the incumbent
supplier that at least one non-incumbent supplier bids below rsh,l in-
creases. As rsh,l remains constant, the actual level of protection awarded
is decreasing in n. Thus the buyer offers more protection (to motivate
investment) to the incumbent supplier in the second auction when sup-
ply base size is smaller, which is consistent with our findings from §3.6.3,
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stating that a buyer prefers a longer-term contract for smaller supply
base sizes.
Moreover, in contrast with Theorem 1, we find that EBh decreases
monotonically in the supply base size, despite that k∗h still drops sud-
denly to 0 as supply base size increases. As the optimal hybrid contract
gathers the instruments from both the long-term (higher investment)
and short-term contracts (fiercer competition), the buyer can prevent
any jump in EBh by subtly coordinating its reserve prices.
In conclusion, one can better balance the fundamental trade-offs be-
tween benefits of supplier investment and supplier competition with dis-
criminatory reserve prices. We find that such a hybrid contract is closer
to a long-term contract when benefits from investment are higher rela-
tive to supplier price competition, i.e., when supply base size is smaller.
Whereas a hybrid contract is closer to short-term contracts when bene-
fits from supplier price competition are higher relative to benefits from
supplier investment, i.e., when supply base size is larger. Thus our re-
sults with discriminatory reserve prices are consistent with our previous
results without reserve prices. From a managerial perspective, hybrid
contracts would change the critical decision from jointly deciding con-
tract length and supply base size to selecting the optimal set of reserve
prices, in order to determine whether the hybrid contract would be closer
to a long-term contract or to two short-term contracts. This is because
hybrid contracts always dominate the long-term contract case as well
as the repeated short-term contracts case, such that the contract length
would not remain a decision variable. Moreover, the supply base size
decision with the hybrid contract would also be straightforward as more
suppliers would always be preferable.
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3.8 Conclusion
In dynamic markets where supplier technology evolves fast, a buyer
regularly auctions off new contracts to stay abreast of the best price
that it can receive from its supply base. However, short-term contracts
might not incentivize the supplier to invest in process improvement ef-
forts that can reduce its production cost; because such an investment
would be risky for the supplier since it is not sure of winning consequent
auctions. On the contrary a longer-term contract can better incentivize
the supplier to invest in production cost reduction since it is assured of
future business. Thus, a short-term contract allows the buyer to stay
abreast of the current best market price but the long-term contract al-
lows the buyer to gain from supplier’s production process improvement
efforts. In this paper we use a second-price auction setting to compare a
buyer organizing two auctions (corresponding to short-term contracts)
to a buyer organizing a single auction (corresponding to long-term con-
tracts) to investigate whether a short-term or a long-term contract would
be better for the buyer.
We find that a buyer typically favors long-term contracts when sup-
ply base is small, since savings from supplier investments are higher as
compared to savings obtained through competition. However for larger
supply base size the buyer is better-off leveraging fiercer competition
(finding a lower-cost supplier in each period) and thus favors short-term
contracts. However, the difference in buyer’s expected cost from short-
term contracts and long-term contracts has a more nuanced dependence
on the size of the supply base. This is because the buyer’s expected cost
in the two-auction setting (short-term contracts) can be non-monotonic
in the supply base size, since beyond a certain supply base size the sup-
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pliers stop investing, resulting in an increase in the buyer’s expected
cost. This increase of the buyer’s expected cost can inflate buyer’s cost
in the two-auction setting over its cost in the single-auction case. Thus,
the buyer’s decision to select a long-term contract (single auction) or
short-term contracts (two auctions) critically depends on the supply
base size.
Optimally set non-discriminatory reserve prices enable the buyer to
lower its expected procurement expenses, but do not affect the validity
of our previous results. With discriminatory reserve prices the buyer
can better balance the trade-off between benefits from the incumbent
supplier’s process improvement investment and benefits from second-
period price competition between the incumbent supplier and the non-
incumbent suppliers. Consistent with our previous findings, the optimal
hybrid contract is closer to a long-term contract for smaller supply base
sizes, and closer to the short-term contracts for bigger supply base sizes.
Also, with an optimal hybrid contract the buyer has sufficient control
over its cost (i.e., it avoids non-monotonicity in its expected cost) even
when the incumbent supplier stops investing as the supply base size
increases.
Interestingly, we find that the expected system cost is typically lower
with the short-term contract than with the long-term contract and the
difference between the system cost in long-term contract versus short-
term contract is increasing in the size of the supply base. This is because
in the long-term contract, supplier investment is higher than in the short-
term contracts and moreover the expected second-period production cost
of supplier is typically higher in long-term contract as compared to short-
term contract. Thus from a system perspective the short-term contracts
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are more efficient than long-term contracts.
Finally, we find that suppliers bid away their second-period gains in
both the auction settings. However, in short-term contracts the supplier
who did not win the first auction can still win the second-period auction,
unlike in the long-term contract. Thus, the supplier can gain a higher
surplus, in expectation, through short-term contracts as compared to
long-term contract, i.e., a buyer might attract higher supplier partici-
pation by giving away short-term contracts as compared to long-term
contracts.
We highlight two practical implications of these results. First, it ap-
pears that the issues of contract length and supply base size are clearly
interrelated. Therefore a buyer should jointly decide on the length of the
contract(s) offered to its suppliers along with the size of its supply base.
This would allow it to reduce procurement expenses by incentivizing
supplier effort in production process improvement along with maintain-
ing supplier competition. Second, our findings strongly suggest that the
investment dimension should be incorporated in the joint decision of the
contract length and the supply base size. Indeed, in sequential auctions,
the non-monotonicity of the buyer’s expected cost in the supply base
size clearly indicates that neglecting investment can misguide the buyer
in making an optimal decision.
In this paper we assumed that investments in new technology made
by suppliers have an uncertain impact on their buyer specific produc-
tion cost, as a result of which their production cost can change from
one period to the next. We did not explicitly analyze the amount of
investments that these suppliers make. In principle, one can analyze the
investments that each supplier would make in equilibrium and then find
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the resulting distribution of suppliers’ production cost for the next pe-
riod. Such an analysis would be an interesting avenue for future research
that builds on this paper.
Finally, one might be further interested in extending the two-auction
case by allowing the buyer to split its purchase among more than one
supplier, which would allow each of these selected suppliers to invest in
process improvement. It would introduce a trade-off between having less
suppliers investing more or more suppliers investing less. The buyer can
balance the resulting trade-off between supplier competition and pro-
duction cost improvement by optimally splitting its award amongst the
suppliers. This would require investigating mechanism design approach
over multiple periods, i.e., investigating dynamic games, which would
be a challenging problem to solve.
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Appendix
Characterization of U sw(k2, n)
U sw(k2, n) = EcswEcs1:n−1 [c
s
1:n−1 − csw|cs1:n−1 ≥ csw] · P(cs1:n−1 ≥ csw)− k2,
=
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c−φ(k2)
c¯∫
y=max(c,x)
(y − x)fcsw(x)fcs1:n−1(y)dydx− k2,
where fcsw and fcs1:n−1 are the p.d.f. of c
s
w and c
s
1:n−1 respectively. Inte-
gration by parts on the inner integral gives
Usw(k2, n) =
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c−φ(k2)
〈
(max(c, x)−x)F cs1:n−1 (max(c, x))+
c¯∫
y=max(c,x)
F cs1:n−1 (y)dy
〉
fcsw (x)dx−k2.
Since
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c−φ(k2)
(max(c, x)−x)F cs1:n−1(max(c, x))fcsw(x)dx =
c∫
x=c−φ(k2)
(c−
x)fcsw(x)dx =
c∫
x=c−φ(k2)
Fcsw(x)dx, we have that
U sw(k2, n) =
c∫
x=c−φ(k2)
Fcsw(x)dx+
c∫
x=c−φ(k2)
c¯∫
y=c
F cs1:n−1(y)fcsw(x)dydx
+
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c
c¯∫
y=x
F cs1:n−1(y)fcsw(x)dydx− k2.
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Integrating
c∫
x=c−φ(k2)
c¯∫
y=c
F cs1:n−1(y)fcsw(x)dydx gives
U sw(k2, n) =
c∫
x=c−φ(k2)
Fcsw(x)dx+
c¯∫
y=c
F cs1:n−1(y)Fcsw(c)dy
+
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c
c¯−φ(k2)∫
y=x
F cs1:n−1(y)fcsw(x)dydx
+
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c
c¯∫
y=c¯−φ(k2)
F cs1:n−1(y)fcsw(x)dydx− k2. (21)
Integrating
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c
c¯∫
y=c¯−φ(k2)
F cs1:n−1(y)fcsw(x)dydx =
c¯∫
y=c¯−φ(k2)
F cs1:n−1(y)dy−
c¯∫
y=c¯−φ(k2)
F cs1:n−1(y)Fcsw(c)dy. And integrating by parts
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c
c¯−φ(k2)∫
y=x
F cs1:n−1(y)fcsw(x)dydx =
−
c¯−φ(k2)∫
y=c
F cs1:n−1(y)Fcsw(c)dy +
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c
F cs1:n−1(x)Fcsw(x)dx
(22)
gives
U sw(k2, n) =
c∫
x=c−φ(k2)
Fcsw(x)dx+
c¯∫
y=c¯−φ(k2)
F cs1:n−1(y)dy
+
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c
F cs1:n−1(x)Fcsw(x)dx− k2. (23)
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Substituting for Fcs1:n−1(x) and Fcsw(x) gives
U sw(k2, n) =
c∫
c−φ(k2)
F (x+ φ(k2))dx+
c¯∫
c¯−φ(k2)
F
n−1
(x)dx
+
c¯−φ(k2)∫
c
F
n−1
(x)F (x+ φ(k2))dx− k2.
Characterization of U sl
From Equation (10), we get
U sl =
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c
c¯−φ(k2)∫
y=x
(y − x)fζs(y)fcsi (x)dydx.
Integrating by parts
c¯−φ(k2)∫
y=x
(y − x)fζs(y)dy, we get
U sl =
c¯−φ(k2)∫
x=c
c¯−φ(k2)∫
y=x
F ζs(y)fcsi (x)dydx.
Further integration by parts gives
U sl =
c¯−φ(k2)∫
c
F ζs(x)Fcsi (x)dx
Substituting F ζs(x) = F
n−2
(x)F (x+ φ(k2)) gives
U sl =
c¯−φ(k2)∫
c
F
n−2
(x)F (x)F (x+ φ(k2))dx. (24)
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Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Lemma 1 is verified if dEc2:ndn ≤ 0, which is true
if the expression inside the integral of Equation (2) (let us denote it
v(x)) decreases in n:
dv(x)
dn
=
d
〈
F
n−1
(x)
〈
nF (x) + F (x)
〉〉
dn
= F
n−1
(x)F (x) + (nF (x) + F (x))F
n−1
(x) ln(F (x))
= F
n−1
(x)
〈
F (x) + (n− 1)F (x) ln(F (x)) + ln(F (x))
〉
.
Let z(x) ≡ F (x) + ln(F (x)). Then z(c) = 0 and dz(x)/dx = f(x) −
f(x)/F (x) ≤ 0 (since F (x) ≤ 1). Therefore F (x) + ln(F (x)) ≤ 0 and
hence dv(x)/dn ≤ 0 (because ln(F (x)) ≤ 0), such that dEc2:n/dn ≤ 0.
In Equation (3), Ecs is independent of n and therefore the difference in
buyer’s expected cost between the single-auction and two-auction case
increases in n. Morevoer, at n → ∞, Ecs − Ec2:n ≥ 0. Hence, there
exists a threshold n beyond which expected cost in single auction would
be greater than expected cost in two-auction case.
Proof of Proposition 1 The winner of the first auction invests k∗2
such that it maximizes U sw(k2, n). From Equation (6), we can charac-
terize ∂U
s
w(k2,n)
∂k2
as
∂Usw(k2, n)
∂k2
= −F (c)(−dφ(k2)
dk2
) +
c∫
c−φ(k2)
dF (x+ φ(k2))
dk2
dx− Fn−1(c¯− φ(k2))F (c¯)dφ(k2)
dk2
+
c¯−φ(k2)∫
c
F
n−1
(x)
dF (x+ φ(k2))
dk2
dx+ F
n−1
(c¯− φ(k2))dφ(k2)
dk2
− 1
=
dφ(k2)
dk2
·
〈
F (c+ φ(k2)) +
c¯−φ(k2)∫
c
F
n−1
(x)f(x+ φ(k2))dx
〉
− 1. (25)
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Any interior solution of k∗2 will be characterized by
∂U sw(k
∗
2(n), n)
∂k2
= 0. (26)
Implicitly differentiating Equation (26) with respect to an n ∈ R gives:
∂〈∂Usw(k∗2(n),n)∂k2 〉
∂n
=
∂2U sw(k
∗
2(n), n)
∂k22
dk∗2(n)
dn
+
∂2U sw(k
∗
2(n), n)
∂k2∂n
= 0.
We can then characterize
dk∗2(n)
dn
=
−∂2Usw(k∗2(n),n)∂k2∂n
∂2Usw(k
∗
2(n),n)
∂k22
.
From Equation (25) we know that ∂
2Usw(k2,n)
∂k2∂n
≤ 0. Moreover, at k∗2 we
will always have
∂2Usw(k
∗
2(n),n)
∂k22
≤ 0. Therefore dk∗2(n)dn < 0 at any interior
solution of k∗2. Since
∂2Usw(k2,n)
∂k2∂n
≤ 0, increasing n can not increase k∗2
when k∗2 = 0. Hence k∗2 is decreasing in n.
Proof of Theorem 1 The first two conditions of Theorem 1 ensure
that U sw(0,m) is decreasing and convex in k2 at k2 = 0, ∀m ≥ mt. The
third condition implies that U sw(k2,m) has at most two local optima for
all m ≥ mt. Let kmin2 (m) and kmax2 (m) respectively denote the local
minimum and the local maximum of U sw(k2,m). Indeed, k
min
2 (m) ≤
kmax2 (m).
From Equation (25) we know that ∂
2Usw(k2,m)
∂k2∂m
< 0. Therefore, if
U sw(k2,m
t) has no local optimum, or if the local maximum kmax2 is such
that U sw(k
max
2 ,m
t) < U sw(0,m
t), then k∗2(m) = 0 ∀m ≥ mt.
Also since ∂
2Usw(k2,m)
∂k2∂m
< 0, for U sw(k
max
2 ,m
t) > U sw(0,m
t), kmin2 (m) is
increasing in m and kmax2 (m) is decreasing in m. Thus k
max
2 (m) is lower
bounded by kmin2 (m
t). Moreover, since k∗2(m) is decreasing in m (from
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Proposition 1), condition (4) can only get satisfied if k∗2 discontinuously
decreases to 0 as m increases.
Proof of Proposition 2 For an m ∈ R and uniformly distributed
costs we can characterize U sw(k2,m) in Equation (6) as
Usw(k2,m) =
c∫
c−φ(k2)
x− c+ φ(k2)
c¯− c dx+
c¯−φ(k2)∫
c
( c¯− x
c¯− c
)m−1(x− c+ φ(k2)
c¯− c
)
dx
+
c¯∫
c¯−φ(k2)
( c¯− x
c¯− c
)m−1
dx− k2
=
φ(k2)(φ(k2)− c)
c¯− c +
[2cφ(k2)− φ(k2)2
2(c¯− c)
]
− φ(k2)
m
m(c¯− c)m−1 +
φ(k2)
m
− φ(k2)
m+1
m(m+ 1)(c¯− c)m +
(c¯− c)
m(m+ 1)
+
φ(k2)m
m(c¯− c)m−1 − k2
=
(φ(k2))2
2(c¯− c) +
φ(k2)
m
− φ(k2)
m+1
m(m+ 1)(c¯− c)m +
(c¯− c)
m(m+ 1)
− k2. (27)
Taking derivative of U sw(k2,m) gives
∂U sw(k2,m)
∂k2
=
dφ(k2)
dk2
〈φ(k2)
c¯− c +
1
m
(
1−
(φ(k2)
c¯− c
)m)〉− 1,
and
∂2U sw(k2,m)
∂k22
=
d2φ(k2)
dk22
〈φ(k2)
c¯− c +
1
m
(
1−
(φ(k2)
c¯− c
)m)〉
+
(dφ(k2)
dk2
)2〈 1
c¯− c −
(φ(k2))
m−1
(c¯− c)m
〉
.
Substituting for φ(k) = φmax(1−e−λk), we get ∂U
s
w(0,m)
∂k2
= φmaxλm −1
and ∂
2Usw(0,m)
∂k22
= −φmaxλ
2
m +
(φmaxλ)2
c¯−c . Thus conditions (1) and (2) of
Theorem 1 are satisfied for mt ≥ max(λφmax, c¯−cφmax ). To show condition
(3) of Theorem 1 we introduce φ(k) = φmax(1− e−λk) into ∂
2Usw(k2,m)
∂k22
:
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∂2Usw(k2,m)
∂k22
= λ2φmaxe
−λk2
〈φmax(2e−λk2 − 1)
c¯− c −
1
m
+
φmmax(1− e−λk2 )m−1
m(c¯− c)m
〈
1−(m+1)e−λk2
〉〉
.
Define h(k2,m) ≡ φmax(2e
−λk2−1)
c¯−c − 1m + φ
m
max(1−e−λk2 )m−1
m(c¯−c)m
〈
1 − (m +
1)e−λk2
〉
. We can then characterize ∂
2Usw(k2,m)
∂k22
= λ2φmaxe
−λk2h(k2,m).
Thus, if h(k2,m) is decreasing in k2 then
∂2Usw(k2,m)
∂k22
= 0 can have at
most one solution.
∂h(k2,m)
∂k2
=
λφmaxe
−λk2
c¯− c
〈
−2+(1−e−λk2)m−2
(φmax
c¯− c
)m−1〈
2−(m+1)e−λk2
〉〉
.
Since (1 − e−λk2)m−2 ≤ 1; ∂h(k2,m)∂k2 ≤ 0 if
φmax
c¯−c ≤ 1. Moreover,
h(∞,m) < 0 for φmaxc¯−c ≤ 1, which implies that ∂
2Usw(k2,m)
∂k22
= 0 has a
unique solution (since ∂
2Usw(0,m)
∂k22
> 0). Thus condition (3) of Theorem 1
gets satisfied for φmaxc¯−c ≤ 1.
Finally we determine when condition (4) of Theorem 1 is true. For
φmax
c¯−c ≤ 1 we get
∂U sw(k2,+∞)
∂k2
=
dφ(k2)
dk2
· φ(k2)
c¯− c − 1 = λφmaxe
−λkφmax(1− e−λk)
c¯− c − 1.
For λφmax ≤ (c¯ − c)/φmax, we get that ∂U
s
w(k2,+∞)
∂k2
≤ 0 and therefore
k∗2(∞) = 0. Thus we see that all conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied
if: mt ≥ max(λφmax, c¯−cφmax );
φmax
c¯−c ≤ 1 and if λφmax ≤ (c¯ − c)/φmax.
Since mt ≥ 2, conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied if 2 ≥ (c¯− c)/φmax;
λφmax ≤ (c¯ − c)/φmax and φmaxc¯−c ≤ 1. Or equivalently conditions of
Theorem 1 are satisfied if 2 ≥ c¯−cφmax ≥ 1 and λφmax ≤
c¯−c
φmax
.
Proof of Proposition 3: To investigate the impact of cost spread
c¯−c on the optimal investment k∗2, we define U sw(k2, c¯−c) as the incum-
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bent supplier’s expected utility for the second-period. From Equation
(27), we can characterize U sw(k2, c¯− c) for uniformly distributed cost as
U sw(k2, c¯− c) =
(φ(k2))
2
2(c¯− c) +
φ(k2)
n
− φ(k2)
n+1
n(n+ 1)(c¯− c)n +
(c¯− c)
n(n+ 1)
− k2
Taking the first order condition of U sw(k2, c¯−c) allows us to characterize
the optimal investment k∗2(c¯− c) through the following Equation:
∂U sw(k2, c¯− c)
∂k2
=
dφ(k2)
dk2
〈φ(k2)
c¯− c +
1
n
(
1−
(φ(k2)
c¯− c
)n)〉− 1 = 0.
Implicitly differentiating the first order condition with respect to c¯ − c
gives
∂〈∂Usw(k∗2 (c¯−c),c¯−c)∂k2 〉
∂(c¯− c) =
∂2Usw(k2, c¯− c)
∂k22
dk∗2(c¯− c)
d(c¯− c) +
∂2Usw(k
∗
2(c¯− c), c¯− c)
∂k2∂(c¯− c) = 0,
(28)
i.e.,
dk∗2(c¯− c)
d(c¯− c) =
−∂2Usw(k∗2(c¯−c),c¯−c)∂k2∂(c¯−c)
∂2Usw(k
∗
2(c¯−c),c¯−c)
∂k22
. (29)
From the first order condition we find that, at optimum,
∂2Usw(k
∗
2(c¯−c),c¯−c)
∂k2∂(c¯−c) =
−dφ(k∗2)dk2 ·
φ(k∗2)
(c¯−c)2
〈
1 −
(
φ(k∗2)
c¯−c
)n−1〉 ≤ 0 if φ(k∗2)c¯−c ≤ 1. Moreover, by defini-
tion of a maximum
∂2Usw(k
∗
2(c¯−c),c¯−c)
∂k22
< 0. Thus
dk∗2(c¯−c)
d(c¯−c) ≤ 0 if
φ(k∗2)
c¯−c ≤ 1.
Since φ(k) ≤ c¯− c, ∀k, we have that dk∗2(c¯−c)d(c¯−c) ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4 In the single-auction case, optimal in-
vestment k∗1 is determined through the following first order condition:
dφ(k1)
dk1
= 1. Since φ(k) − k is concave in k, there is a unique global
maximum. In the two-auction case, the first order condition for opti-
mal investment is dU sw(k2, n)/dk2 = 0, which can be characterized from
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Equation (6) as:
dφ(k2)
dk2
·
〈
F (c+ φ(k2)) +
c¯−φ(k2)∫
c
F
n−1
(x)f(x+ φ(k2))dx
〉
= 1.
Because U sw(k2, n) is not necessarily concave or convex, this FOC could
give several local optima. We want to show that none of these potential
local maxima can be higher than the optimal investment from the single-
auction setting. For this, we first note that
F (c+ φ(k2)) +
c¯−φ(k)∫
c
F
n−1
(x)f(x+ φ(k))dx
≤
c∫
c−φ(k)
f(x+ φ(k))dx+
c¯−φ(k)∫
c
f(x+ φ(k))dx = 1.
Therefore
〈
F (c + φ(k)) +
c¯−φ(k)∫
c
F
n−1
(x)f(x + φ(k))dx
〉
≤ 1 and
the optimal k∗2 should satisfy
dφ(k∗2)
dk2
≥ 1. However, optimal k∗1 satisfies
dφ(k∗1)
dk1
= 1. Thus
dφ(k∗2)
dk2
≥dφ(k∗1)dk1 . Since φ(k) is increasing and concave in
k, this implies that k∗1 ≥ k∗2. Finally, from Proposition 1 we know that
k∗2 decreases in n, whereas k∗1 is independent on n. Thus regardless of
the supply base size, k∗1 ≥ k∗2.
Proof of Lemma 2 We denote by bfi the per-unit bid of supplier
i in the first period. We assume that the other suppliers j 6= i follow
an increasing and continuous bidding strategy bfj = β(c
f
j ). We can then
characterize supplier i’s total (over the two periods) expected profit as
pii =
 U sw(k2, n) + b
f
1:n−1 − cfi if bfi < bf1:n−1
U sl if b
f
i > b
f
1:n−1,
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where bf1:n−1 represents the lowest bid amongst the n− 1 other sup-
pliers in the first auction. Denote by cf1:n−1 the first-period lowest cost
amongst n − 1 other suppliers, and denote by f
cf1:n−1
(x) the density of
cf1:n−1, we can characterize supplier i’s expected profit as
Epii = F cf1:n−1(β
−1(bfi ))
(
U sw(k2, n) + E
(
β(cf1:n−1)|β(cf1:n−1) > bfi
)
− cfi
)
+ F
cf1:n−1
(β−1(bfi ))U
s
l
= F
cf1:n−1
(β−1(bfi ))
(
U sw(k2, n)− cfi
)
+
c∫
β−1(bfi )
β(x)f
cf1:n−1
(x)dx+ F
cf1:n−1
(β−1(bfi ))U
s
l .
Differentiating the above with respect to bfi and equating it to 0 gives
dEpii
dbfi
= f
cf1:n−1
(β−1(bfi ))
dβ−1(bfi )
dbfi
(
− β(β−1(bfi )) + cfi − δ
)
= 0,
where δ = U sw(k2, n) − U sl . Assuming that supplier i also follows the
similar bidding strategy β(cfi ) = b
f , allows us to characterize β from the
above first order condition as
f
cf1:n−1
(cfi )
1
dβ(cfi )/dc
f
i
(
− β(cfi ) + cfi − δ
)
= 0,
which implies that βdouble(c
f
i ) = c
f
i − δ. Note that β is increasing in cfi
since δ does not depend on cfi . We further need to check whether this
strategy forms an equilibrium, i.e., maximizes supplier i’s surplus. Let
supplier i misrepresent itself as a supplier with cost z, then its expected
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surplus can be characterized as :
Epii(βdouble(z), cfi ) = F cf1:n−1(z)
(
U sw(k2, n)− cfi
)
+
c∫
z
(
x+ U sl − U sw(k2, n)
)
f
cf1:n−1
(x)dx+ F
cf1:n−1
(z)U sl
= U sl + F cf1:n−1
(z)
(
z − cfi
)
+
c∫
z
F
cf1:n−1
(x)dx.
Since Epii(β∗double(z), c
f
i )−Epii(β∗double(cfi ), cfi ) = F cf1:n−1(z)
(
z−cfi
)
+
c∫
z
F
cf1:n−1
(x)dx −
c∫
c
F
cf1:n−1
(x)dx ≤ 0 for all z implies that β∗double(cfi ) =
cfi − δ is indeed an equilibrium bidding strategy.
Proof of Proposition 5 In the single-auction case, supplier i’s
expected utility is given by
EUsingle = Eb1:n−1
[
b1:n−1 − cfi − Ecsw − k∗1|b1:n−1 ≥ bi
]
· P(b1:n−1 ≥ bi).
Since suppliers bid according to Equation (8), supplier i’s expected util-
ity can be characterized as
EUsingle = Ecf1:n−1
[
cf1:n−1 − cfi |cf1:n−1 ≥ cfi
]
· P(cf1:n−1 ≥ cfi ).
Similarly, in the two-auction case, supplier i’s expected utility before
first auction is
EUdouble = Ebf1:n−1
[
Usw(k2, n) + b
f
1:n−1 − cfi |bf1:n−1 ≥ bfi
]
· P(bf1:n−1 ≥ bfi )
+ Usl · P(bf1:n−1 ≤ bfi )
= E
b
f
1:n−1
[
Usw(k2, n)− Usl + bf1:n−1 − cfi |bf1:n−1 ≥ bfi
]
· P(bf1:n−1 ≥ bfi ) + Usl .
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Since δ = U sw(k2, n) − U sl and from Lemma 2 we know the equilibrium
bid of each supplier as β∗double(c
f
i ) = b
f
i = c
f
i − δ. Thus supplier i’s
expected utility can be characterized as
EUdouble = Ecf1:n−1
[
cf1:n−1 − cfi |cf1:n−1 ≥ cfi
]
· P(cf1:n−1 ≥ cfi ) + U sl .
Since U sl ≥ 0, it follows that EUdouble ≥ EUsingle.
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4. Chapter 3 - Cost of information sharing in
group purchasing
4.1 Foreword of Chapter 3
The third chapter of this dissertation is entitled “Cost of informa-
tion sharing under group purchasing”, and it is a joint work with W.
Peng, Pr. A. Chaturvedi and Pr. P. Chevalier. This chapter focuses on
the information leakage that would be unavoidable when firms join in
buying groups, in order to obtain a lower per-unit purchasing price from
a common supplier. More precisely, we determine under which condi-
tions the cost benefits of group purchasing would outweigh the cost of
disclosing information to a competitor. For this, we use an analytical
model considering Cournot competition.
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Figure 23: Positioning of Chapter 3 according to the framework pre-
sented in Figure 2.
This chapter pertains principally to the literature dealing with pro-
curement cost reductions. Namely, it examines the incentives for buyers
engaged in horizontal competition to jointly purchase a component from
a common supplier, as a mean to increase their bargaining power and
hence negotiate down the per-unit purchasing price received from this
supplier. Although we do consider group purchasing organizations in
this project, this work also shares some common grounds with the liter-
ature on supply chain intermediaries, since the logic of the paper could
be adapted to group purchasing organizations. In addition, this project
deals with both uncertainty and information management. Namely, it
takes into account two types of uncertainties that can be present in com-
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petitive markets, and considers that through group purchasing, the firms
reduce the uncertainty by disclosing information to each other. There-
fore, both uncertainty and information clearly affect the rival firms’
decision on jointly purchasing or not. Finally, in the introduction of
this dissertation, we have discussed the benefits from vertically shar-
ing information along the supply chain, in terms of inventory decisions
and supply chain coordination. This chapter focuses rather on horizon-
tal information sharing and its implications on horizontal competition,
which, outside of group purchasing, is not related to the procurement
literature. However, horizontal information sharing is usually studied to
find new cost reduction opportunities. These pieces of information are
represented in Figure 23.
Group purchasing across rival firms suits well the current business
environment for two principal reasons. First, the increasingly competi-
tive environment pushes firms to search for original means of reducing
costs. While cooperating with a rival might have been philosophically
unacceptable in the past, it has almost become a common practice in
several supply chain activities (inventories, logistics, production, etc...).
This might have been facilitated by the outsourcing trend, which has
trivialized the reliance on outside partners’ capabilities. Second, as the
environment allows nowadays any firm to work with the worldwide most
efficient suppliers, many firms actually have the same suppliers, espe-
cially when few suppliers can deliver a certain component. For example,
competing giants in the hi-tech and automotive sectors have plenty of
common suppliers (a fortiori if they diversify their supply). This context
makes more likely the creation of buying groups across rival firms.
Deciding whether to jointly purchase with a rival would follow a
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highly strategic decision. It implies to estimate anticipatively the im-
pact of sensitive information leakage across firms on the outcome of
horizontal competition, and to compare this with the cost benefits de-
rived from group purchasing. In some situations, rival firms would prefer
to purchase jointly, whereas in other situations they would not. Hence,
it is not trivial whether on average, they would be willing to disclose
strategic information to their rival.
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Cost of Information Sharing Under
Group Purchasing
G. Merckx • W. Peng • A. Chaturvedi • P. Chevalier
While group purchasing amongst competing OEMs enables these to
obtain rebates from the supplier, it also requires regular interactions be-
tween the OEMs, which result in disclosure of private information such
that OEMs might prefer individual purchasing to conceal their private
information. This paper investigates how information sharing dimen-
sion affects OEMs’ motivations towards group purchasing, specifically
in industries characterized by market demand and technology level un-
certainties. Under Cournot competition, we find that group purchasing
is preferred by OEMs when product technology strongly affects mar-
ket demand, and that preference for group purchasing would depend on
product substitutability, market demand variability and supplier rebate
when influence of the product technology is low. We further find that
group purchasing can benefit both the OEMs and the consumers.
4.2 Introduction
In order to reduce their procurement cost competing Original Equip-
ment Manufacturers (OEMs) might collaborate to jointly procure com-
ponents from a common supplier through a group purchasing agreement.
For example, BMW and Daimler have jointly purchased tyres and seat
frames for several years now, and consider procuring further items to-
gether (Reuters, 2017). Similarly, nine Chinese TV makers have been
together spending around 5 billion dollars each year since 2009 in jointly
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ordering flat screens from Taiwanese producers (ChinaDaily, 2011). Al-
though the input cost reduction aspect of group purchasing (hereafter
referred to as GP) has been widely documented in the extant literature,
whether or when should rival OEMs prefer GP agreements over the tra-
ditional individual purchase order (hereafter referred to as IP) from their
respective supplier/s remains debatable. Chen and Roma (2011) argue
that one reason why competing OEMs might prefer IP over GP agree-
ments could be due to order size asymmetry across OEMs. Since per-
unit procurement costs are typically decreasing in the quantity ordered,
an OEM ordering more units would actually subsidize its competitor’s
purchase price through GP, and hence erode its own competitive ad-
vantage. Moreover, under GP the OEMs have to coordinate upfront
in order to negotiate as a single buyer with the supplier, For instance
OEMs would have to coordinate on a joint order quantity that they
would place to the supplier. Such coordination between OEMs would
implicitly involve disclosure of sensitive market information, which they
might not prefer to reveal to each other. Thus even though GP would
give lower procurement cost to the competing OEMs it might also in-
volve unavoidable disclosure of private information, which makes it un-
clear why (or when) competing OEMs might want to enter into GP
agreements. It is this question that we try to answer in this paper by
addressing the trade-off between lower procurement cost and informa-
tion disclosure when entering into GP agreement.
Actually, whether information disclosure is always detrimental to
competing OEMs’ profitability is far from being trivial. Economics lit-
erature has shown that competing firms’ incentives to disclose private
information critically depends on the type of information exchanged and
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on the type of competition. For instance, Clarke (1983), Vives (1984)
and Gal-Or (1985) have shown that firms sharing private information
about their common demand estimates correlates their strategies (i.e.,
the quantities that they bring in the market) which in turn hurts their
expected profits when they are competing a` la Cournot but not neces-
sarily under Bertrand competition. However, Fried (1984) and Shapiro
(1986) have shown that firms sharing private information on production
costs does not necessarily correlate their strategies and hence could in
fact increase their expected profits.
Besides being privately informed on common demand, OEMs might
also be better informed about the technology level of their own prod-
uct as compared to the rival’s product before these products are brought
out into the market. Information on technology level of product includes
knowledge on the extent to which a new product has been upgraded or
if the new product belongs to a new generation. Upgrades to existing
products or whether the product belongs to a new generation is depen-
dent on R&D programs whose eventual success or failure is known to
the undertaking firm and not to the rival firm. Hence the technology
level of product, prior to its launch, is private information of the firm.
Evidently, the product’s technology level would be an important deter-
minant of its eventual market demand. In markets that see frequent
introduction of new products, e.g. electronics, the competing OEMs
might simultaneously (or within relatively short interval) bring out their
respective products thus resulting in the demand for their products not
only being influenced by their own product’s technology level but also
by the competing product’s technology level. If these OEMs enter into a
GP agreement prior to product launch for pooling their order quantities
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on a common item, then these firms would not only be communicating
(advertently or inadvertently) their information about common market
demand but also their private information on the impact that their pro-
prietary product technology would have on the market demand. Since
firms typically decide on GP agreement and consequentially their or-
der quantities before introducing their product to the market, therefore
it is natural that decision to enter into a GP agreement should be as-
sessed through the lens of Cournot competition. As discussed above dis-
closing common market demand information would usually hurt OEMs’
expected profits when they are competing a` la Cournot. However, the
impact on OEMs profitability from disclosing information about product
technology has never been studied.
Built on these observations, our objective is threefold: (1) indepen-
dent of procurement cost advantage we first investigate the economics
of information sharing (on both market demand and technology level)
and characterize the conditions under which OEMs would be penalized
from information disclosure inherent to GP. (2) For situations in which
OEMs are better off by concealing information, we study whether the
purchasing cost advantage derived from GP can offset their cost of dis-
closing information. (3) We investigate the impact of GP agreements on
consumer surplus to characterize situations under which GP agreements
would benefit both the OEMs and the consumers. This last point is
important in determining when would GP agreements be acceptable by
both competing OEMs and by anti-competitive regulations.
To address the above issues we investigate a stylized three-period
duopoly model with Cournot competition. In the third (last) period
both OEMs realize their market demand, which we model through their
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respective inverse demand functions that are linked by a common mar-
ket demand parameter and by substitutability between their respective
products. In the second period both OEMs observe their private signals
on the common market demand and observe their realized technology
level (which in turn influences their products demand). The OEMs
then disclose their signals to each other if they have entered into a GP
agreement in period 1 and then decide individually on their respective
order quantity which they then pool to jointly procure from a common
supplier. If they have not agreed on GP then they decide their order
quantity individually without disclosing their signal (and without know-
ing the other’s order quantity) and procure their respective quantities
at a higher per-unit cost as compared to the GP agreement. In the first
period both the OEMs decide whether they want to enter into a GP
agreement or not (with the default strategy being IP).
We find that when technology level is the only source of private in-
formation then the OEMs always prefer to share their information with
each other. However, they prefer to conceal their private information
on market demand uncertainty when it is the only source of private in-
formation and as long as product substitutability is sufficiently high.
When competing OEMs’ information on both technology level and mar-
ket demand are private then getting into GP agreements would require
them to reveal their information on both technology and market to each
other. We find that sharing or not sharing technology level and mar-
ket demand information can be favored, depending on product substi-
tutability, market demand variability, signal accuracy, as well as market
impact of technology. This latter factor is crucial in determining OEMs’
purchasing strategy when purchase cost reduction in GP is taken into
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consideration. If product technology has a strong market impact, GP is
always beneficial for the OEMs, whereas for a weaker market impact of
technology, GP is favored over IP only if product substitutability is low
or if market demand variability is limited as compared to the reduction
in purchase cost in GP. We further find that, if GP does not give any
cost reduction compared to IP then OEMs and consumers never benefit
simultaneously from the information revelation inherent in GP agree-
ments, when only market demand or technology level is the source of
private information. However, when both are sources of private informa-
tion then there always exists situations in which GP would be preferred
by both OEMs and consumers. These situations become more frequent
as cost reduction obtained through GP increases, suggesting that OEMs
pass on a part of this cost reduction from their supplier to the consumers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.3,
we review the literature dealing with information sharing and GP. We
study the IP strategy in Section 4.4, the GP strategy in Section 4.5 and
compare those strategies in Section 4.6. Finally, we discuss the consumer
welfare implications in Section 4.7 and present our concluding remarks
in Section 4.8. All the relevant proofs are present in the Appendix.
4.3 Literature Review
This paper is principally related to two broad streams of literature
dealing with to 1) information sharing and to 2) group purchasing. Eco-
nomics literature has investigated the benefits and disadvantages of in-
formation sharing between competing firms. In case of Cournot compe-
tition is considered, Clarke (1983), Vives (1984), Gal-Or (1985) and Li
(1985) show that not sharing information is a dominant strategy if firms
are symmetrically informed about common uncertain demand intercept
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and if goods are close substitutes. In contrast, Li (1985), Fried (1984)
and Shapiro (1986) find that sharing information is a dominant strategy
if firms possess private information about their own cost. The ratio-
nale is that releasing firm-specific information makes firms’ decisions
less correlated, which has a positive impact on firms’ profits, unlike re-
leasing common market information, which makes firms’ decisions more
correlated. These conclusions are reversed under Bertrand competition
(Vives, 1984; Gal-Or, 1985). Our paper investigates information shar-
ing under Cournot competition about both common market, i.e. the
maximum price that the market is willing to accept, and about a firm-
specific technology, i.e. OEM’s information on the price sensitivity of
its product.
GP agreements first emerged in public entities, like hospitals or
schools, between which there is no competition. In that case, GP mostly
lowers purchasing expenses with limited disadvantages, as notably dis-
cussed in Burns and Lee (2008) or in McKone-Sweet et al. (2005).
However, some practical threats also exist, like the difficulty to gather
a sufficient number of buyers (Liang et al., 2014), or the reduced incen-
tives for OEMs to innovate when they sell to GP organizations (Hu and
Schwarz, 2011). Hu et al. (2012) and Saha et al. (2010) further study
how those GP organizations affect healthcare supply chains.
The body of literature on GP has since then investigated strategic
issues related to GP agreement, specially for competing retailers. Ke-
skinocak and Savas¸aneril (2008) find that, under Cournot competition,
whether buyers would engage in group purchasing agreements would de-
pend on their size and production capacity. Chen and Roma (2011) use
a Bertrand model to show that, because of a reduced acquisition cost,
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GP is always beneficial for symmetric retailers, whereas it can be detri-
mental for one retailer if it has a larger market base (or if it is more
cost efficient). For this retailer, letting its rival benefit from its bet-
ter negotiating position (and hence lower purchasing cost) would erode
its competitive advantage. In our paper, we examine the incentives for
competing retailers to jointly procure from an information exchange per-
spective. Specifically, we study the mixed impact of uncertainty about
both market demand and price sensitivity on the GP decision, where the
price sensitivity uncertainty is attributed to the specific firm’s uncertain
product technology level. To the best of our knowledge, no extant work
has studied this problem. Similar to our context, Yan et al. (2017)
analyze the impact that asymmetric private information about demand
has on retailers’ attitude towards group purchasing. They find that the
most informed retailer is never favorable to GP, suggesting that under
information asymmetry, the cost benefits of GP do not compensate the
loss of information advantage about the demand. In our work, we do not
consider information asymmetry. However, we focus on the combined
effect of two different types of uncertainties in motivating GP, rather
than a single one as in Yan et al. (2017).
Finally, Group purchasing organizations (GPO) which play the role
of intermediaries between buyers and suppliers have also received at-
tention from academicians. Yang et al. (2017) and Zhou et al. (2017)
investigate the incentives for buying firms to contract with a GPO or to
share information with a GPO. However, in our paper the interaction is
limited between the buying firms.
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4.4 Individual purchasing case
We consider a duopoly with two OEMs represented by subscripts i
and j. Both the OEMs simultaneously bring out a new product (which
could be an upgrade to an existing product or a new generation of prod-
uct) to the market. The demand for OEM i’s product is modeled by its
inverse demand as
pi = P + θ −
(
qi +Kqj
Mi
)
, (30)
with P +θ being the uncertain common market demand (where P is
a constant and θ is a random variable with mean 0 and variance σ2);
1
Mi
is OEM i’s price sensitivity to quantities brought to the market and K
is product substitutability. We assume K ∈ [0, 1] as an OEM is always
more impacted by its own quantity decision than by its rival’s, with
K = 0 corresponding to independent markets and K = 1 to perfectly
substitutable products.
As mentioned in the Introduction, prior to launching their respec-
tive products the competing OEMs are privately informed about their
own product technology level. In our model, technology level can turn
out to be high or low (based on the uncertain result of R&D program
undertaken by the respective firms) with a likelihood of γ and 1 − γ.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that γ = 0.5, even though the
main insights of our model would carry with any other value of γ. A
low technology level of OEM i’s product results in Mi = 1 and a high
technology level of OEM i’s product results in Mi = M , with M ≥ 1.
Thus Mi could either be 1 or M with a likelihood of 50% and is private
information of OEM i. We interpret M as the market impact of tech-
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nology and a higher value of M would represent a greater impact of high
technology level product on OEMs’ price and market shares relative to
low technology level product. Actually, from a market perspective, it is
maybe more the perception of the technology level that would influence
the market shares rather than the technology level itself, such that tech-
nological competitiveness uncertainty might better suit our model than
technology uncertainty. However, to simplify the terminology, we refer
to this uncertainty as technology uncertainty. Further note that both γ
and the value of M are exogenous, common knowledge and symmetric
across OEMs. P and K are also exogenous and common knowledge.
Technology level is not the only source of private information that
the OEMs would possess at the time of making their quantity deci-
sion. OEMs might also gain (private) information about other attributes
that influence overall market demand as they move closer to intro-
ducing their product into the market. Specifically, before making the
quantity decision each OEM receives a private signal Yi, which is an
unbiased estimator of θ, i.e., EYi [Yi|θ] = θ. This signal could, for
example, arise from market research conducted independently by the
OEMs to estimate the market demand. Similar to Li (1985), we as-
sume a linear-expectation information structure, i.e. Eθ[θ|Yi] is linear
in Yi. This information structure includes well-known conjugate pairs
like normal-normal, beta-binomial and gamma-Poisson. For example,
with the gamma-Poisson distribution, an OEM i would receive a sig-
nal Yi derived from a Poisson distribution, which would then enable the
OEM to formulate the gamma distribution of θ, since the distribution
of θ is conditional upon the signal received by the OEM. We further de-
fine signal accuracy as t =
EYi [V ar[Yi|θ]]
σ2
. Note that we omit subscript
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Figure 24: Timeline with the sequence of events.
from t since it is symmetric across OEMs and can take values between
0 and ∞, with 0 corresponding to a perfect signal, and ∞ correspond-
ing to an uninformative signal. From Li (1985), we directly obtain that
Eθ[θ|Yi] = EYj [Yj |Yi] = Yi1+t . Figure 24 depicts the Model timeline.
Under IP, an OEM i makes its quantity decision after having ob-
served its own technology level (which directly gives Mi) and its own
market demand signal, Yi, but having no access to its competitor’s pri-
vate information. We denote OEM i’s quantity decision in the IP case
by qIi (Yi,Mi). Assuming that under IP each OEM incurs a symmetric
per-unit purchasing cost cI< P . We characterize OEM i’s conditional
expected profit as
EMjEYjEθ[pi
I
i |Yi,Mi] = qIi (Yi,Mi)(
P + Eθ[θ|Yi]− 1
Mi
(
qIi (Yi,Mi) +KEMjEYjEθ[q
I
j (Yj ,Mj)|Yi]
)
− cI
)
.
(31)
Maximizing this conditional expected profit provides the equilibrium
quantities under the IP case,12 which are presented in Proposition 6. We
12Under both IP and GP, the quantity purchased by an OEM corresponds to the
quantity that it finally sells on the market
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assume M <
2
K
such that the expected equilibrium quantities and prices
are non-negative. In addition, we assume that P is sufficiently large as
compared to σ, such that realized quantities and prices are almost always
positive.
Proposition 6 In the IP case, the unique equilibrium quantities for
OEM i are characterized as
qIi (Yi,Mi = 1) =
(P − cI)(4−K(M − 1))
4(K + 2)
+
4(t+ 1)−K(M − 1)
4(t+ 1)(K + 2(t+ 1))
Yi,
qIi (Yi,Mi = M) =
(P − cI)(4M +K(M − 1))
4(K + 2)
+
4M(t+ 1) +K(M − 1)
4(t+ 1)(K + 2(t+ 1))
Yi.
Moreover, OEM i’s expected profit, i.e. before it observes its technology
level and market demand signal, is characterized as
EpiIi =
(M + 1)
32M〈(P − cI)2
(K + 2)2
(
K2(1−M)2 + 16M)+ σ2 (16M(t+ 1)2 +K2(1−M)2)
(t+ 1)
(
K + 2(t+ 1)
)2 〉.
(32)
Equation (32) characterizes OEM’s ex-ante profit, i.e., before it ob-
serves its technology level and its market demand signal. We will later
compare this expected profit with OEM’s expected profit in the GP case
to characterize OEM’s decision to enter into a GP agreement or not.
4.5 Group purchasing case
Competing firms may decide to jointly procure a common compo-
nent, that both of them need in their final product, from a single sup-
plier. In such situation both the OEMs enter into a GP agreement in
which they decide individually their respective order quantity, which
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they then pool into a joint order quantity that they place to their se-
lected supplier. Compared to individually procuring this component
(see previous section) the GP agreement allows both the OEMs to re-
duce their per-unit cost of procuring the component. We model this
by assuming cI > cG, with cG being the per-unit purchasing costs un-
der GP. Specifically, we define cG = (1 − r)cI , with r ∈ [0, 1] being
the per-unit rebate offered by the supplier to OEMs that would jointly
procure.
Reaching an agreement on a joint order quantity would typically in-
volve iterative discussions between the OEMs which would inevitably
result in some exchange (or leakage) of private information that each
OEM possesses about the common market and/or its product technol-
ogy. By information exchange we do not necessarily mean that OEMs
would voluntarily reveal their private information but rather that the
OEMs would glean each other’s information from the repeated interac-
tions that they would have before agreeing on a joint order size. This is
consistent with Hendrick (1997), as well as Nollet and Beaulieu (2005),
who argue that sensitive information disclosure is one of the disadvan-
tages of GP. Schotanus (2007) even shows through an empirical study
that sensitive information disclosure is an important factor in discour-
aging private firms (more than public) to commit to GP agreements.
Without getting into the details of this process of repeated interactions,
we rather use a parsimonious model in which we assume that through
GP agreements OEMs become fully aware of each other’s private infor-
mation, on both common market demand and their product technology
level, when deciding on a joint order quantity. Specifically, each OEM
would formulate its expectation of θ conditional on both signals (Yi and
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Yj) and moreover would be informed about both Mi and Mj . Following
Li (1985) we obtain that Eθ[θ|Yi, Yj ] = Yi + Yj
2 + t
. Thus their joint quan-
tity decision would involve each OEM deciding its own order quantity,
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj),
13 that maximizes the OEM’s expected profit condi-
tional on the OEM being informed of each other’s information set. The
OEMs procure their joint order quantity qGi + q
G
j at a per-unit cost of
cG. Under the GP strategy, OEM i’s conditional expected profit can be
characterized as:
Eθ[piGi |Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj ] = qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj)(
P + Eθ[θ|Yi, Yj ]− 1
Mi
(
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj) +Kq
G
j (Yj , Yi,Mj ,Mi)
)
− cG
)
.
(33)
Note that a critical difference between Equation (31) and Equation
(33) is that in the former (IP case) OEM i’s expected profit is character-
ized from the expectation of the equilibrium quantity that OEM j would
bring to the market (i.e., from EMjEYjEθqIj ) whereas in the latter (GP
case) OEM i’s expected profit is characterized directly by qGj . Maximiz-
ing this conditional expected profit for each OEM gives the equilibrium
quantities under GP.
Proposition 7 In the GP case, OEM i’s unique equilibrium quantity
can be characterized by
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj) =
(2Mi −KMj)
4−K2
(
P +
Yi + Yj
2 + t
− cG
)
.
OEM i’s expected profit, i.e. before it observes its technology level
13Regardless the OEM that we consider, we denote quantity decisions in GP as
being dependent on (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj), such that we have q
G
j (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj).
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and market demand signal, can be characterized as
EpiGi =
(
(P − cG)2 + 2σ2t+2
)(
M + 1
)(
K2(M2 + 1) + 8M(1−K)
)
4M
(
4−K2
)2 .
(34)
4.6 Comparison between individual and group purchas-
ing
Having analyzed the IP and GP cases in the previous sections, we
are now in a position to answer the question on when would an OEM
select GP rather than IP and inversely? Typically, the decision to get
into a GP agreement would be made on a strategic level since the OEMs
would have to select their common supplier and then negotiate the con-
tract (quantity and price) terms with the supplier long before they bring
their product to the market. We therefore model that an OEM decides
to join a GP agreement or purchase individually before observing its
market demand signal or its technological level. To formulate this deci-
sion we compare the ex-ante, expected, profit of an OEM in the IP case
(characterized in Equation (32)) with its expected profit for the GP case
(characterized in Equation (34)).
We denote the difference in expected profits between GP and IP as
∆OEM = EpiGi − EpiIi , which is characterized as
∆OEM =
(M + 1)
(
σ2f + h
)
32M(K2 − 4)2(t+ 1)(t+ 2)(K + 2(t+ 1))2 , (35)
where
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f =
(
256Mt(t+ 1)2
)
(1− 2K) + 16K2
(
(M2 + 1)
(
4t3 + 12t2 + 11t+ 2
)
+M
(
8t3 − 14t− 4))
+ 64K3(t+ 1)
(
(t+ 1)(M2 + 1)− 2M
)
− 8K4
(
M
(
2t3 + 8t2 + 12t+ 8
)− (3t+ 4)(M2 + 1))
− K6(1−M)2(t+ 2),
h = (t+ 1)(t+ 2)(K + 2t+ 2)2〈
K2(1−M)2(−K2 + 4K + 4)(P − cI)2 + 8φ(K2(M2 + 1) + 8M(1−K))〉,
(36)
φ = cIr
(
cIr + 2(P − cI)). (37)
Proposition 8 ∆OEM is convex in M . Moreover, ∆OEM is increasing
in M for ∆OEM ≥ 0.
This proposition indicates that, as soon as GP is preferred over IP, a
higher market impact of technology M makes GP increasingly attractive
as compared to IP, and thus would never result in a change of preferred
strategies from GP to IP. We next determine how other parameters in-
fluence OEMs profitability in GP relative to IP. We present in Figure
25 a surface illustrating the set of parameter combinations for which the
OEMs are indifferent between either purchasing option (i.e. ∆OEM = 0).
This surface separates the region where IP is preferred (below the sur-
face), from the region where GP is preferred (above the surface). One
can notice from Equation (35) that the sign of σ2f+h completely deter-
mines the sign of ∆OEM (the other factors of the fraction are positive)
and hence one needs to focus only on analyzing σ2f + h to characterize
the regions of Figure 25, which we show in the next Theorem.
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Figure 25: The surface represents situations in which OEMs are indiffer-
ent between IP and GP. GP (IP) is preferred above (below) this surface.
On the left figure, r = 0, while r = 0.01 on the right figure. The other
parameters are P = 10, t = 0.5, and cI = 0.5.
Theorem 2 GP is preferred over IP if K ≤ K∗, with K∗ being defined
as
K∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣2(t+ 1)(σ2t− φ(t+ 2))− 2σt
√
(t+ 1)(t+ 2)(2σ2 + φ(t+ 2))
φ(t+ 2)− σ2t(3 + t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
(38)
and with K∗ being always greater than 23 . Otherwise, there exists a
threshold M∗ such that GP is preferred over IP if M > M∗, whereas IP
is preferred over GP if M < M∗.
This result shows that whether IP or GP would be preferable criti-
cally depends on the value of the exogenous parameters K and M . The
first part of theorem 2 provides the condition (K < K∗) under which
GP dominates IP for any value of the market impact of technology M .
This condition (i.e. K < K∗) implies that competing OEMs would be
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willing to share information as long as substitutability between their
respective products is below a certain threshold (K∗). For the special
case of M = 1, i.e., when there is no technology level uncertainty, Vives
(1984) also finds a similar result in which OEMs should share market
demand information as long as product substitutability is low enough.
The reason for this comes from the information sharing dimension of GP,
which has two effects: 1) on the one hand, it hurts OEMs’ expected prof-
its by perfectly correlating their quantity decisions but 2) on the other
hand, it increases OEMs’ expected profits since they can make more
informed decision on their production quantity. While the benefits of
sharing information (i.e. precision effect) are always attractive, its cost
(i.e. correlation effect) depends on the value of K. If K is low, OEMs
operate in rather independent markets and hence do not suffer from
having correlated strategies (see Equation (30)), making GP more at-
tractive. However, IP tends to be favored more often as substitutability
between the products increases (i.e., as K increases). Actually, Theorem
2 confirms that OEMs competing on rather independent markets (i.e.
low level of product substitutability K) are not penalized by exchang-
ing sensitive private information (regardless whether it is information on
common market demand or on product technology level), but that they
rather benefit from making more informed decisions. Finally, comparing
the left and right panels of Figure 25 we find that increasing the pur-
chasing cost rebate r indeed results in GP being increasingly preferred
over IP.
In the second part of Theorem 2, we show that even for K > K∗ GP
could still be preferred over IP if the market conditions are such that
M > M∗.14 Interestingly, this result complements the earlier results in
14We provide the expression for M∗ in the proof of Theorem 2 in appendix.
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Economics literature Vives (1984) which state that OEMs should not
share information when product substitutability is high enough. The
reason being that models in Economics literature have typically focused
on information uncertainty on market attributes, like common market
demand (which in our case is P ). However, we also bring in information
uncertainty on attributes that are associated with specific OEM, like
the impact that an OEM’s product technology can have on the market.
If market is insensitive to product technology (low M), i.e., the rela-
tive difference in the technological specification of the competing OEMs
product does not influence their respective demand, then our model
is similar to the traditional Economics model. However, typically the
difference in technological specs of competing products would influence
their respective demand and if a better product (by better we mean a
product that has more advanced technological specs) has greater impact
on demand (i.e., a high M) then we find that OEMs might be interested
in sharing their information with each other even when their respective
products have high substitutability. Namely, unlike with common mar-
ket demand uncertainty alone, with both types of uncertainty consid-
ered simultaneously, product substitutability is not a sufficient criterion
to guarantee that IP can be preferred over IP. Rather, to draw such con-
clusion, the substitutability has to be examined in parallel with market
demand variability and with supplier rebate. Evidently the existence of
a threshold value of M∗ echoes the result of Proposition 8 in which the
difference in OEMs’ profit with GP relative to IP was increasing in M
(for ∆OEM > 0).
To further understand the trade-offs in sharing information on tech-
nology versus sharing information on common market demand we next
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investigate how uncertainty about technology level alone would affect
the purchasing strategy choice of the OEMs. For this, we set σ2 = 0 (in
which case t has no impact anymore).
Proposition 9 When technology level is the only source of uncertainty,
OEMs always prefer to share information.
Proposition 9 claims that, without market demand uncertainty, OEMs
are always better off sharing information through GP, even when the
supplier does not offer any rebate in counterpart. This can be explained
by the interactions that our model allows between competitors. Under
GP, the OEMs would make their quantity decision while knowing both
their own and their rival’s technology levels. If an OEM has a technology
advantage over the other, it would make a bigger order, to put its com-
petitor under pressure, since OEMs affect each other’s price through the
quantity of products that they put on the market. In response, the rival
would reduce its order to avoid flooding the market. Thus, technology
level information makes OEMs’ quantity decisions less correlated, which
is profitable under Cournot. Specifically, the higher the market impact
of technology, the more each OEM can put pressure on the other when it
has a technology advantage, and the less correlated are the equilibrium
decisions. In contrast, with only market demand uncertainty, OEMs
prefer not to share information. Therefore in Theorem 2 we find that
when both common market demand and OEMs’ technology level are
uncertain then a higher value of M (indicating higher uncertainty on
technology) results in sharing of information between OEMs more bene-
ficial, such that M offsets the disadvantages of sharing information due
to uncertainty on common demand.
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Next, we examine the sensitivity of ∆OEM in the parameters r and P .
Proposition 10 The difference in expected profits between GP and IP,
i.e. ∆OEM , is:
(1) increasing in r, while M∗ is decreasing in r;
(2) increasing in P , while M∗ is decreasing in P .
We unsurprisingly find that ∆OEM increases in the per-unit purchasing
cost rebate arising from GP, i.e. r, such that with higher supplier rebate,
GP gets more attractive relative to IP. Therefore, higher rebates would
make GP preferred over IP for lower values of the market impact of
technology M , and hence would result in a lower threshold value M∗.
This can be visualized by comparing the left and the right plots of Figure
25.
As discussed after Theorem 2, uncertainty on common market de-
mand incentivizes competing OEMs to conceal their private information,
and thus to favor IP rather than GP. Especially, if the information on
the market demand would be more uncertain, the information on com-
mon market demand would be even more valuable, and the suppliers
would be even less willing to disclose it. On the contrary, a higher value
of P would lower the effect of common market demand uncertainty, and
would thus make GP preferred over IP more often, such that ∆OEM is
increasing in P . Note that, similar to r, the effect that P has on the
threshold M∗ introduced in Theorem 2 is the opposite of their effect on
∆OEM such that M
∗ decreases in P .
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4.7 Discussion on consumer welfare
Information sharing, and more generally cooperation, among rival
OEMs would typically raise antitrust concerns if the related benefits de-
rived by the OEMs would come at the detriment of the consumers. It
is therefore interesting to examine whether GP can be favorable simul-
taneously for both the OEMs and the consumers, which is investigated
in this section. We define consumer surplus for either IP or GP case as
(P + θ − pi)qi
2
+
(P + θ − pj)qj
2
and characterize the expected consumer
surplus in, respectively, the IP and the GP situations as:
ECSI = EMiEMjEθEYiEYj
1
2Mi
(
qIi (Yi,Mi) +Kq
I
j (Yj ,Mj)
)
qIi (Yi,Mi)
+ EMiEMjEθEYiEYj
1
2Mj
(
qIj (Yj ,Mj) +Kq
I
i (Yi,Mi)
)
qIj (Yj ,Mj), (39)
ECSG = EMiEMjEθEYiEYj
1
2Mi
(
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj) +Kq
G
j (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj)
)
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj)
+ EMiEMjEθEYiEYj
1
2Mj
(
qGj (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj) +Kq
G
i (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj)
)
qGj (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj).
(40)
By introducing the equilibrium quantities, as defined in Propositions 6
and 7, in the previous equations, we obtain ∆CS≡ECSG−ECSI , which
is characterized as
∆CS =
(M + 1)(σ2fCS + hCS)
32M2(K2 − 4)2(t+ 1)(t+ 2)(K + 2(t+ 1))2 , (41)
where
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hCS = −(t+ 1)(t+ 2)(K + 2t+ 2)2
〈
K2(M2 + 1)
(
(P − cI)2(−K2 + 4K + 4) + 8φ
)
−M
(
16φ(K3 − 2K2 + 4) + 2(P − cI)2K2(−K2 + 4K + 4)
)〉
,
fCS = (M − 1)2(t+ 2)K6 − 16Mt(t+ 1)K5
+
(
16(−t3 + 4t2 + 8t+ 4)M − 8(3t+ 4)(M2 + 1)
)
K4
+
(
128(t3 + 2t2 + 2t+ 1)M − 64(t+ 1)2(M2 + 1)
)
K3 + 256Mt(t+ 1)(K + t+ 1)
− 16
(
(4t3 + 12t2 + 11t+ 2)(M2 + 1) + 2(4t3 + 8t2 + t− 2)M
)
K2. (42)
Proposition 11 The difference in expected consumer surplus between
GP and IP, ∆CS, is
(1) non-negative when market demand is the only source of uncer-
tainty.
(2) non-positive when technology level is the only source of uncertainty
and when r = 0.
(3) increasing in r.
These results suggest that whether GP is desirable from the point
of view of the consumers depends on the type of uncertainty faced by
the OEMs. On the one hand, if market demand is the only source of
uncertainty, we find that GP always benefits the consumers, which is
consistent with Vives (1984), despite the fact that he does not take
supplier rebate into account. On the other hand, in an environment
with technology level uncertainty only, consumer surplus would decrease
if OEMs commit to GP agreements, as long as the suppliers offer no
rebate.
Interestingly, existing Economics literature (Vives, 1984) has found
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Figure 26: In the region between solid curve and dashed curve both
OEMs and consumers are better off under GP . The parameters for
3.1(a) and 3.1(b) are P = 10, t = 0.5, cI = 0.5, σ2 = 5, r = 0 for (a)
and r = 0.01 for (b). The parameters for 3.2(a) and 3.2(b) are P = 10,
t = 0.5, cI = 0.5, K = 0.9, r = 0 for (a) and r = 0.01 for (b).
that with market demand uncertainty only (and high enough product
substitution K) OEMs do not prefer to share information and hence
would not get into GP agreements even though GP agreement would
benefit the consumer. On the other hand with technological level un-
certainty only, Proposition 9 shows that OEMs would benefit from GP
agreement, whereas consumer surplus might suffer specially when sup-
plier rebate, r, in GP is low. This suggests that GP agreements can
plausibly be beneficial to both OEMs and the consumers in cases where
higher rebate offered by the supplier to the OEMs is partially passed to
the consumers and when market demand uncertainty is not too high rel-
ative to technological level uncertainty. In the next Theorem we analyze
precisely this, i.e., the situation in which GP agreement is beneficial to
both the OEMs and the consumers.
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Theorem 3 There always exists a non empty interval in the market
impact of technology M over which both consumers and OEMs simulta-
neously prefer GP over IP. This interval becomes larger as the supplier
rebate r increases.
We provide the implications of this theorem by first introducing
M∗CS ,
15 which is the threshold up to which consumers prefer GP and
beyond which they prefer IP. In the proof of Theorem 3 we show that,
M∗CS ≥ M∗ and therefore when OEMs sometimes prefer IP at M = 1
then the interval in which OEMs and consumers are simultaneously bet-
ter off with GP is defined by [M∗,M∗CS ]. Otherwise when OEMs prefer
GP at M = 1 then the interval in M over which OEMs and consumers
both benefit from GP is defined by [1,M∗CS ]. It follows that there always
exists an interval in M over which everyone benefits from GP. However,
for high values of M , OEMs take advantage of GP agreements at the
detriment of the consumers (i.e. when M > M∗CS), whereas for low val-
ues of M , it can be that consumers benefit from GP at the detriment of
the OEMs (i.e. when 1 ≤ M < M∗). Finally, we obtain that increases
in the supplier rebate r result in a larger interval over which OEMs and
consumers are better off together, as illustrated on Figure 26. These nu-
merical results also suggest that the range of M , in which consumers and
OEMs simultaneously favor GP, typically increases as market demand
variability σ2 increases or when product substitutability K decreases.
4.8 Conclusion
Although cost advantages for competing OEMs to get into GP agree-
ments are well understood, other strategic aspects, specially information
15Similar to K∗ and M∗, M∗CS is a function of the model parameters.
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sharing which is inherent to GP agreements, remain inaccurately under-
stood. In this paper, we have investigated how the exchange of informa-
tion about both market demand and technology level uncertainties that
takes place when firms get into GP agreements, could affect their incen-
tives to get into GP agreements. While Econmics literature has already
found out that competing OEMs typically do not gain by exchanging
information about market demand, little was known about the impact
of sharing information on technology level, despite the fact that agree-
ing on common order size in GP agreements would involve information
sharing on not only market demand estimates that each OEM possesses
but also on each OEM’s knowledge about the impact that its prod-
uct specifications and technology would have on the market demand.
This is specially relevant in markets where new versions of products are
released periodically, i.e., OEMs do not know their rival’s product tech-
nology level for the next period in advance, and hence can not anticipate
the impact of their rival’s product on their own demand for next period.
In such markets, we have shown in this paper that when the uncertainty
on technology is relatively high compared to uncertainty on market de-
mand, then OEMs are always willing to share their technology level and
market demand information and hence such situation might involve GP
agreements. However, a lower level of technological uncertainty would
not necessarily discourage OEMs to opt for GP, as this strategy would
remain beneficial as long as either product substitutability is low, or if
market demand uncertainty is sufficiently low relatively to the supplier
rebate offered under GP.
In order to focus on impact that information sharing would have on
competing OEMs’ profitability we have assumed in this paper that GP
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agreements would involve OEMs fully sharing their information about
their respective estimates of market demand and their technology level.
In reality such an exchange of information might be more nuanced, since
evidently the information is not directly communicated but is rather in-
terpreted by OEMs from each other’s order size which by themselves
might be negotiated by OEMs prior to being given to a supplier. We do
not model such a negotiation process between the firms but rather as-
sume that an outcome of such an iterative negotiation process would re-
sult in each OEM having full information about the other OEM’s private
information. Future research on this topic could actually model such an
iterative negotiation as a dynamic game to investigate the amount of
information that OEMs would reveal in equilibrium through their order
sizes. Such models could be further enriched if OEMs can order the
same part from multiple suppliers while sharing just one supplier, as
part of GP agreement. Although these models would be more detailed,
the underlying tension in exchange of information would remain same
as our paper, i.e., OEMS would be reluctant to part with their informa-
tion on common market estimates but would be more willing to share
information on their respective product technology.
There is a fine line between sharing information and collusion and/or
anti-competitive practices, hence it is also necessary to measure the effect
that information sharing would have on consumers’ surplus, in order to
determine whether GP could be conflicting with antitrust regulations.
Our analysis shows that there always exists an interval for the market
impact of technology over which the consumers and the OEMs would
simultaneously benefit from GP agreements. Moreover, we obtain that
this interval becomes larger as the rebate offered by the suppliers to
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OEMs jointly purchasing increases. It follows that under such conditions
GP can be beneficial for both OEMs and consumers
Our model could also be extended in various ways, as through consid-
ering a market with more than two OEMs or a multi-period model. We
believe, however, that those two specific extensions would not result in
different findings than those presented in this paper. Allowing for more
sophisticated purchasing strategies than IP or GP could also be investi-
gated. For example, OEMs could be given the option to make parallel
orders to GP, as a mean to avoid revealing their private information.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6
Using Equation (31), we characterize the FOCs of EθEMjEYj
[
piIi |Yi,Mi
]
and EθEMiEYi
[
piIj |Yj ,Mj
]
for each technology level as:
2qIi (Yi,Mi = 1) = P − cI + Eθ[θ|Yi]−
K
2
EYjEθ[q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = 1) + q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi] (43)
2
M
qIi (Yi,Mi = M) = P − cI + Eθ[θ|Yi]−
K
2M
EYjEθ[q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = 1) + q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi]
(44)
2qIj (Yj ,Mj = 1) = P − cI + Eθ[θ|Yj ]−
K
2
EYiEθ[q
I
i (Yi,Mi = 1) + q
I
i (Yi,Mi = M)|Yj ] (45)
2
M
qIj (Yj ,Mj = M) = P − cI + Eθ[θ|Yj ]−
K
2M
EYiEθ[q
I
i (Yi,Mi = 1) + q
I
i (Yi,Mi = M)|Yj ]
(46)
In order to solve the above system of equations we first assume a
specific form of equilibrium quantities (that are linear in market demand
signal); we then characterize these quantities. Finally we show that
these are indeed a unique solution to the above equations and hence we
formulate an equilibrium. We define the linear candidate strategies as
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qIi (Yi,Mi = M) = H
0
i +H
1
i Yi, q
I
i (Yi,Mi = 1) = L
0
i + L
1
iYi, q
I
j (Yj ,Mj =
M) = H0j + H
1
j Yj and q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = 1) = L
0
j + L
1
jYj . Inserting these
expressions into Equation (43) to (46) gives us 4 equations that are linear
in Yi (since qi and qj are linear in Yi and Yj respectively and moreover
EYj [Yj |Yi] too is linear in Yi). By separating out terms containing Yi
and those not containing Yi we obtain the following 8 equations :
2L0i = (P − cI)−
K
2
(L0j +H
0
j ) (47)
2L1i =
1
t+ 1
− K
2(t+ 1)
(L1j +H
1
j ) (48)
2
M
H0i = (P − cI)−
K
2M
(L0j +H
0
j )
2
M
H1i =
1
t+ 1
− K
2M(t+ 1)
(L1j +H
1
j )
2L0j = (P − cI)−
K
2
(L0i +H
0
i )
2L1j =
1
t+ 1
− K
2(t+ 1)
(L1i +H
1
i )
2
M
H0j = (P − cI)−
K
2M
(L0i +H
0
i )
2
M
H1j =
1
t+ 1
− K
2M(t+ 1)
(L1i +H
1
i )
Solving this system of equations gives
L0 = L0j = L
0
i =
(P − cI)(4−K(M − 1))
4(K + 2)
L1 = L1j = L
1
i =
4(t+ 1)−K(M − 1)
4(t+ 1)(K + 2(t+ 1))
H0 = H0j = H
0
i =
(P − cI)(4M +K(M − 1))
4(K + 2)
H1 = H1j = H
1
i =
4M(t+ 1) +K(M − 1)
4(t+ 1)(K + 2(t+ 1))
.
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Inserting these values into qi gives
qIi (Yi,Mi = 1) =
(P − cI)(4−K(M − 1))
4(K + 2)
+
4(t+ 1)−K(M − 1)
4(t+ 1)(K + 2(t+ 1))
Yi.
qIi (Yi,Mi = M) =
(P − cI)(4M +K(M − 1))
4(K + 2)
+
4M(t+ 1) +K(M − 1)
4(t+ 1)(K + 2(t+ 1))
Yi.
(49)
Similarly, expressions for qj are derived by substituting Yi with Yj in the
above equations.
Next, we show the uniqueness of above linear equilibrium quantities.
For this, we suppose qI
∗
i (Yi,Mi = M), q
I∗
i (Yi,Mi = 1), q
I∗
j (Yj ,Mj =
M), qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = 1) is another equilibrium, i.e., they solve Equation
(43). Reformulating Equation (43) with qI
∗
i , q
I∗
j and then subtracting
2qIi (Yi,Mi = 1) from both sides gives
2(qI
∗
i (Yi,Mi = 1)− qIi (Yi,Mi = 1))
= P − cI − 2L0i + Yi(
1
1 + t
− 2L1i )−
K
2
EYjEθ[q
I∗
j (Yj ,Mj = 1)
+qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi].
From Equation (47) we get (P − cI) − 2L0i = K2 (L0j + H0j ) and from
Equation (48) we get 1t+1 − 2L1i = K2(t+1)(L1j +H1j ). Therefore
2(qI
∗
i (Yi,Mi = 1)− qIi (Yi,Mi = 1))
= K2 (L
0
j +H
0
j ) +
K
2(1+t)(L
1
j +H
1
j )Yi − K2 EYjEθ[qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = 1)
+qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi].
We know that
K
2 (L
0
j +H
0
j ) +
K
2(1+t)(L
1
j +H
1
j )Yi =
K
2 (L
0
j + L
1
j
Yi
(1+t)) +
K
2 (H
0
j +H
1
j
Yi
(1+t))
= K2 (L
0
j + L
1
jEYj [Yj |Yi]) + K2 (H0j +H1j EYj [Yj |Yi])
= K2 EYjEθ[q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = 1) + q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi].
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Therefore,
2(qI
∗
i (Yi,Mi = 1)− qIi (Yi,Mi = 1))
= K2 EYjEθ[q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = 1) + q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi]
−K2 EYjEθ[qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = 1) + q
I∗
j (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi]
= −K2 (EYjEθ[qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = 1)− qIj (Yj ,Mj = 1)|Yi]
+EYjEθ[qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = M)− qIj (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi]).
(50)
Similarly, reformulating Equation (44) with qI
∗
i , q
I∗
j and then sub-
tracting 2M q
I
i (Yi,Mi = M) from both sides, and then following the same
steps as above gives
2
M
(qI
∗
i (Yi,Mi = M)− qIi (Yi,Mi = M))
= − K
2M
(EYjEθ[q
I∗
j (Yj ,Mj = 1)− qIj (Yj ,Mj = 1)|Yi]
+ EYjEθ[q
I∗
j (Yj ,Mj = M)− qIj (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi]).
(51)
From Equations (45), (46) we get:
qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = M) = q
I∗
j (Yj ,Mj = 1) +
M − 1
2
(P − cI + Eθ[θ|Yj ]) (52)
and
qIj (Yj ,Mj = M) = q
I
j (Yj ,Mj = 1) +
M − 1
2
(P − cI + Eθ[θ|Yj ]). (53)
Subtracting Equation (52) from Equation (53) gives
qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = M)− qIj (Yj ,Mj = M) = qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = 1)− qIj (Yj ,Mj = 1).
(54)
Taking the expectation on both sides of Equation (54) conditional on Yi,
we have EYjEθ[qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = M)−qIj (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi] = EYjEθ[qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj =
1)− qIj (Yj ,Mj = 1)|Yi]. Therefore Equation (50) and Equation (51) can
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be rewritten respectively as
− 2
K
(qI
∗
i (Yi,Mi = 1)− qIi (Yi,Mi = 1)) = EYjEθ[qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = 1)− qIj (Yj ,Mj = 1)|Yi] (55)
− 2
K
(qI
∗
i (Yi,Mi = M)− qIi (Yi,Mi = M)) = EYjEθ[qI
∗
j (Yj ,Mj = M)− qIj (Yj ,Mj = M)|Yi].
(56)
Let gi(Yi) = q
I∗
i (Yi,Mi = 1)−qIi (Yi,Mi = 1), and g′i(Yi) = qI
∗
i (Yi,Mi =
M)− qIi (Yi,Mi = M), then Equation (55) and (56) are equivalent to
− 2
K
gi(Yi) = EYj
[
gj(Yj)|Yi
]
− 2
K
g′i(Yi) = EYj
[
g′j(Yj)|Yi
]
.
Since | − 2K |> 1, according to Claim 1 in the Appendix of Ha et al.,
gi(Yi) = 0 and g
′
i(Yi) = 0 almost surely. Therefore q
I∗
i (Yi,Mi = 1) =
qIi (Yi,Mi = 1) and q
I∗
i (Yi,Mi = M) = q
I
i (Yi,Mi = M).
This finishes to prove that Equations (49) give the unique equilibrium
quantity decisions, which we present in Proposition 6.
We substitute Equations (43) to (46) into Equation (31) to further ob-
tain OEMs’ ex-post expected profit. For low and high technology levels
respectively, these are given by
EMjEYjEθ[pi
I
i |Yi,Mi = 1] =
(
qIi (Yi,Mi = 1)
)2
(57)
EMjEYjEθ[pi
I
i |Yi,Mi = M ] =
1
M
(
qIi (Yi,Mi = M)
)2
. (58)
The expected profit, as presented in Proposition 6, is then obtained by
weighting Equations (57) and (58) according to the likelihood that each
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technology level is reached (i.e. γ = 0.5):
EpiIi = EYi
[1
2
(
L0 + L1Yi
)2
+
1
2M
(
H0 +H1Yi
)2]
=
1
2
(L0)2 +
1
2M
(H0)2 + EYi [Yi](L
0L1 +
1
M
H0H1)
+ EYi [Y
2
i ]
(1
2
(L1)2 +
1
2M
(H1)2
)
.
(59)
Since EYi [Yi] = 0, then EYi [Y 2i ] = V ar[Yi] = EYi
[
V ar[Yi|θ]
]
+V ar
[
EYi [Yi|θ]
]
=
tσ2 + σ2 = (1 + t)σ2. Substituting EYi [Yi], EYi [Y 2i ], L0, L1, H0, H1 into
Equation (59), we obtain
EpiIi =
(M + 1)
32M
〈 (P − cI)2
(K + 2)2
(
K2(1−M)2 + 16M)+ σ2 (16M(t+ 1)2 +K2(1−M)2)
(t+ 1)
(
K + 2(t+ 1)
)2 〉.
Proof of Proposition 7
From Equation (33) and for a given (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj) we obtain the
FOCs for OEM i and OEM j respectively as
P + Eθ[θ|Yi, Yj ]−
KqGj (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj) + 2q
G
i (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj)
Mi
− cG = 0
P + Eθ[θ|Yi, Yj ]−
KqGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj) + 2q
G
j (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj)
Mi
− cG = 0.
Solving the above two equations and substituting Eθ
[
θ|Yi, Yj
]
=
Yi + Yj
2 + t
,
we obtain
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj) =
(2Mi −KMj)
4−K2
(
P +
Yi + Yj
2 + t
− cG
)
.
Inserting the FOCs back into Equation (33) we obtain OEM i’s equi-
librium conditional expected profit:
Eθ
[
piGi |Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj
]
=
1
Mi
(
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi,Mj)
)2
.
Then, we find the expected profit trough weighting the different combi-
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nations of technology levels by their respective probabilities (since γ = 12 ,
any pair of Mi and Mj together would occur with a likelihood of
1
4):
EpiiGP =
1
4
〈
EθEYiEYj
[(
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi = 1,Mj = 1)
)2]
+ EθEYiEYj
[(
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi = 1,Mj = M)
)2]
+ 1
M
EθEYiEYj
[(
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi = M,Mj = 1)
)2]
+ 1
M
EθEYiEYj
[(
qGi (Yi, Yj ,Mi = M,Mj = M)
)2]〉
=
(M+1)EθEYiEYj
[(
(P−cG)2+Yi+Yj
t+2
)2]
4
(
2+K
)2 (1 + 4(1−K)(2−K)2 + K2(M2−M+1)M(2−K)2 )
(60)
Since EYi = EYj = 0 and since Yi and Yj are conditionally independent,
we have
EYiYj [YiYj ] = Cov[Yi, Yj ] = E
[
Cov[Yi, Yj |θ]
]
+Cov
[
EYi [Yi|θ],EYj [Yj |θ]
]
=
0 + Cov(θ, θ) = σ2. Using these and EYi [Y 2i ] = EYj [Y 2j ] = (1 + t)σ2, we
can write
EYiEYj
[(
(P − cG) + Yi + Yj
t+ 2
)2]
= (P − cG)2 + EYi [Y
2
i ] + EYj [Y 2j ] + 2EYiYj [YiYj ]
(t+ 2)2
= (P − cG)2 + 2σ
2
t+ 2
.
Inserting the above expression back into Equation (60) gives Equation
(34).
Proof of Proposition 8.
From Equation (35), we define Ω(M) ≡ σ2f + h and ξ ≡ 32(K2 −
4)2(t + 1)(t + 2)(K + 2(t + 1))2. Note that ξ is independent of M and
strictly positive. Now ∆OEM =
(M + 1)Ω(M)
M · ξ would be convex in M
if M+1M Ω(M) = (1 +
1
M )Ω(M) is convex. We can characterize Ω as a
quadratic function of M :
Ω(M) = αM2 + βM + α, (61)
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with
α = K2σ2
〈
16
(
4t3 + 12t2 + 11t+ 2
)
+ 64K(t+ 1)2 + 7K2(3t+ 4) +K2(2t+ 2)
+(t+ 2)(K2 −K4)
〉
+K2(t+ 1)(t+ 2)(K + 2(t+ 1))2
(
(−K2 + 4K + 4)(P − cI)2 + 8φ
)
(62)
β = 2σ2
〈
128t(t+ 1)2(1− 2K) + 16K2(4t3 − 7t− 2)− 64K3(t+ 1)
−8K4(t3 + 4t2 + 6t+ 4) + (t+ 2)K6
〉
+2(t+ 1)(t+ 2)(K + 2(t+ 1))2
(
32φ(1−K)−K2(−K2 + 4K + 4)(P − cI)2
)
.
(63)
Given that K ≤ 1 implies α ≥ 0, Ω is convex in M . Also ΩM = β+(M +
1/M) · α is convex in M . Thus, ∆OEM is convex in M for M > 0.
Differentiating ∆OEM with respect to M gives
ξ · d∆OEM
dM
= −Ω(M)
M2
+
(
1 +
1
M
)
dΩ(M)
dM
= − α
M2
+ 2α ·M + β + α = Ω(M)
M
− α
M
− α
M2
+ α ·M + α
=
Ω(M)
M
+ (M + 1)α
(
1− 1
M2
)
,
which is non-negative for Ω ≥ 0 (which is true for ∆OEM ≥ 0) and
M ≥ 1 (assumed). Hence ∆OEM is increasing in M for ∆OEM ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 2.
In this proof, we first focus on giving the conditions for which GP
dominates IP for any value of M . In a second part, we show that
when this is not the case, there exists a threshold M∗ from which GP
dominates IP.
Starting with the first part of this proof, we know that, from the
proof of Proposition 8, once ∆OEM (M) > 0, it keeps increasing in M .
Thus, if ∆OEM (M = 1) > 0, ∆OEM > 0 for any M ≥ 1. Since from
Equation (35), the sign of ∆OEM is given by the sign of Ω, we first
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provide the conditions for Ω(M = 1) > 0. Using Equation (61), (62)
and (63) we find that,
Ω(M = 1) = 16(t+1)(2−K)2
〈
σ2t
(
4(t+1)(1−K)−K2(3+t)
)
+(t+2)
(
K+2(t+1)
)2
φ
〉
. (64)
Since 16(t + 1)(2 −K)2 > 0, Ω(M = 1) > 0 if the bracket of Equation
(64) is positive, namely if
l(K) ≡K2
(
−(3+t)tσ2+(t+2)φ
)
+4K(t+1)
(
−σ2t+(t+2)φ
)
+4(t+1)
(
σ2t+(t+1)(t+2)φ
)
> 0.
(65)
We know that l(K = 0) > 0 (φ > 0 since cI < P ). Moreover the two
roots of l(K) in K can be characterized as
K1,2 =
2(t+ 1)(σ2t− φ(t+ 2))± 2σt√(t+ 1)(t+ 2)(2σ2 + φ(t+ 2))
φ(t+ 2)− σ2t(3 + t) .
For φ ≥ σ2t(t+3)t+2 , l(K) is convex in K. Given that l(K = 0) > 0,
convexity of l(K) implies that both the roots are either negative or both
are positive. For φ ≥ σ2t(t+3)t+2 we know that
2(t+1)(σ2t−φ(t+2))−2σt
√
(t+1)(t+2)(2σ2+φ(t+2))
φ(t+2)−σ2t(3+t) < −1, which implies that the
other root is also negative. Which implies that l(K) > 0 for all K ≥ 0.
For φ < σ
2t(t+3)
t+2 , l(K) is concave inK. Given that l(K = 0) > 0, con-
cavity of l(K) implies that one root is negative and the other positive. In-
deed, for φ < σ
2t(t+3)
t+2 the only positive root can be
2(t+1)(σ2t−φ(t+2))−2σt
√
(t+1)(t+2)(2σ2+φ(t+2))
φ(t+2)−σ2t(3+t) > 0.
DefiningK∗ ≡
∣∣∣∣2(t+1)(σ2t−φ(t+2))−2σt√(t+1)(t+2)(2σ2+φ(t+2))φ(t+2)−σ2t(3+t) ∣∣∣∣, we can write
that l(K) ≤ 0 for K ≥ K∗ when φ < σ2t(t+3)t+2 . Since K ∈ [0, 1], irrespec-
tive of the value of φ one can write that l(K) ≥ 0 if K ≤ K∗.
We further show that for any K < 23 , Ω(M = 1) > 0 such that
K∗ ≥ 23 . For this, we rewrite Inequality (65) as
σ2t
(
t(−K2−4K+4)−3K2−4K+4
)
≥ −φ(t+2)
(
K+2(t+1)
)2
, (66)
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which is true if t(−K2 − 4K + 4) ≥ 3K2 + 4K − 4. Since on the
interval K ∈ [0, 23 ], −K2−4K+4 ≥ 0 and 3K2 +4K−4 ≤ 0, Inequality
(66) is true for any K < 23 . Therefore K
∗ ≥ 23 .
Concerning the second part of this proof, from Equation (61) we see
that ∆OEM > 0 beyond a threshold value of M (since α > 0). Thus
if Ω(M = 1) < 0 (and consequently ∆OEM < 0), for K > K
∗ and
knowing that ∆OEM is convex in M (from Proposition 8) implies that
∆OEM would be greater than 0 beyond a threshold M . This threshold
is the highest root in M of Equation (61), namely M∗ =
√
β2−4α2−β
2α .
Proof of Proposition 9
From Equation (35), the sign of ∆OEM is given by the sign of σ
2f+h.
Without market demand uncertainty, σ2 = 0 such that if h is positive,
GP dominates. This is actually always true, as can be seen in Equation
(36).
Proof of Proposition 10.
Equations (35) to (37) directly reveal that Ω = σ2f + h increases
in both r and P , and hence that ∆OEM increases in r and P , since
the other terms of ∆OEM are positive and independent of r and P .
Moreover, from the second part of Theorem 2, we know that, if IP
dominates GP at M = 1, there exists a threshold M∗ from which GP
dominates IP, which is given by the highest root of Ω(M). As Ω(M) is
convex with a minimum, an increase (decrease) in Ω(M), for all values
of M , would result in M∗ being lower (higher). From the first part of
this proof, we thus find that the threshold M∗ is decreasing in r and in
P (and is bounded at 1 since M ≥ 1).
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Proof of Proposition 11
Inserting the equilibrium quantities in Equations (39) and (40) en-
able us to find the equilibrium expected consumer surplus, and then the
difference in expected consumer surplus between GP and IP, i.e. ∆CS ,
as presented in Equation (41).
We define ΩCS = σ
2fCS + hCS such that, from Equation (41), the
sign of ∆CS is given by the sign of ΩCS . We thus focus on analyzing
ΩCS for the two first points of Proposition 11 and find that
ΩCS(M = 1) = 16(K−2)2(t+1)〈tσ2
(
4(t+2K+1)+tK(4−K)+K2−K3)+φ(K+1)(t+2)(K+2t+2)2〉,
ΩCS(σ
2 = 0, r = 0) = −(P − cI)2K2(M − 1)2(t2 + 3t+ 2)(−K2 + 4K + 4)(K + 2t+ 2)2,
with ΩCS(M = 1) being non-negative and ΩCS(σ
2 = 0, r = 0) non-
positive for K ∈ [0, 1].
Regarding the last point of Proposition 11, from Equation (40),
ECSG increases in equilibrium quantities qGi , qGj . Since from Propo-
sition 7 the equilibrium quantities are increasing in r (as cG decreases in
r), it follows that ECSG increases in r. Moreover, ECSI is independent
of r. Therefore, ∆CS = ECSG − ECSI increases in r.
Proof of Theorem 3
This proof is organized in 3 steps. First, we show that there exists
a threshold M∗CS(·) ≥ 1 such that consumers prefer GP to IP as long
as M < M∗CS(·) and prefer IP to GP when M > M∗CS(·). For this, we
write ΩCS (from Equations (41) to (42)) as a quadratic function in M ,
such that ΩCS = aM
2 + bM + a, where
a = −K2(t+ 1)(t+ 2)(K + 2t+ 2)2
(
(−K2 + 4K + 4)(P − cI)2 + 8φ
)
−K2σ2
(
− (t+ 2)K4 + 8(3t+ 4)K2 + 64(t+ 1)2K + 16t(4t2 + 12t+ 11) + 32
)
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b = (t+ 1)(t+ 2)(K + 2t+ 2)2
(
2(P − cI)2K2(−K2 + 4K + 4) + 16φ(K3 − 2K2 + 4)
)
+ 2σ2
(
− (t+ 2)K6 − 8t(t+ 1)K5 + 8(−t3 + 4t2 + 8t+ 4)K4 + 64(t3 + 2t(t+ 1) + 1)K3
− 16(4t3 + 8t2 + t− 2)K2 + 128t(t+ 1)(K + t+ 1)
)
Given that K ≤ 1 implies a ≥ 0, which implies that ΩCS is con-
cave in M . Moreover, ΩCS would be non-positive beyond a certain
threshold value of M since a < 0. From Proposition 11, we know
that ΩCS(M = 1) ≥ 0, and therefore there exists a unique square root
M∗CS =
−b+√b2−4a2
2a ≥ 1 above which ΩCS < 0.
The second part of this proof shows that there always exists an in-
terval on which both consumers and OEMs are better off with GP, rel-
atively to IP. Following Theorem 2, there can be two situations from
the perspective of the OEMs. First, GP can dominate IP from M = 1
(and hence for any value of M). In that case, OEMs and consumers
prefer GP if M ∈ [1,M∗CS ], which is non empty as we have shown in
the first part of this proof that M∗CS ≥ 1. Second, GP can be preferred
by the OEMs only from a certain threshold M∗. We show this part
of the proof by contradiction. Let us assume that M∗ > M∗CS . Then,
since consumers prefer GP (IP) up to (beyond) M∗CS and OEMs prefer
GP (IP) beyond (up to) M∗, therefore for M∗CS < M < M
∗ we have
∆CS < 0 and ∆OEM < 0 which implies that ∆OEM + ∆CS < 0. From
Equations (35) and (41) we characterize ∆OEM + ∆CS as
∆OEM + ∆CS =
(M + 1)
(
φ(t+ 2)
(
K + 2(t+ 1)
)
+ tσ2(2−K)
)
2(K + 2)(t+ 2)(K + 2(t+ 1))
≥ 0,
which contradicts our assertion that M∗ > M∗CS . As a consequence,
M∗CS ≥ M∗, and hence both OEMs and consumers are better off over
M ∈ [M∗,M∗CS ].
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In the third part of this proof, we demonstrate that the interval in
M over which OEMs and consumers simultaneously prefer GP becomes
larger as r increases. In the case where OEMs prefer GP for any M ,
since ∆CS is concave with a maximum and increases in r (see point 3
of Proposition 11), M∗CS increases in r, while OEMs would still prefer
GP for any M . Consequently, the interval [1,M∗CS ] becomes larger as r
increases. If OEMs prefer IP up to M∗, then we know from Proposition
10 that M∗ is decreasing in r. Moreover, from Proposition 11 we know
that ∆CS increase in r, which along with concavity of ∆CS in M and
the fact that ∆CS(M = 1) > 0 implies that M
∗
CS would increase in r.
Therefore, the interval [M∗,M∗CS ] also becomes larger as r increases.
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5. Conclusion of the dissertation
In this dissertation, we have described the critical role of procure-
ment, which aims at maintaining and developing comparative advan-
tages in product availability, product cost competitiveness, as well as
in product value development. To reach this objective, we have em-
phasized the necessity of managing procurement strategically, in order
to cope with the current challenging environment and complex supply
chain structures. Specifically, we have documented (some of) the avail-
able procurement levers that a firm can use when establishing its pro-
curement strategy, as well as their implications for the various functions
of the procurement in specific situations. Then, we have presented our
three research projects, while highlighting how they insert in the existing
literature and how their strategic dimension can support procurement
in fulfilling its functions in the present context.
Because the importance of procurement inside organizations grows
continuously, research on each of its three functions should remain abun-
dant in the near future. Specifically, academicians interested in pro-
curement are likely to concentrate some of their efforts on the major
challenges that procurement will face in the near future. We present
some of these in this paragraph. (1) First, while continuous cost re-
ductions will remain a primary task of procurement, the focus might
be directed towards the creation of value for the customers, notably
through innovating and improving quality. Aiming at this, a major
driver for end-product differentiation will be the ability of procurement
to integrate the capabilities of various suppliers and make these collab-
orate together. (2) Also, real-time accurate information will become
standard thanks to big data and real-time analytics. This will require
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more flexibility from procurement, to react to the information received,
and more efficient information sharing along the supply chain. Data can
be considered as a competitive weapon, but only if it is well exploited.
(3) Firms sourcing globally will also have to manage the rapid develop-
ment of China, as it produces a quarter of global manufacturing output
by value (The Economist, 2015). With the increasing Chinese labor
costs, some firms might be tempted to shift their production networks
to lower-cost countries, to re-shore or next-shore manufacturing jobs.
This phenomenon might be accentuated with robotics, as it would lead
production costs to be less dependent on human work and hence less
sensitive to labor costs. It is therefore not obvious whether the Chinese
impact on the global manufacturing output will keep increasing or, on
the contrary, whether it might start to get reduced.
The environment will further pose challenges along various direc-
tions. (4) The scarcity of some resources is likely to increase the com-
petition (and the price) for some items or raw materials. This threat is
actually an opportunity for firms leading the innovation, as these might
adapt faster their product for not being dependent on those scarce re-
sources. (5) If natural disasters keep occurring still more often and keep
being more and more violent, procurement managers could be obliged
to increasingly weight the product availability function of procurement
over the two others, in order to secure the supply chain and ensure conti-
nuity of operations. (6) Finally, environmental and social considerations
might transform the procurement role by requiring more circular sup-
ply chains. These likely evolutions in the environment will continuously
put pressure on procurement managers to adapt their strategy to re-
main competitive. Moreover, as the world will keep changing faster and
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faster, the procurement practices will evolve at the same pace, such that
the firms’ ability to attract talented people to govern the procurement
activity will reveal being a major challenge.
Leaning on these six potential changes, as well as on the literature
review from Subsection 1.2, we discuss in the last paragraphs three di-
rections that could be followed for our future research in procurement.
A first opportunity would be to study the trade-off for a buying firm be-
tween keeping suppliers under pressure to obtain cost competitive sup-
ply and securing long-term supply. Because of the outsourcing trend,
even critical functions like innovation are often outsourced to suppliers,
resulting in a loss of skills from the buyer, which thus relies increas-
ingly on its supply base. Therefore, such strategic suppliers would be
in a more comfortable position to negotiate prices with the buyer. It
would therefore be challenging to further investigate mechanisms allow-
ing the buyer to maintain pressure on its suppliers, without threatening
the long-term collaboration with these, except if the buyer has another
valuable option. Notably, it would be interesting to investigate whether
buyers would rather reverse the current outsourcing trend through ver-
tically integrating such strategic suppliers, or if they would rather prefer
to create barriers to keep some bargaining power with the supplier (i.e.
partial integration of the supplier). Buyers’ dependence on suppliers is
a source of risk that becomes increasingly crucial with outsourcing prac-
tices. This situation would thus deserve more attention in the future to
determine which mechanisms the buyer and/or the suppliers might want
to implement. Moreover, this phenomenon is exacerbated by factors like
resource scarcity or market concentration (i.e. mergers and acquisitions
among suppliers).
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A second direction that could be followed for future research is re-
lated to green supply chains. Although the green revolution has already
begun, it is highly likely to become increasingly prevalent in the fu-
ture, especially as it is driven simultaneously by both regulators and
customers. The question is therefore not whether higher standards will
be required from firms, but when those standards will become applica-
ble. And at that moment, the firms that would have better managed
the transition would have a comparative advantage over the competi-
tion. As we have seen that procurement plays an increasingly central
role in the supply chain, it therefore presents an important potential
for improvement towards greener supply chains, and hence for research,
especially as very few analytical models on green procurement exist so
far.
A central question on the environmental transition is how firms
should manage the innovation (both in terms of technologies and pro-
cesses). Two main issues that we have already considered in this dis-
sertation then appear. First, one can wonder whether competing firms
should cooperate through pooling their investments to reach faster and
better benefits. Cooperating with rivals becomes more and more fre-
quent, as a mean to reduce costs (i.e. innovation costs in this situation).
However, the impact on competition across the firms pooling their in-
vestments would not be obvious and might deter firms from jointly in-
vesting if they do not define the right incentives for the different par-
ticipants. Second, as firms tend to integrate as much as possible their
suppliers’ expertise in the innovation process, it might be unclear where
the investments would be the most efficient: at the suppliers’ side or at
the firm’s side? Notably both firms’ financial ability to invest, as well as
196
the risk of spillovers would be factors to be taken into account for such
analysis.
Another challenge dealing with the environment would be to cope
with resource scarcity, through securing enough supply on the long-term,
or better anticipating the transition. For example, circular supply chains
could sometimes become necessary to limit the utilization of some raw
materials. However, as recycling would be a process with more variabil-
ity (from the amount of utilized material that could be retrieved) than
simply buying from suppliers, it could be interesting to wonder how
circular supply chains could be coupled with traditional supply chains
to balance green, cost and availability efficiency. Once again, jointly
recycling with other firms might be an attractive option. Finally, we
could also study how to optimally integrate the environmental criteria
in procurement auctions. Namely, either a premium could be paid to the
best performers on this criterion, or bad performers might be withdrawn
from the auction. Designing auction mechanisms that motivate suppli-
ers’ investments to improve their environmental performance could also
be an option to investigate.
Finally, a third direction that we would be tempted to further inves-
tigate deals with the flows of capital along a supply chain, since there is
still a lack of understanding about the financing of operations when vari-
ous participants constitute the supply chain. Notably, multiple rationale
for the utilization of trade credit co-exist and sometimes conflict with
each other, making it unclear when it should be utilized. Then, it could
also be interesting to measure the financial risk along the whole supply
chain and to study the optimal financing of the operations based on this
level of risk. More generally, thinking the financing of the whole supply
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chain rather than linkage by linkage could be an important improvement.
This might have different effects, such as reducing production cost, in-
centivizing suppliers’ investments, creating stronger ties between supply
chain participants, etc... With the same logic, other questions could
also be investigated, such as the long-term impact of putting financial
pressure on both strategic and non-strategic suppliers, the benefits from
sharing the individual financial information along the supply chain, the
type of signal sent through extending trade credit or yet the interactions
between supply chain financing and competition.
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